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The Legislative Council, which is composed of five Senators,
six Representatives, and the presiding officers of the two houses,
serves as a continuing research agency for the legislature through
the maintenance of a trained staff. Between sessions, research
activities are concentrated on the study of relatively broad problems formally proposed by legislators, and the publication and
distribution of factual reports to aid in their solution.
Du~ing the sessions, the emphasis is on supplying legislators,
on i
idual request, with personal memoranda, providing them with
information needed to handle their own legislative problems. Reports
and memoranda both give pertinent data in the form of facts, figures,
arguments, and alternatives.

,,.

I-~

~

,.

.

'

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
REPORT TO THE
COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I

~

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN COLORADO

.
....

...

.

. r

"

~

..
Research Publication No. 49

COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Ol'l'ICl:fl ■

CHAflLII ■

MIEM ■ IEII ■

CONKLIN

LT. GOY, fl08CflT L.

CHAfflNAN

■ IIN. CHAflLI: ■

■ l:N,

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

■TAl'I'

LYLIE C. KYLi:
LAW ■ON

■ llNIOtll ANAl.'HT

l'HILLI" IE. JONIE ■
■ INID• ANAL.¥1T

KNOU ■

■ IINNCTT

811N, T. IIYIUIIITT COOK
■ l:N, CAflL W. l'ULGHUtit

VICI CHAIRMAN

HA .. JIY O.

I:.

81;N. DAVID J. CLAftKII

DAVID J. CLAIIKIE

ROOM 343, 8TATIE CAP'ITOL

DENVER 2. COLORADO
KEYaTONt: 4-1171 - EXTt:N810N 287

PAUL II. Wl:NKI:

■ Pl:AKl:fl CHAflLII ■

fll!P,
IIIE ...
fll:P,
IIIE ...
IIIE ...
IIIE ...

CONKLIN
01:WIIY CAflNAHAN
JOIE DOLAN
PIITllfl H, DOMINICK
OUY ..OIE
IIAYMOND H. ■ IM"90N
AL ■ IEIIT J. TOM ■ IC

December 9, 1960

To Members of the Forty-third Colorado General Assembly:

...
.

As directed by the terms of Senate Joint Resolution
No. 16 (1959) and Senate Joint Resolution No. 9 (1960), the
Legislative Council is submitting herewith its report and
recommendations on judicial organization and administration.
Also included is a report of the progress made in the examinations of the Colorado criminal code and related matters,
which were among the subjects enumerated for study in both
Senate Joint Resolutions. This portion of the study was
not completed because of the priority given judicial reorganization and the great amount of work related to that
subject.
The committee appointed by the Legislative Council
to complete this study submitted its report December 9,
1960, at which time the report was adopted by the Legislative Co~l for transmission to the General Assembly •

,.

.

Respectfully submitted,

....

.

Charles Conklin
Chairman

--

.·i

COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY

'.

Ol'l'ICIERe

MIEM ■ IERe

CHARLIEe CONKLIN

LT, GOV, RO ■ IEIIT L, KNOUe
e1EN. CHARLIEe IE, elENNIETI
elEN. DAVID J. CLARKIE
elEN, T, IEVIERIETI COOK
e1EN. CARL W. l'ULGHUl\ol
HN. f'AUL IE. WIENKIE

C1ouu,.-,,.N
DAVID J, CLARICIE

••

VtC ■ CNAIIINAN

eTAl'I'

•

LYLIE C, ICYLIE

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

Du1•cTOII
HARRY 0. LAW90N
■ •NIOfl ANAL,'Y ■T

..

NIILLlf' IE, JONH
aSNtOIIANAl,.'HT

ROOM 343, aTATE CAPITOL

DENYER 2. COLORADO
KEYaTONI: 4-1171 - EXTENalON 287

December 9, 1960

The Honorable Charles Conklin, Chairman
Colorado Legislative Council
State Cap:i:tol
Denver 2, Colorado
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Transmitted herewith is the report of the Legislative
Council Committee on Administration of Justice appointed pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution No. 16 (1959) and continued
by Senate Joint Resolution No. 9 (1960). This report covers
the committee's study of judicial organization and administration and its recommendations thereon, including a proposed
amendment of the judicial article of the Colorado Constitution.
Aslo contain~d herein is a report of the committee's progress
on the study of the criminal code.
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/
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Senator Carl Fulghum
Chairman
Committee on Administration
of Justice
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FOREWORD
This study was authorizeq by Senate Joint Resolution No. 16.
(1959) and continued by Senate Joint Resolution No. 9 (1960). These
resolutions directed the Legislative Council to appoint a subcommittee to make a study directed at improving the administration of
justice, including the organization and jurisdiction of all courts
and judicial services, the criminal code, and rules of criminal
p;-ocedure.
The Legislative Council committee appointed to make this
study included: Senator Carl w. Fulghum, Glenwood Springs, chairman; Representative Albert Tomsic, Walsenburg, vice chairman;
Senator Charles E. Bennett, Denver; Representative Edward J. Byrne,
Denver; Senator David J. Clarke, Denver; Senator T. Everett Cook,
Canon City; Representative Joe Dolan, Denver; Representative
Peter Dominick, Englewood; Representative M. R. Douglass, Grand
Junction; Representative Robert E. Holland, Denver; Representative
John Kane, Thornton; Representative Roy McVicker, Wheatridge;
Senator Ranger Rogers, Littleton; Representative Walter Stalker,
Joes; and. Senator Paul E. Wenke, Fort Collins.
Senate Joint Resolution No. 16 (1959) also directed the
chairman of the Legislative Council to appoint an advisory committee to represent a cross section of knowledge and interest in
the administration of justice, including the operation of all
courts, judicial services, and criminal law. A sixteen-member
advisory committee was appointed with the following members:
Douglas McHendrLe, Colorado Bar Association, chairman; Judge Jean
Jacobucci, Adams County Court, vice chairman; Justice O. Otto
Moore, Colorado Supreme Court; Justice Frank Hall, Colorado Supreme
Court; Judge James Noland, Sixth Judicial District; Judge Edward
Pringle, Second Judicial District; Judge Marshall Quiat, First
Judicial District; Judge David Brofman, Denver County Court; Judge
Hal Chapman, Otero County Court; Judge Gerald McAuliffe, Denver
Municipal Court; Judge Daniel Shannon, Jefferson County Justice
Court; Donald Stubbs, Colorado Bar Association;l Matt Kikel, Tenth
Judicial District Attorney; Max Melville, Assistant District Attorney, Second Judicial District;2 Professor Homer Clark, University
of Colorado Law School; an<l Professor Vance R. Dittman, University
of Denver Law School.

...

,.•

l.
2.

Replaced by Ben Stapleton, Jr. when Mr. Stapleton succeeded
Mr. Stubbs as chairman of the Colorado Bar Association
Judiciary Committee
Deceased, replaced by Gregory Mueller, Deputy District Attorney, Second Judicial District~
iii

The staff work on this study was the primary responsibility
of Harry O. Lawson, Legislative Council senior research analyst,
assisted by Myran Schlechte and Charles B. Howe, Legislative Council
research assistants. Professors Albert Menard and Austin W. Scott,
University of Colorado Law School, served as legal consultants to
the committee, Professor Menard with respect to judicial organization and administration, and Professor Scott with respect to criminal
law.
~ The Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of
Justice held 21 meetings between June 1959, and December 1960. Ten
of these meetings were regional public hearings, which were held in
Alamosa, Denver, Durango, Glenwood Springs, Grand Junction, Fort
Collins, Fort Morgan, Golden, La Junta, and Pueblo. At these hearings, judges and other court officials, legislators, other public
officials, attorneys, and interested citizens met with the committee
to discuss judicial problems and solutions.

To provide basic data on court operations, the committee
directed a docket analysis of cases filed in the supreme court and
in all of the district and county courts. More than six months were
needed by the Council staff to collect, compile, and evaluate the
extensive court data included in this analysis. In addition, the
committee studied court organization and related subjects in other
states, focusing special attention on judicial studies and the
resultant findings and recommendations. Considerable study was
made of the many recommendations made for change in Colorado. The
committee's final proposal for judicial reorganization was the
product of a ser~es of workshop meetings extending over several
months, at which the committee and the advisory committee pinpointed
the problems in the present judicial system, evaluated various proposals for change, and formulated a plan designed to improve judicial
administration on all court levels and in all areas of the state -urban, mountain, and rural.
Judicial reorganization was considered by the committee to
be its most important assignment. Because of the amount of work
required on this subject, the committee was unable to complete its
study of the criminal code. A good beginning was made on this
subject, however, and the committee's progress on the criminal code
is covered in the last chapter of this report.
The committee wishes to express its deep appreciation to the
members of the advisory committee, who spent many days at their own
expense attending the regionctl hearings and the workshop sessions.
The assistance ~ided by the advisory committee in exploring the
many judicial problems and possible solutions was invaluable. The
committee also wishes to thank all of the judges and attorneys for
their help, both individually and through the various judges'
associations and bar association committees. In particular the
committee would like to thank the judges and members of their staffs
for their cooperation and assistance in making the docket analysis,
and Clyde O. Martz and James Carrigan, the former and present
judicial administrators, for their help.
iv
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The committee's report is lengthy, because of the many
facets to the administration of justice. The report sets the committee's findings within a background covering: the state's
present judicial organization; "the history of Colorado's courts;
previous studies and recommendations; present judicial problems;
judicial organization, administration, and studies in other states;
a summary of the regional hearings; and the results and implications of the docket anaiysis.

Lyle C. Kyle
Director

December 10, 1960
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COLORADO'S JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION
Introduction

,..

.

Colorado's judicial structure today is very much the same
~sit was when Colorado became a state in 1876, despite a sizable
population increase, accompanied by an expanding and changing
economy, and vast technological improvements in transportation and
communications. With the exception of a few and, for the most
part, minor ymendments, the judicial article of the Colorado
Constitution has not been altered since its adoption.

',4/l

...

.
...

..,.,

•

In part, there has been little change because the judicial
article in the past has proven flexible enough to accommodate,
within limitations, the changes described above. For this reason,
legislation has been used as the primary method of solving particular judicial problems. As a result, much of the change in judicial
organization and administration has been expedient and piecemeal,
and little attention has been given to long-range planning to provide
a judicial structure to meet the needs of the state 50 or 75 years
in the future. In many instinces this legislation unintentionally
has hampered long-range solutions because basic court organizational
problems have been ignored, additional courts have been provided,
and changed and overlapping jurisdictions have resulted in new
obstacles to judicial reorganization.2
The difficulty in amending the state constitution has also
been a major factor in the increased reliance on legislation to
correct court organizational problems, not only in Colorado, but in
other states as well. The legislative approach to court problems
was followed throughout the ~ountry in the last two decades of the
19th century and the first 20 to 30 years of the present one. Often
problems were so immediate that a legislative solution, which could
be achieved in a short period of time, was preferable to the much
slower process of constitutional amendment. As long as legislation
could solve immediate court problems, there appeared to be l~ttle
need for basic reorganization through constitutional change.

"I .

Tradition also works against acceptance of change in
judicial organization and procedures, often even against recognition

..

1.
2.
I

"'-

r

t

3.

Article VI, Colorado Constitution.
Piecemeal, expedient approaches to judicial problems and their
effects are explored more thoroughly in the next chapter.
The judicial article of most state constitutions gives the
legislature rather broad powers in adding to existing trial
courts or in creating new ones.

,

that perhaps change is needed. The American legal system has its
roots in British common law and judicial organization. Through
the years evolution at times has been slow, especially in the older
states along the Atlantic seaboard. Members of bench and bar
trained and accustomed to working within a particular organizational
and procedural pattern often are slow to desire basic change until
inefficiency, case backlog, and related problems become so serious
that no less drastic remedy appears adequate.
Even when a proposal for the basic overhaul of judicial
administration has gained the acceptance of a majority of attorneys
and judges, it will not be successful unless citizens in general see
the need and feel the plan is sound. In every state where judicial
reorganization has been successful, it has resulted from the concerted activity of informed civic groups and organizations.
Unfortunately (from the standpoint of. judicial improvement), the
average citizen has little contact with the day-to-day operation of
the court system. Consequently, it is difficult for him to recognize
the need for change, except with respect to justice courts, where
over 90 per cent of the citizens who have any contact with the
courts have their only experiences.
A certain amount of flexibility in the judicial article, the
difficulty of effecting constitutional change, .short run and piecemeal improvements through le~islation, tradition, lack of public
understanding, resistance to change, and general apathy have all
helped to prevent any basic change in Colorado's court structure
since 1876. To this list should be added disagreement among proponents of different plans of judicial reorganization and the
difficulty in developing a plan of judicial reorganization which
would meet urban and rural needs in a state as widely diversified
as Colorado.

.

•

••

•

•
J

.•
•◄

The need for judicial reorganization should be determined
by an evaluation of the effectiveness of the present judicial
system and_its ability to meet the demands of population growth and
economic expansion in the future without constitutional change.
This analysis includes: an inventory of the present court system,
an evaluation of organizational, procedural, and personnel impediments
to the just and speedy disposition of cases, an examination of changes
made since 1876 and their effect, and a pinpointing of particular
problem areas.
The Present Colorado Court System
Colorado's court system consists of four levels of courts:
supreme court, district courts, county courts, and justice of the
peace and municipal courts. The first three are constitutional
courts and their jurisdiction is defined in the judicial article.
The justice of the peace courts are referred to in the judicial
article and the justice of the peace and constable are. constitutional

- 2 -
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The justice of the peace, therefore, has no constitutional
guarantee of jurisdiction and the General Assembly, if it wished,
could strip him of all judicial authority, although he would still
~emain a constitutional officer .

,,.

..

l

offices by virtue of another article of the Colorado Constitution; 4
but justice of the peace courts are not constitutional in the same
sense as the supreme, district, and county courts. Justice court
jurisdiction is not defined in ~he constitution; rather, certain
limit~tions are placed within which the General Assembly may
choose to confer jurisdiction.S

-.,

Municipal courts in home rule cities also derive their status
from the constitution,6 while municipal courts in general law cities
and towns are provided for by statute.

r

,, .,..

-

Colorado also has two other courts which are on the same
judicial level as county courts. The Denver Superior Court was
established by statute pursuant to the authority conferred upon the
General Assembly by the judicial article to create courts other than
those enumerated as constitutional courts. 1 The Denver Juvenile
Court was also established by statute pursuant to the constitutional
provision permitting the General Assembly to create a separate court
in counties and cities and counties over 100,000 population, with
exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving minors and persons
whose offenses concern minors.8 An outline of the state judicial
system is shown in Figure 1.
Supreme Court

...

.

The supreme court consists of seven justices elected at
large for ten-year staggered terms. It has original jurisdiction to
issue remedial writs and answer interrogatories from the governor
and either house of the General Assembly. It has appellate juris-

..
...
•

4•

s.

..
ti,

..,_

6.

t

.

7•

8.

Article XIV, Section 11, Colorado Constitution.
Article VI, Section 25, Colorado Constitution provides that
justices of the peace sh~ll have such jurisdiction as may be
conferred by law, but they shall not have jurisdiction of any
case wherein the value of property or the amount in controversy
exceeds $300, nor where the boundaries or title to real property
are in question •
Article XX, Section 6, Colorado Constitution. The municipal court
of the City and County of Denver also has justice of the peace
jurisdiction as provided in Article XX, Section 2.
Article VI, Section 1, Colorado Constitution.
Ibid.

~

.
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diction to review decisions of all inferior courts, and writs of
error lie from the supreme court to all county court final judgments.9
Review of other cases is limited by statute and court rule.IO

..•

A supreme court candidate must be learned in the law, a
citizen of the United Slates residing in Colorado, and must be at
least 30 years of age.l
Supreme Court justices receive an annual
salary or $15,000, and the chief justice receives an additional $500.
The justice not holding office py appointment or election to fill a
vacancy and who has the shortest period yet}~ serve on the court
is desJgnated as chief justice for one year.
The'chief justice
presides at all sessions of the court when it meets e n ~ and
directs the work of the court in general.
·
The supreme court is authorized to sit in two or more departments (or divisions) as the court may determine, except that cases
involving the construction of the United States or Colorado
Constitutions shall be decided by the court en bane. When the court
sits in departments, each department has thefull power and authority
of the court authorized in the judicial article subject to court
rules, except that no decision of any department shall become the
judgment of the court unless concurred in by at least three judges.13
The supreme court also has general superintending control
over all inferior courts, and for this purpose the state is divided
into six judicial departments, iach headed by one of the justices
appointed by the chief justice. 4 The Office of Judicial Administrator
is provided by statute and the administrator is appointed by the
supreme court and performs certain statutory functions and other
duties assigned him by the supreme court to assist it in its administration of the state judicial system.15

•
.•

District Courts
The_district court is Colorado's major trial court of general
jurisdiction. At present there are 18 judicial districts, of which
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Article VI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 23.
37-2-33, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953 limits review of other
cases to a writ of error procedure and such review is limited
by court rule to final judgments, certain conditional water
decrees, orders granting or denying temporary injunctions and
orders appointing or denying the appointment of receivers.
Article VI, Section 10, Colorado Constitution.
Article VI, Section 8, Col~rado Constitution.
Article VI, Section 5, Colorado Constitution.
Article VI, Section 2, Colorado Constitution and Chapter 37,
Article 10, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended by
Chapter 93 Session Laws of Colorado,1959.
32-10-1 (2~, Colorado Revised Statutes,1953, as amended by
Chapter 93, Session Laws of Colorado,1959.
- 4 -
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four are one-county districts. The boundaries of the 18 judicial
districts are shown in Figure 2. The district court has original
jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters with the exception
of probate matters and juvenile cases.16 Cases may be brought
from the county court on appeal or transferred from county and
justice of the peace courts for lack of jurisdiction in these
lower courts, but no appeals may be taken to the district court
from any judgment in a county court in cases previously appealed
from a justice or municipal court. Cases appealed from county court
are retried (trial de novo). The district court also has appellate
jurisdiction to revfew findings and conclusions of administrative
agencies and certiorari powers to review cases of any inferior
tribunal.
District judges are elected for six-year terms and are
required to be learned in the law, at least 30 years of age,
citizens of the United States, Colorado residents for at least two
years preceding election, and electors within their judicial
districts.17 All district judges are elected at the same time,
even in multi-judge districts. As of January 1961, there will be
41 district judges, with the 2nd Judicial District (Denver) having
the largest number: 10. In multi-county districts, the judges ride
circuit, holding court in the various counties at certain specified
times, as provided for by the judicial article and by statute and
determined by the extent and press of judicial business.1 8 District
judges receive an annual salary of $12,000 from the state. Salaries
of non-judicial personnel and other court expenses are borne by the
county or counties composing each judicial district. On invitation
or assignment district judges may sit for other district judges both
within and outside t~ ir districts or preside in county, superior,
and juvenile courts.
Upon request of the supreme court, district
judges may sit with that body and assist it in opinion writing.20
County, ~upe~ior! and juvenile court judge~ who ~ie lawyers may also
sit as district Judges as requested or assigned.

9

.f·

...

...

'
'

The General Assembly has the authority to change the
boundaries of judicial districts and to increase or decrease either
the number of judicial districts or the number of district judges,
except that no such change can result in the removal of any district
judge from office before the expiration of his term. 2 L
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

Article VI, Section 11, Colorado Constitution.
Article VI, Section 16, Colorado Constitution.
Article VI, Section 17, Colorado Constitution, and Chapter 37,
Article 3, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended.
37-4-11 through 15, 37-5-14 through 16, 37-9-20 through 22, and
37-11-11, Colorado Revised Statutes,1953, as amended by Chapter
40, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960.
.
Chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960.
Chapter 40, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960.
Article VI, Section 14, Colorado Constitution.
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County Court

~

The county court is a constitutional trial court of more
limited jurisdiction than the district court. With the exception of
probate, mental health, and juvenile cases and appeals from justice
of the peace and municipal courts, its jurisdiction is concurrent
with the -district court. This concurrent juri-sdiction is limited
to misdemeanors and to civil cases involving claims of less than
$2,000.L3 Cases appealed from justice of the peace and municipal
courts are retried (in county court). Appeals from the county court
lie to- the supreme court by writ of error or to the district court
with certain exceptions as already indicated.
Each county has a county court and is limited to one county
judge. County judges are elected every four years and their salaries
and other court expenses are borne by the counties. Salaries of
county judges are set by statute according to county classification
and currently ran~~ from $734 (Hinsdale and Mineral counties) to
$12,500 (Denver).
The judicial article does not require county
judges to be lawyers, but there is such a statu;gry requirement for
county judges in Class I and Class II counties.
Prior to the 1960
general election, only eight of the 51 county judges in Class III
through VI counties were attorneys. Many of the judges in the
smaller counties also serve as their own court clerks and a few
serve in a similar capacity f6r the district court. Except in Class
I and II counties, county judges who are attorneys are not restricted
from the practice of law.
Denver Juvenile ~ourt

.•
'

The Denver Juvenile Court has been in existence since 1903,
when it was created by statute, presumably under the authority
given the General Assembly by the judicial article to establish
other courts in addition to those specified. Through a 1907 amendment to the judicial article, the General Assembly was given the
authority to create separate courts with exclusive original jurisdiction2~n cases involving minors and persons whose offenses concern
minors.
Included within the juvenile court's jurisdiction are
such matters as juvenile delinquency, dependency and neglect,
relinquishment, adoption, guardianship, contributing to delinquency,
23.
24.

25.

26.

Article VI, Section 23, Colorado Constitution.
56-2-3,Colorado Revised Statute~ 1953, as amended by Chapter 44,
Section 4, Session Laws of Colorado, 1958, and ~6-2-18,Colorado
Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended by Chapter 40, Section 11,
Session Laws of Colorado, 1960.
37-5-22,Colorado Revised Statutes,1953, _as amended. Denver is
the only Class I county. The 11 Class II couhties include:
Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, El Paso, Jefferson, Latimer, Las
Animas, Mesa, Otero, Puebio, and Weld.
Article VI, Section 1, Colorado Constitution.

-a-
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.,._
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-

,

-·

and contributing to dependency. Not all of the juvenile court's
jurisdiction is exclusive, however. It has concurrent jurisdiction
with district and county courts in criminal cases involving or concerning persons under 21 a~d in annulment cases where one of the
parties is less than 21.27
·
The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction in delinquency
cases, but in such cases involving minors between 16 and 18, if the
alleged offense also constitutes a felony, an action may be brought
in district court rather than juvenile court. In these cases the
~district attorney determines whether to file a petition of delinquency
in juvenile court or an information on a felony charge in district
court.£8 The juvenile court is excluded from jurisdiction of
traffic offenses, and game and fish violations by minors. 2 9 There
have been several supreme court cases which have involved an
interpretation of the concurrent criminal jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, particularly with reference to adults involved in offenses
against minors. There have also been a number of supreme court
decisions concerned with the relationship between the custody jurisdiction of the district court and the dependency jurisdiction of the
county court. Appeals from juvenile court may be taken to the
district or supreme court in the same manner as from county court.
Prior to 1960, Denver was the only city and county or county
which met the population requirement of 100,000 for the creation
of a separate juvenile court as provided by statute pursuant to
the judicial article.30 Preliminary 1960 census figures indicate
that five counties, Adams, Arapahoe, El Paso, Jefferson, and Pueblo,
now exceed 100,000 population; however, during the 1960 legislative
session, the General Assembly raised the population limit from
100,000 to 250,000, for a number of reasons which will be discussed
later in this report.31 As a result of this legislation, Denver
remains the only city or county which can meet the population
requirement for a separate juvenile court. In the other 62 counties,
juvenile matters are heard in the county court.
The juvenile court in Denver is financed entirely by the
city and county. The court has only one judge, who must have the

•

27.
28.
29.

30.
31.

37-9-2 (!),Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953.
The same relationship exists in other counties between the
district court and the county courts, which also sit as
juvenile courts.
22-8-15,Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953 as amended by Chapter 74,
Session Law$ of Colorado, 1959, and 22-8-7,Colorado Revised
Statutes, 1953 as amended by Chapter 36, Section 2, Session Laws
of Colorado,1960.
37-9-1,Colorado Revised Statutes of 1953.
37-9-1,Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended by Chapter 41
Session Laws of Colorad~ 1960.
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same qualifications for office as a district judge and who.also
receives the same salary as a district judge. The juvenile judge
is elected for a four-year term, and his term of office expires
at the same time as do those of the county judges.

•

I I

Denver Superior Court
Superior courts were authorized by statute in 1954"in
counties or cities and counties of more than 300,000 population. 32
The Qxclusive jurisdiction of the superior court is limited to
trials de !lQ.Y.Q. in matters appealed from justices of the peace and
municipal courts. It has concurrent jurisdiction with the county
and district courts in divorce, separate maintenance, annulment,
and other civil actions where the amount involved does not exceed
$2,00o.33 Appeals may be taken to the district or supreme court
in the same manner as from county couits. The superior court was
established to relieve some of the burden of the Denver County
Court, which was finding it difficult to keep its docket current
on the large number of probate and mental health matters filed in
that court, because of the substantial increase in justice court
and municipal court appeals. At the time this legislation was
considered there was no great need expressed for a superior court
in the large counties other than Denver. For this reason the population limit was set at 300,000, which, even after the 1960 census,
still excludes all other counties. There is only one judge of the
superior court and his salary and all court expenses are financed
by the City and County of Denver. Qualifications for superior court
judge are similar to those of district judg~, and.he receives the
same salary as a district judge. He is elected for a four-year
term and stands for election at the same time as county judges and
the juvenile judge.

•

'

•
•

I

•

Justice of the Peace Courts
Justice of the peace courts are the state trial courts of
least jurisdiction. These courts are created by the constitution
as are the offices of justice of the peace and constable, but the
court's jurisdiction is limited by the constitution to misdemeanors
and civil actions under $300, not involving real property disputes.3 4
Justices of the peace have county-wide jurisdiction (as contrasted
with county judges, who are considered state officers with statewide jurisdiction, even though elected and paid by a particular
county) concurrent with the county and district courts within the
32.
33.
34.

Chapter 37, Article 11, Colorado Revised Statutes of 1953 as
amended.
·
32-11-2,Colorado Revised Statutes of 1953 as amended.
Article VI, Section 25, and Article XIV, Section 11, Colorado
Constitution.
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limits specified above. Justices of the peace may hold preliminary
hearings in felony cases, perform marriages, administer oaths, and
take acknowledgments.35

I ..

~:
,,.

.

In the City and County of Denver, justice court jurisdiction
is exercised by the Denver Municipal Court, which has separate
justice of the peace civil and criminal divisions, in addition to its
municipal c0urt divisions, for various categories of ordinance
violations.36 Appeals from the justice court in the City and County
of Denver lie to the superior court where they are tried de !:!QYQ.•
fn the other 62 counties appeals lie to the county court where they
are also heard de novo.

---

The qualifications which a justice of the peace must meet
are relatively few, none of which pertain to his aptitude or experi~
ence for judicial office. He must be a qualified elector and must
reside and have his office in the precinct for which he was elected.
Beyond these requirements, there are no standards which a justice
must meet to qualify for the office.37 Very few justices of the
peace are attorneys or have had any legal training.
Each county is entitled to two justices of the peace in each
precinct. The board of county commissioners has statutory authority
to create additional justice precincts or consolidate existing
precincts.38 There has been no need in recent years for creating
additional justice precincts, and, while consolidation would be
helpful in reducing the number of justices of the peace, it has been
accomplishe9 in very few counties -- notably Huerfano, Jefferson, and
Pueblo. In several other counties there are often no candidates from
some justice precincts and no one will accept appointment to these
positions, with the result that the county may have as few justices
as might be accomplished by precinct consolidation.

,.

Justices of the peace are compensated from the fees of their
office within certain statutory limitations. Justices in precincts
of more than 100,000 population may retain up to $7,500 in fees.
Those in precincts between 70,000 and 100,000 population may retain
up to $5,000 in fees, and all others have a maximum of $3,6Oo.J 9
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.

For a full discussion of justice of the peace jurisdiction and
duties see Justice Courts in Colorado, Colorado Legislative
Council, Research Publication No. 24, December 1958, pp. 5-25.
Denver's authority to combine justice of the peace and municipal
jurisdiction in the same court is derived from an amendment to
the Denver City Charter passed pursuant lo the provisions of
Article Xv, Section 2, Colorado Constitution •.
Justice Courts in Colorado, p. 13.
79-1-1,Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953.
56-2-13,Colorado Revised Statutes, as amended by Chapter 42,
Session Laws of Colorado,196O. For most civil cases, the J.P.
receives a docket fee of $4; certain civil actions require a
docket fee of $5 or $6. The docket fee is $4 for traffic cases
and $5 in all other criminal cases.
- 11 -

Except in large counties, the justices of the peace have insufficient
business to reach the statutory fee maximum. In 1958 there were
approximately 275 justices of the peace in the state and there may
be between 250 and 275 at the present.40

,f

Municipal Courts
Municipal courts are not state courts, as their jurisdiction
is limited to ordinance violations, which are of local concern.
Muni~ipal courts in home rule cities derive their authority from
the Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado Constitution.41 Municipal
courts in general law cities and towns are provided for by statute. 42
Appeals from municipal courts are taken to the county court and are
tried de nova, except in the City and County of Denver where these
appeals are tried de novo in superior court.
The office of municipal judge is a full-time position only
in Denver and perhaps a few other of the larger cities such as
Pueblo and Boulder. In most of the larger municipalities the
municipal judge is usually an attorney. The charters of several of
these cities require that the position be filled by a lawyer. Usually
municipal judges are appointed for a specified term by the city
council.
(In Denver these appointments are made by the mayor.) In
several smaller cities and tdwns, the local justice of the peace has
also been appointed police magistrate or municipal judge. With the
exception of Denver, which has 10 municipal judges (four of whom
preside over the justice court divisi0ns), no municipality has
more than one judge who serves on a full-time basis, although some
cities such as Boulder have a judge who serves on a standby basis
when the regular judge is not available; and others (e.g., Grand
Junction) may have more than one part-time judge.

•

••

The salaries of municipal judges are set by the city
council or town board of trustees and vary according to the size of
the municipality and whether the position is full or part time.
The practice in municipalities under 2,000 population is to compensate the police magistrate or municipal judge from the fees of
his office rather than by a fixed monthly or annual salary.
40.

41.
42.

It is very difficult even to estimate the number of justices
of the peace with any accuracy. · The only official published
list includes only those elected at the general election. A
number of these don't take office, and an additional number
resign. It is difficult to determine if any of these vacancies
are filled by the county commissioners or if appointments are
made to fill vacancies caused by the failure of candidates to
stand for election.
Article XX, Section 6P Colorado Constitution.
139-63,Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953.
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Municipal ordinance violations were considered to be civil
in nature prior to the supreme court decision in the Merris case
in 1958,43 even though rather severe penalties, including large
fines and jail sentences, are authorized in certain instances.
Consequently, alleged violators did not have the usual due process
protections expected in criminal proceedings, especially the right
of trial by jury. Since the Merris decision, these cases are
treated as criminal in nature, and defendants are given due process
including jury trials if they so desire. Home rule cities have
passed municipal jury ordinances under their constitutional and
charter powers, and legislation was adopted giving statutory cities
ana towns the authority to pass jury trial ordinances. 4 4 A further
consequence of the Merris decision was the limitation placed on
municipal court jurisdiction, through the court's ruling that the
power of home rule cities to legislate on matters of local concern
is limited to those areas in which the state has not enacted legislation.
A Brief History of Court Organization in Colorado

\

l•
J

At the time Colorado became a state, its population was only
194,100, more than 1.5 million less than the preliminary 1960 census
total of 1,742,029. There were only 26 counties, and the judicial
article originally provided for only four judicial districts, which
spanned the entire state. Adjudication of water rights and mining
claims were primary concerns,' since mining and cattle constituted
the main economic activity in the state. The telegraph was the only
means of rapid communication throughout the state and mountains were
a very formidable barrier between isolated, sparsely-populated areas.
Because of these conditions there was a real need for local courts
to administer justice and settle minor disputes quickly and cheaply,
and justice of the peace courts played a prominent judicial role;
indeed, the justice of the peace during this period was exactly what
his title implied. Besides settling minor civil matters, his major
function was maintaining the peace with criminal jurisdiction over
assaults, batteries, and affrays.
Both justices of the peace and circuit judges were officially
part of the judicial structure of Colorado prior to statehood. As
early as 1856, wh~n Colorado was part of the Kansas Territory, district judges rode circ~lt by authority of the territorial legislature. 45
The short-lived territory of Jefferson passed an act e~tablishing a
judicial system for the territory in 1859. fnis ~ct provided for
the following courts: supreme court, district courts, county courts
(which combined county commissioner~ functions with probate
jurisdiction), justice courts, and miners' courts. The latter was
a local court presided over by panels of miners, with jurisdiction
limited to disputes of water rights and mining.
43.
44.
45.

C

Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colorado 169, 323 P. 2d. 614.
Chapter 270, Session Laws of Colorado, 1959.
The Case for Courts, League of Women Voters of Co.lorado,
September, 1960~P• 15.

•
~
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The government of the Territory of Jefferson faded away on
the arrival of the first territorial governor of Colorado in June
of 1861. The Organic Act of the Territory of Colorado, signed into
law i~ February of 1861, provided that the judicial power of the
territory shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, probate courts, and justices of the peace. The Organic Act limited
the jurisdiction of the two inferior courts to debts or sums of
];.•ss than $100 and excluded these courts fr.om jurisdictign in any
controversy involving the title and boundaries of land. 4
The
court structure embodied in the Organic Act of 1861 was incorporated
with-minor changes in the judicial article of the state constitution. 47

1'

••

In establishing a four-level court system in its judicial
article, Colorado was following the pattern of many of the states
which were admitted to statehood between the termination of the civil
war and 189Q.48 The far western states, however, which achieved
statehood after California's constitutional revision of 1879, for the
most part followed California's lead in eliminating the county or
probate court level and placing probate jurisdiction in the trial
court of general j~Iisdiction, generally called either the district
or superior court. ~ In general, the states (including Colorado)
which adopted or modified judicial articles after the civil war
avoided many of the jurisdictional problems of the older eastern
states which had followed the English pattern of separate courts of
law and equity.SO

•

Colorado Supreme Court

.•

In 1876, when Colorado became a state, there were three
supreme court justices -- each elected for a nine-year term. The
business of the court increased so rapidly that in 1887, a supreme

46.
47.

48.

49.

~o.

'

•

Justice Courts in Colorado, p. 3.
For example, the probate court became the county court was given
civil jurisdiction up to $2,000, including property matters.
The property controversy restriction still applied to justice
courts but their civil jurisdiction was raised to $300 as provided by law.
Nebraska, Oregon, Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota are
cited as examples by Roscoe Pound, Organization of Courts,
Little, Brown and Company, 1940, in Chapter V, "Development of
Judicial Organization in the Newer States After the Civil War."
According to Professor Pound, op. cit., some states already
admitted also modified their judicial articles in accord with
the California revision. Western states which followed California
in this respect included Arizona, Montana, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming, and this step had already been taken by Nevada in
1864.
Pound, op. cit., Chapter V, pp. 161-193.
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court commission was created by legislative enactment. 51 The legislation which established the commission authorized the governor
to appoint three commissioners with senate approval. The commissioners were to serve a four-year term, unless their services were
no longer needed prior to the expiration of their terms. These
commissioner$ were t,o h~ve the .$~me qualif i(:a.tions as supreme court
justices, to take tht same oath of office, and:were subject to
supreme court rules. The commissioners were 'to review and render
written opini9ns in all cases referred to them by the supreme court.
The supreme court w~s required to review all opinions written by
the commission and could approve, modify, or reject such opinions .
.l

,

The use of commissions to expedite app~llate review was
tried by 19 states, includihg Colorado, duri~g the latter two
decades of the 19th century, as there was a general condition of
arrears in federal and state supreme courts, which became more and
more acute in the last quarter of the century.52 While a number
of states continued the use of commissions after Colorado had
abandoned this approach, the commission plan did not prove to be a
satisfactory permanent solution to increased appellate case loads.
In Colorado the creation of the supreme court commission
failed to bring about the expected reduction in the supreme court's
docket, because the commission had no power to render final judgment.
The supreme court had to review each case, arid then write another
opinion if it disagreed with the commission, so that the commission's
work amounted to no more than a finding of fact and law. 5 ~

•

.

.

I

Court of Appeals I. After terminating the supreme court
commission, Colorado turned to another method, also popular at the
time, of handling increased supreme court caseloads: the creation
of an intermediate court of appeals. Intermediate appellate courts
were established in a number of states -- some by statute and some
by constitutional amendment. Only 13 states, however, all more
populous than Colorado, presently have intermediate appellate
tribunals. None of these states has less than three milligg
residents and seven of the 13 have more than five million.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Rocky Mountain Law Review. "The Trend - Appellate Courts and
Procedure in Colorado," James Perchard, former Clerk, Colorado
Supreme Court, November 1929, p. 60.
Pound, oe~ cit ► ,P• 201.
Perchard,'lo~. riit.
.
,
State IntefmectTate Appellate Courts, Their Jurisdiction, Case
Load and Expenditµres, !nstltute of Judicial Administration,
New York, 1956 •
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The Colorado Court of Appeals was created by legislation
passed at the 1891 session.55 This legislation provided for three
judges with the same qualifications as supreme court justices to
be appointed by the governor, with senate approval. The first
appointments were to be made for staggered terms of two, four, and
six years. Subsequent appointments were to be made for six-year
terms •. The three former supreme court commissioners were appointed
as appellate judges.
The court of appeals was given final jurisdiction in all
case~ where the amount involved in the judgment or replevin was
$2,500 or less. The court also had jurisdiction which was not final
in criminal cases, in cases involving franchises or-freeholds, in
cases involving constitutional provisions, and in cases heard on
writ of error from the county court. Cases in these latter
categories could be taken on appeal on writ of error to the supreme
court. The court of appeals was given authority similar to that
of the supreme court to issue all necessary and proper writs and
other processes on causes within its jurisdiction. Court of appeals'
opinions were to be delivered as required by the supreme court and
published in a like manner.
That the court of appeals did a vast amount of work was
shown in the 20 volumes of its reports, and on the whole it proved
quite satisfactory.56 Howev~r, the existence of two appellate
courts created a certain degree of friction, so that in 1904, the
court of appeals was abolished and a constitutional amendment was
adopted increasing the number of supreme court justices from three
to seven and terms from nine to ten years.57
Court of Appeals II. From 1904 through 1910, the enlarged
supreme court handled the entire appellate work load. Judging by
Governor Shafroth's message to the 18th General Assembly in 1911,
the supreme court's dockets again became overcrowded during this
period. In his message, Governor Shafroth offered several recommendations to limit "the ever increasing number of cases before
the supreme court." First, he asked that an act be passed limiting
the right of appeal from district court to the supreme court to
only those cases where the amount in question was in excess of $1,000,
except for cases concerning freeholds or franchises. Second, he
recommended that an act be passed to give supreme court judges the
right to affirm district court judgments without written opinion.
Third, he called for a constitutional amendment to be presented to
55.

56.
57.

Prior to passage of the legislation creating the intermediate
appeals court the senate submitted an interrogatory to the
supreme court to find out: 1) if such a court could be created
legally; 2) the jurisdiction both final and coordinate which
could be conferred upon such court; and 3) further questions
of constitutionality.
Perchard, op. cit., p. 61.
Ibid.
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the people by the General Assembly. This amendment would strike the
clause "writ of error shall lie from the supreme court to every final
judgment of the county court." In lieu thereof the following would
be inserted ''that writ of error may lie from the supreme court to
such final judgments of the county court and in such manner as may
be prescribed by law." After passage of such amendment, he requested
that the General Assembly pass an act limiting cougty court appeals
in the same manner recommended for district court. 8
Instead of acting in accord with Governor Shafroth's recomm~ndations, the General Assembly again created an intermediate court
of appeals. This tribunal, also known as the court of appeals,was
established for a four-year period. The number of judges was
increased from three to five, not more than three of whom could
belong to the same political party. These judges were to have the
same qualifications as supreme court justices. In addition to
appointing the judges (with senate approval), the act provided that
the governor designate the presiding judge.
The court of appeals was given the authority to review and
determine all judgments in civil cases pending before the supreme
court, except in those cases from county court on writs of error.
The legislation provided that the supreme court should transfer as
many cases to the court of appeals as it deemed advisable. The
General Assembly did not re-enact the statute in 1915 at the
expiration of the four-year period specified in the original act,
nor was there any discussion of appellate problems in Governor
Orman's message to the 20th General Assembly in 1915. Colorado has
not had an intermediate court of appeals since that time, nor has
the supreme court commission plan been re-adopted. Recent efforts
to reduce the backlog of appellate cases have been concentrated on
expediting the disposition of cases by the supreme court itself
without resorting to additional appellate tribunals. The court
itself has taken the lead in this respect and has had the assistance
of the General Assembly, which provided funds for supplying each
justice with a law clerk and also made an appropriation to the court
so that retired supreme court justices, district judges, and
qualified county judges called in to assist the court in opinion
writing could be paid a small honorarium.
There has been only one constitutional change affecting the
jurisdiction of the supreme court. In 1912 an amendment to section
3 of the judicial article was adopted, which enlarged the court's
jurisdiction by the addition of the following:59
and each judge of the supreme court shall
have like power and authority as to writs
of habeas corpus. The supreme court shall
58.
59.

Senate Journal, 18th Legislative Session, 1911, p. 42.
Article VI, Section 3, Colorado Constitution, as amended,1912.
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give its opinion upon important questions
upon solemn occasions when required by the
governor, the senate or the house of representatives; and all such opinions shall be
published in connection with the reported
decisions of said court.

..

Al

District Courts
J

,
The Organic Act of the Colorado Territory (1861) provided
for three judicial districts, with one judge each. This number was
increased to four when the judicial article was adopted. These
four districts, with one judge each, covered the entire state and
its 26 counties then in existence. As the population and economic
activity of the state increased, additional judicial districts were
created.
·
In 1886 an amendment to section 12 of the judicial article
was adopted to provide for one or more judges in each district, and
section 14 of the judicial article was also amended to allow the
General Assembly to increase or diminish the number of judges or
judicial districts at any time, provided that no judge could .be
deprived of his office by such action until completion of the term
for which he was elected.
·
The addition of judges to existing judicial districts, the
creation of new judicial districts, and the alteration of judicial
district boundaries have made it possible for the district courts
to keep pace generally with increased case loads, although in recent
years the accelerated growth of metropolitan areas has resulted in
a larger increase in judicial business than has been accommodated,
as yet, through legislation. The last alteration in judicial district
boundaries took place in 1958 when the 17th judicial district
{Adams County) and the 18th judicial district {Arapahoe County) were
created. These counties were formerly part of the 1st judicial
district, which now consists of Clear Creek, Gilpin, and Jefferson
counties. Additional judges also have been authorized recently
in some of the metropolitan judicial districts; the 17th and 18th
districts each elected a second judge at the 1960 general election;
the number of judges in the 2nd district (Denver) was increased
from nine to 10 by the General Assembly in 1959; and a fourth
judge was provided in the 4th district {El Paso, Douglas, Elbert,
Kit Carson, Lincoln, and Teller) by the General Assembly in 1960.

.•

,

County Courts
;t

The major function of the county court at the time the
judicial article was adopted was probate jurisdiction. Following
the trend in many midwestern states, this jurisdiction was vested
in a separate court rather than in the district court.
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The expanding agricultural ~conomy of eastern Colorado,
accompanied by railroad development and water diversion problems, gave
impetus to the creation of new counties in that part of the state •
In the mountain and west slope areas, population booms, usually
related to mining development (Teller County is a good example), led.
to the demand for a county government to serve these areas. Efforts
were also made to straighten out some of the geographical inconsistencies
resulting from the boundaries of the original 26 counties; for
example, Archuleta County was carved out of Conejos County so that
Conejos would be wholly east of the continental divide. La Plata
County was also divided by the mountains of the same name, and
Montezuma County established.

...
....

...

..
.

Colorado had 26 counties in 1876, and four more were created
during the following four years. During the 1880's, 25 new counties
were established by the General Assembly. Only two counties were
added during the i890's (Mineral 1893 and Teller 1899). Six counties,
including Adams and the City and County of Denver, were established
during the early years of the 20th century; the last county to be
created was Alamosa in 1913. ·

,

,

...

...
...

_,
•

The increase in the number of counties has greatly reduced
the area served by each county court; improvements in transportation
have made the county seat more accessible. The shift in population
away from eastern rural and mountain mining areas has also left a
number of county courts with very little judicial business. In
addition, there has been a considerable change in the kind of case
brought before the county court. Through the years since statehood,
probate jurisdiction has continued to constitute the major portion
of the court's case load, especially in the smaller counties. However,
mental health cases and juvenile matters now constitute a very
significant portion of the total case load. The civil jurisdiction
of the county court is no longer as important as it once was. The
$2,000 civil case limit was high enough in the latter quarter of
the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th to encompass
a large proportion of civil actions. There was also greater
inclination to file _these cases in county court when there were
considerably fewer district judges, who covered a multi-county area,
and might hold court in a particular county only for a few days in
each six-month period.
Present day price levels have greatly reduced the proportion
of civil actions within the $2,000 limit, and a number of these
cases are filed in district court rather than county court for two
reasons: 1) to avoid the possibility of trial de novo upon appeal
to the district court from county court; and 2) to assure that the
action will be heard by a judge who is an attorney. District jµdges,
even in sparsely-populated multi-county judicial districts, no
longer hold court in a county only two or th~ee times a year.
Consequently, even in these areas the district court may be almost
as accessible as the county court for the speedy disposition of
causes .

.
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Very few original criminal actions are filed in county court;
these are usually limited to the most serious misdemeanors, with the
others tried in justice courts. As a result the county court exercises
its criminal jurisdiction primarily as an appellate tribunal, retrying
cases on appeal from justice and muni~ipal courts.
There have been very few statutory changes and only one
constitutional change affecting the judicial functions of county
courts. In 1902 a constitutional amendment was approved which
increased the county judge's term of office from three to four years.
Legislation was also adopted at the same time which permitted both
an assisting county judge and the resident county judge to sit concurrently in Class I and II counties if the press of judicial business
so warranted.60 In 1957, the General Assembly provided that county
judges in Class I and II counties must be attorneys.61
Superior and Juvenile Courts. The creation of the Denver
Superior Court by legislation in 1954 to relieve some of the burden
on the Denver County Court already has been discussed. The Denver
Juvenile Court was one of the first in the country and was established
during the period (first two decades of the 20th century) when
nation-wide attention was focused on the judicial handling of juvenile
offenders, and court organization and procedures were recommended
incorporating social work concepts. While no other special juvenile
courts were established, legislation was adopted providing for the
special handling of delinquent and dependent juveniles, and county
judges, except in Denver, were authorized to sit as juvenile courts. 62

•

.•

...

II

.,
...

.•

Justice of the Peace Courts
Colorado's First Territorial Assembly provided for the
election of two justices of the peace in every justice precinct and
established procedures, fees, and specific criminal and civil
jurisdiction for the justice courts. Little change in the statutory
outline of justice court functions, asi?e from provisions increasing
jurisdiction and compensation, have occurred since that date. The
judicial article provided that justice court civil jurisdiction
should not exceed $300, that provision being the major change from
the provisions of the Organic Act of 1861 establishing justice
courts.
The criminal jurisdiction of Colorado's justice courts was
increased gradually by the legislature in the years following the
adoption of the state constitution. In 1923, the legislature gave
the justice of the peace general jurisdiction over all misdemeanors
committed in his county. Both the criminal and civil jurisdiction
60.
61.
62.

37-5-15, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953.
37-5-22, Colorado Revised Statutes, as amended.
Chapter 22, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953.
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of the justice courts have changed little in the past 35 years. The
composition of justice court case loads has changed considerably,
however. The justice of the peace court has become largely a tra!~ic
cour\, 70 per cent of the cases tried involve traffic violations.
The organizational structure of the justice courts remains
much the same as it was when Colorado became a state. Justices are
county officers. The county commissioners may consolidate or add
justice precincts and to a limited extent they have done so.

...

...

In many counties the small number of justices indicates both
a lack of interest in the office and the small case loads which are
the lot of justices in remote and rural areas. Many justices continue
to hold court in their homes or places of business and have very
little. if any, training in the law, rules of evidence, and court
procedure. Indeed, many do not even have copies of the Colorado
statutes.
Over the years the justice court has fallen from a respected
position in the state judicial system. It played an important
judicial role when the state was predominantly rural and sparsely
populated, and t~avel difficult and time-consuming. Today the
justice court is more or less ignored except for the constant complaint of people who have be~n party to actions before justices of
the peace. There is little ~espect for the justice court as a
judicial institution as well as for the office of justice of the
peace. The justice of the peace takes the blame for the failure of
the public to be concerned over the years with the development of
a modern, adequate lower court system . . The perpetuation of the
justice court system in much the same way as it operated when
Colorado became a state attests to that fact.
Recent Colorado Studies Concerned with
the Administration of Justice

...

Since World War II considerable attention has been focused
on the administration of justice in Colorado. Studies on various
phases of court organization and procedure have been made by bar
association committees, the various judges' associations, individual
members of bench and bar, legislative committees, and lay organizations such as the League of Women Voters. The prime areas of concern
have been the supreme court case backlog, selection of judges, nonlawyer judges, justice courts and other minor courts with emphasis
on traffic case jurisdiction, and juvenile and domestic relations
jurisdiction, including auxiliary court services such as marriage
counseling and probation.
!O·

63.

Justice Courts in Colorado, p. 37.
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Colorado Sar Association
In 1946 the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association formed a judiciary committee to study the Colorado and
American court systems and to make'recommendations as to where and
how the Colorado system could be improved.64 A chairman was
selected for each judicial district, and they selected chairmen
for each county. The committee had a total membership of 157 and
was financed by $14,000 raised from the state bar association membership and $1,000 from the Penrose Foundation. 05 Extensive studies
were made by the committee and its recommendations were approved by
more than a three to one vote at the Colorado Bar Association Convention in 1947. 0 6 After discussing these recommendations throughout
the state, they were submitted to the General Assembly in the form
of five bills and one constitutional amendment.
Legislation was proposed whicn: 1) provided for an
integrated court system with the chief justice as the head; 2)
created a judicial council; 3) provided for retirement benefits
for judges after 10 or more years of service; 4) increased judicial
salaries; and 5) increased the salaries of other court employees.
The proposed amendment to the judicial article included the
following changes:
1) clarified the provision giving the supreme court general
superintending control over all inferior courts by specifying that
the court shall exercise this control through the chief justice;
2) provided that the supreme court shall elect the chief
justice instead of being bound by seniority;
3) clarified the qualifications for supreme court justices
and district court judges by replacing the phrase "be learned in
the law" with "shall have been admitted to practice law in Colorado";

.

4) provided that the salary of judges may be increased
during their terms of office and that no judges, except county
. judges in counties with less than 10,000 population~ shall practice
law;
5) provided that district judges could sit in county courts;
6) required that county judges in counties with more than
10,000 population be attorneys, and permitted additional county
judges in counties with more than 100,000 pop~lation;
64.

1

6.5.

66.

Rocky Mountain Law Review, "The Colorado Judicial System - Can
It and Should It Be Improved", Philip S. Van Cise, Volume 22,
No. 2, p. 14 2.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 143.
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7) transferred justice court jurisdiction to the county
court and provided for the appointment of magistrates and referees
by county judges to assist in administering justice court
juri~diction; and
8)

1-

replaced the election of judges with a selection plan.

In supporting these recommendations the Bar Association
Judiciary Committee emphasized the need for an integrated court
system administered by the supreme court through the chief justice.
ThQ chief justice should be selected on the basis of administrative
ability and not seniority. The bar committee also commented on the
success of judicial councils in other states. These councils, composed of judges, lawyers, and laymen, conduct a constant study of
the judicial systems and make recommendations for improvement. The
bar committee focus~d considerable attention on the county and
justice of the peace courts and chara~terized justice courts as a
sarvival of medieval days, inefficient, and unnecessary. While the
lack of lawyer judges on the county bench was deplored, it was
recognized that it would be extremely difficult and in some counties
impossible to get lawyer judges. The consolidating of county courts
and justice of the peace courts, providing adequate salaries for
county judges, and requiring county judges to be attorneys in counties
of more than 10,000 population was expected to improve greatly the
administration of justice on:the lower court levels.
Judicial Selection. The greatest emphasis was placed by
the committee on changing the method of judicial selection. It
contended that judges should be removed from the political arena
and selected on the basis of qualification and experience. The method
of judicial selection advocated by the committee followed the socalled Missouri Plan. Judges on various levels would be selected
from panels of three nominees made by commissions composed equally
of lawyers and laymen.
At the first general election after completion of one year in office, the nominee would run on his record.
If returned to office, the judge would serve a complete term before
again running on his record at a general election. Should a judge
be defeated at a general election (a majority of negative votes on
the question of retaining him in office), a new judge would be
appointed and the process started again. It was recommended that
this method of judicial selection apply to supreme court justices,
district court judges, and county judges in counties with more than
10,000 population.67

I

The amendment to the judicial article was defeated in the
General Assembly as were the bills providing for an integrated
court system and a judicial council. The retirement bill and the
~

67.

The forgoing synopsis of the bar association's recommendations
is based on the Philip S. Van Cise article previously cited.
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measures providing increased salaries for judges and court employees
were passed, although the increases were less than had been recommended.
Further Study and Recommendations. Following its limited
success in the 1949 session of the General Assembly, the Colorado
Bar Association Judiciary Committee continued its efforts and brought
several proposals before the 1951 session of the General Assembly.
An amendment of the judicial article was again proposed, considerably
more limited in scope than the 1949 proposal. The amendment containep three provisions: 1) The pay of judges may be increased or
decreased during their terms of office. 2) Judges may be retired
if age or mental or physical impairment prevents the performance of
judicial duties, but only after investigation and determination by
the supreme court. 3) Judges are to be restricted from running for
office other than judicial unless they resign from their present
judicial positions.
This amendment was approved by the General Assembly for submission at the 1952 general election, when it was adopted by a
majority vote of the electorate.68 Legislation to improve court
administration, create a judicial councilA and consolidate county
and justice courts was also recommended.6~ The proposal to improve
court administration divided the inferior courts into departments,
each to be presided over by a supreme court justice. Each departmental justice would administer the courts in his department, assign
judges on a temporary basis as necessary, and gather judicial
statistics. While this measure did not pass, the General Assembly
approved a bill in 1953 which had somewhat similar provisions.70
The bill creating a judicial council was similar to the bar proposal
in 1949 and was again defeated. Legislation to consolidate county
and justice courts was offered as a substitute for the constitutional
amendment provision which was defeated in 1949. Again this approach
to county court and justice of the peace court problems was rejected
by the General Assembly.
During the past 10 years, the Colorado Bar Association
Judiciary Committee has continued its efforts to improve the administration of justice and the bar has also appointed committees to
study separate problems such as justice and traffic courts.71
68.
69.
70.

71.

Article VI, Sections 18, 21, and 31,as amended,1952.
Dicta, "Colorado and Minimum Judicial Standards", Peter H.
Holmes, Jr., Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, January, 1951, p. 1.
Chapter 37, Article 10, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953. This
legislation was revised in 1959 to implement the intent of the
1953 measure and to provide for the office of judicial administrator.
For a discussion of the recommendations of the Colorado Bar
Association Committee on Justice and Traffic Courts see Justice
Courts in America, pp. 73-77.
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In 1957, a constitutional amendment pertaining to judicial
selection was drafted by the judiciary committee and introduced at
the 1957 session of the General Assembly. This proposal was very
similar to the one which was rejected by the General Assembly in
1949. Aside from printing, no a~tion was ta~en .. Instead of having
this proposal introduced again .in 1958, the judiciary committee
referred it to the Judicial Council. for con$1dijration.

\.,

'\..
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The bar association also participated· in the studies made
by the Judicial Council 1957-1959 and has actively supported and
p.articipated in the efforts of the Legislative Council Committee on
the Administration of Justice.
Colorado Judicial Council

...
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In September 1957, a request was made to the governor by
Chief Justice O. Otto Moore of the Colorado Supreme Court that a
Judicial Council be created to conduct a study concerning problems
of the first magnitude in the administration of justice. 72 The
governor responded by issuing an executive ordei creating the
Colorado Judicial Council and appointing 29 ~embers including
judges, legislators, attorneys, and lay citi~ens.
·
The 41st General Assembly, second regular session (1958),
adopted legislation creating the Judicial Council and authorizing
the governor to appoint the members thereof, and making an
appropriation of $2,500.73 The governor appointed Chief Justice
Moore as chairman and reappointed those named previously in his
executive order.; Two appointments of county judges were made, to
give the county court$ representation on the Council.
In April 1958, the membership of the Judicial Council was
divided into five sub-committees for consideration of the following
topics:
1) preparation of legislation to eliminate district court
appellate review of actions taken by the Industrial Commission and
other public agencies and for judicial review only by the supreme
c.ourt and then only if the court feels there ii sufficient reason
for review;
2) preparation of legislation aboll:t.hi.ng trials ~ ~ in
the district court from county court~ in tho•e tounties where a full
trial is heard before a lawyer judge, and general consideration of
county and justice of the peace court operation and jurisdiction and
the problems related thereto;
72.
73.

First Report on Proceedings of the J~dicial Council, State of
Colorado, Denver, December 1958, p . .
Chapter 33, Session Laws of Colorad~ 1958.
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3) preparation of legislation abolishing writs of error
based on the complete record as a matter of right in every case to
the supreme court and requiring that in certain types of cases a
petition of certiorari be filed upon which the supreme court would
deter'mine whether to order a full rev,iew on the record;

~

-·

-.J

4) preparation of legislation patterned after the Pennsylvania Arbitration Law under which all damage cases and money demands
involving less than $3,000 must be submitted to arbitrators upon
request of either party with provision for further legal action upon
rejec~ion of the arbitration award by either party; and

5) preparation of legislation or court rule making an
adequate pretrial conference report a prerequisite to the right of
review by the supreme court either by petition for certiorari or on
writ of error, and preparation of a court rule making it necessary
that in all trials (whether to the court or to a jury) a motion for
a new trial be filed and determined by the trial court before a review of the judgment will be entertained by the supreme court. 74

_.1

The reports of the five sub-committees were reviewed by the
Judicial Council en bane and then referred to the Colorado Bar
Association for study and comment.
Review of Administrative Agency Action. The sub-committee
studying the elimination of district court review of state administrative agency actions reported that in its opinion " ..• before
a procedure can be adopted eliminating review of board orders and
decisions by the District Court and permitting original review by
the Supreme Court, it will first be necessary to amend our Constitution and grant to the Supreme Court such powers. 11 75 Some members
of the sub-committee questioned the elimination of district court
appeals because of the increased burden which would be placed on
the supreme court, and the increased cost resulting from appeals
directly to the supreme court. The sub-committee, however, proposed a constitutional amendment which provided for direct appeals
to the supreme court from the Public Utilities Commission and the
Industrial Commission but not from other agencies. Further, the
sub-committee recommended the employment of law clerks to assist
supreme court justices, and proposed legislation on this subject.

,,.

I

~

County and Justice Court Operation. The sub-committee on
county and justice court organization and operation, which also
had the specific assignment of preparing legislation to eliminate
trials de !J.Q.Y.Q. from county to district court in certain instances,
made the following recommendations:
74.
75.

-

Ibid., pp. 2 and 3.
Ibid, p. 8.

~/
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1) Trials de novo on appeal from county court to district
court should be aboITsfied":"'
2) The office of district court family judge should be
created in each judicial district except Denver. Such judges would
have the same qualifications as other district judges and would
have jurisdiction in all domestic relations and juvenile cases.
This recommendation would deprive the county court of jurisdiction
in these matters.
3) County court jurisdiction in counties of less than
5,000 population should be transferred to the district court.
4) The present justice of the peace system should be
abolished and replaced with the best minor court system which can
be developed from the various proposals which have already been
made. Whatever plan is developed, magistrates should be under the
supervision of the county courts, should be salaried, and should
possess necessary educational qualifications.76

._

The sub-committee was of the opinion that a constitutional
amendment would not be necessary to adopt the recommended family
court system, but a constitutional amendment would be needed to
transfer county court jurisdiction to district courts in the smaller
counties.
·
Elimination of Writs of Error. The sub-committee studying
the elimination of writs of error to the supreme court in certain
categories of cases made the following recommendations:
1) Legislation should be adopted to provide adequately
compensated and experienced research assistants to the justices of
the supreme court.
.,._,.

.

~--

,. ::

_,

•

.

2) The Judicial Council should make a continued study to
determine the need for an intermediate court of appeals.
3) Complete and detailed statistical information concerning
case loads, nature of cases, and other pertinent matters relating
to Colorado courts should be obtained to assist the Judicial Council
in further study.
4) As an immediate measure to help alleviate the backlog
of cases in the supreme court, the supreme court should modify the
rule of civil procedure applying to writs of error to allow it the
76.

.

The proposals reviewed by the Judicial Council included: the
recommendations of the Colorado Bar Association Justice and
Traffic Court Committee, circuit magistrate system proposed by
Judge Mitchell Johns, and the proposal to consolidate justice
court and county court jurisdiction •

..;-
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discretion to reject writs of error in district court cases involving less than $3,00o.77
Other Matters. The sub-committee studying the adoption of
the Pennsylvania Arbitration Law recommended that such legislation
not be adopted. The sub-committee studying rule changes pertaining
to pre-trial conferences and new trial motions prepared amended
rules o~ both these subjects.78
Comments by Colorado Bar Association. The bar association
referred the recommendations of the Judicial Council sub-committee
to its judiciary committee, which in turn appointed sub-committees
to study the Judicial Council proposals.
As a result of this study, the Colorado Bar Association
Board of Governors and the Judiciary Committee reported the following findings on the Judicial Council recommendations.79
1) Opposition was voiced to the recommendation that
appeals from the Public Utilities Commission and the Industrial
Commission be taken directly to the supreme court.
2) Constitutional reform of the Colorado judicial system
should be comprehensive and~ piecemeal approach should be avoided,
since any change in one segment of the judicial system, such as the
modification of the jurisdiction of any of the courts or the
elimination of existing courts or creation of new courts, of necessity
affects the entire system.BO

•

3) The elimination of trials de nova from county court to
district court was approved in principle, providing that any
legisl•tion submitted to accomplish this objective contain proper
safeguards to the litigants.
4) The proposal for creation of a•district court family
judge was referred to the bar association's domestic relations committee for further study, especially with reference to population
and distance problems in some judicial districts and the availability
. of qualified judges.

5) Further study is needed with respect to eliminating
county courts in small counties and provision of an intermediate
court of appeals. The abolition of writs of error is opposed as
77.
78.
79.
80.

Judicial Council Report op. cit. p. 14.
Ibid.,p. 15.
Ibid.,pp. 21-26.
This comment was made with reference to the recommendations that
county court jurisdiction be transferred to the district courts
in counties of less than 5,000 population and a constitutional
amendment be offered for this purpose.

- 28 -

•

•

.,._

'.

.

long as the present court system is in effect. There was general
agreement with the proposed rule changes relating to pretrial conferences and new trial motions .

....

Legislative Action

.

The 42nd General Assembly, first session (1959~ passed
legislation which provided a law clerk for ~ych supreme court justice
and made an appropriation for this purpose.
The most important
legislative action concerning the administration of justice was
the adoption of a measure which implemented the supreme court's
general superintending control o~~r inferior courts. This legislation provided the following:

.,.

..
.,.

.

1) division of all courts of record in the state into
judicial departments, not to exceed six in number, with a justice
of the supreme court assigned to each department as departmental
justice;
""

••

2) creation of the position of judicial administrator to
be appointed by the supreme court, such administrator to be responsible to the supreme court for the performance of duties assigned
by it or authorized by law;
record;

,.

3)

collection of judicial statistics from all courts of

4) assignment of district court and qualified county court
judges by departmental justices on temporary basis to other district
courts as needed, with a similar provision assigning county judges
to other county courts;
5) provision for judi~ial conferences to be held at least
once annually by all judges and the departmental justice in each
department;

•
,.

.

6) appointment of a presiding judge in each multi-judge
judicial district by the appropriate departmental justice; and

7) definition of the administrative powers of the chief
justice and departmental justices and the rule-making powers which
may be exercised thereunder •

•

.

None of the other Judicial Council recommendations which
required legislative action or constitutional change were referred
81.

.,,;

82.

37-2-10 (2),Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953,as amended by Chapter
89, Colorado Session Law~ 1959 •
Chapter 37, Article 10, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as
amended by Chapter 93, Colorado Session Laws, 1959.

✓
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to the General Assembly, although there was a large number of bills
relating to justice courts introduced, as a result of various minor
court studies. Instead of providing a new appropriation for the
Judicial Council, the General Assembly passed a joint resolution
establishing a two-year study of admfnistration of justice under
the direction of the Legislative Council.83
League of Women Voters
~
The League of Women Voters has included various phases of
court organization and operation on its study agenda for the last
several years. In 1955, the league recommended the establishment
of separate juvenile courts throughout the state, established with
a broad enough tax base so that adequate salaries could be paid and
essential services provided.84

The League of Women Voters has also been interested in
judicial selection and recently turned its attention to over-all
judicial organization problems. In a recent publication the league
outlined its findings on court problems and proposed solutions, but
· did not make any definite recommendations.85 This report covered
all court levels from the supreme court through justice courts and
outlined personnel, organizational, and procedural problems. It
is anticipated that the league will make some specific recommendations
after further study.

•

.
l

Legislative Studies
Prior to the current Legislative Council administration of
justice study, there were Legislative Council studies pertaining
to juvenile courts and justice of the peace courts. The Legislative
Council Children's Laws Committee focused attention on juvenile
courts and juvenile court services in its studies from 1955 through
1958. The committee considered the creation of separate juvenile
courts, including the proposal to establish a district court family
division, but made no definite recommendations. Instead the committee recommended the improvement of juvenile probation services
through state aid. This recommendation resulted in legislation which
was passed by the General Assembly in 1959, providing matching funds
of $200 per month or one-half, whichever was less, of the salary of
each juvenile probation officer who met the minimum qualifications
set in the act.86
83.

84.
85.
86.

Senate Joint Resolution No. 16, 42nd General Assembly, 1st
session, 1959. It appears that the other Judicial Council
recommendations requiring legislative action or constitutional
change were not submitted, pending the results of the Legislative
Council study and the data developed by the Judicial Administrator.
The Establishment of Special Juvenile Courts ·in Colorado, League
of Women Voters of Colorado, Inc., Denver, October 1955.
The Case for Courts.
22-8-8 through 10, Coloraao Kevised Statutes of 1953.
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Justice Court Study. The Legislative Council justice court
· study was made puijsuant to a joint resolution passed by the General
Assembly in 1957. 7 The Legislative Council committee which made
the justice court study held meetings throughout the state and
directed an analysis of justice ·court dockets. In addition, this
committee traced the historical development of justice courts in
Colorado, examined minor court reform in other states, analyzed
various proposals for eliminating or improving the justice court
system, and conferred with the Colorado Justice of the Peace
Association and the Colorado Bar Association Justice and Traffic
Court Committee.
There was no unanimous agreement among the committee members
in favor of any specific proposal for improving Colorado's minor
courts. The committee's report to the 42nd General Assembly covered
the data developed in the course of the study along with several
alternate recommendations.88
·
In proposing these alternate recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly, the Legislative Council Justice Court
Committee commented, "The importance of lower courts and the many
difficulties in administering justice efficiently and equitably in
these courts warrant careful consideration by the General Assembly of
all propositions placed before it for modification or abolition of
justice courts, not just thos:e made by the committee. 11 89
The committee then made the following recommendations:90

,.

•
,.

.

-•

1. Justice court jurisdiction in the 11 Class II counties
should be repealed and superior courts treated in these counties.
The judges of these superior courts should be attorneys licensed
to practice law in Colorado. These courts should have jurisdiction
in all misdemeanors and the same civil jurisdiction as county courts,
except for probate and juvenile matters. The jurisdiction of the
Denver Superior Court should be the same as for the proposed superior
courts in Cla~s II counties. There should be a sufficient number of
superior courts in each of the Class II counties and in Denver to
handle each county's justice court case load. Consideration should
be given to locating additional superior courts outside of the county
seat,
2. The General Assembly should consider alternate proposals
for handling justice court cases in the 51 Class III through VI
counties: a) repeal of all justice court jurisdiction with the
result that justice court cases would be tried in county court; or

,.
87.
,,;

88.
89.
90.

House Joint Resolution No. 6, 41st General Assembly, first
session, 1957.
Justice Courts in Colorado, Chapter V, pp. 65-92.
Ibid. , p. xvi.
Ibid.,p. xvii.
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b) limit of justice court criminal jurisdiction while continuing present civil jurisdiction. Under the second proposal, the maximum
fine which a justice of the peace could levy would be $100, and he
could not impose a jail sentence. Certain offenses such as hit-andrun ~ccidents, driving while intoxicated, and driving under revocation
and suspension, would automatically be tried in county court. If
this second proposal is considered favorably, each Class III through
VI county should be limited to one justice precinct, and two justices
of the peace. One of these justices might be located outside of the
county seat at the discretion of the county commissioners. The
county commissioner in these counties should be required to provide
adequate court facilities or reimbursement for same, statutes, and
other material necessary for proper court operation.
3. A constitutional amendment providing long-range overhaul
of the justice court system should be worked out in conjunction with
the Colorado Judicial Council, because of the interrelationship of
the v~rious levels of the state's judicial system.91
Justice Court Legislation. Some 28 bills relating to
justice court organization, jurisdiction, and procedures were introduced during the first session of the 42nd General Assembly in 1959.
Included among these measures were: 1) a bill providing for transfer
of justice court jurisdiction to county courts; 2) a bill covering
the proposal of the Colorado :Bar Association Justice and Traffic
Court Committee; 3) several bills embodying the recommendations of
the justices of the peace association; and 4) a bill which included
some of the alternate suggestions of the justice court committee,
such as consolidation of precincts, provision by county commissioners
of necessary equipment and facilities for justice court operation.
None of the measures to eliminate or modify and improve the
justice court system was passed. After defeat of the justice court-county court consolidation proposal on second reading in the house,
a sub-committee of the House Judiciary Committee was appointed to
consolidate the best features of the various proposals into one
bill for consideration by the house. This consolidated measure
included the following main features:92
1) Compensation: Justices of the peace in counties with
populations between 70,000 and 100,000 could retain up to $7,500
in fees and would be barred from outside employment. All other
justices could retain up to $5,000 in fees instead of the present
$3,600 limit.
91.
92.

At that time it was contemplated that the Colorado Judicial
Council would continue in existence.
H.B. 112, 42nd General Assembly, 1st session, 1959.
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2) Jurors: The fees for justice court jurors was set at
$6 per day, the same as for courts of record and jury selection
procedures were improved.

I.

r
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3) Consolidation of Precincts: Each county would be
reduced to one justice precinct with two justices of the peace,
except that in counties over 50,000 population, the board of county
commissioners could appoint an additional justice for each 20,000
population .
4) Qualifications: In Class I and II counties justices
ot the peace would be required to be attorneys admitted to the
practice of law in Colorado. In all other counties justices of the
peace would be required to be high school graduates. All justices
of the peace, except those already in office, would be required to
be at least 25 years of age and not more than 70 years of age, and
no justice of the peace could be a law enforcement officer during
his term of office.
5) Removal from Office: Justices of the peace could be
removed from office upon petition to the county court by the
attorney general or district attorney for any of the following
reasons: adjudication as a mental incompetent, malfeasance or
misfeasance in office, failure to reside in the county, conviction
of a felony, or failure to pcist the required bond .
6) Court Clerks: Provision of clerical assistance to
justice courts by the county commissioners in all counties would
be mandatory.
7) Contempt: Any person found guilty of contempt in justice
court would be subject to a maximum fine of $25 instead of $5.

•

8) Facilities, Training, Supplies: The boards of county
commissioners would be required to provide complete sets of
statutes, other supplies, and adequate courtroom facilities for
justice courts, and also pay the expenses for justices of the peace
to attend meetings of the Justices of the Peace Association and other
official conferences.

-

9) Rules of Procedure: The supreme court would be requested
to adopt a uniform manual of procedure for civil and criminal actions
in justice of the peace courts, including basic rules on the
admission of evidence.

After considerable amendment on the floor, the bill was passed by
the house in the closing days of the session and died in the senate.
The senate also approved a bill which represented a consolidation of various proposals for justice court improvement and
which differed from the house measure in the following respects.93
93.

S.B. 277, 42nd General Assembly, 1st session, 1959.
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1) Compensation: Justices of the peace in counties between
70,000 and 100,000 population could retain $7,500 in fees and could
not be otherwise employed (similar to H.B. 112), but justices of the
peace in all other counties could retain only $3,600 in fees (as
compared with $5,000 in H.B. 112).
·
2)

Jurors:

No provision.

3) Consolidation of Precincts: Each county would be reduced
to one justice precinct as in H.B. 112, but additional justices could
be appo--inted in any county by the board of county commissioners without any restrictions. (This provision appeared to be in violation of
Article XIV, Section 11, Colorado Constitution,which limits the number
of justices of the peace in each justice precinct to two, except in
precincts of 50,000 or more population).
4) Qualifications: Justices 'of the peace would be required
to be attorneys in Class I and II counties (similar to H.B. 112),.
but in the other counties, justices would be required only to be
under 72 years of age and not law enforcement officers.

5)

Removal from Office:

6)

Court Clerks:

7)

Contempt:

No provision.

No provision.

No provision.

8) Facilities, Training, Supplies: The provision that
county commissioners be required to furnish sets of statutes, supplies,
and adequate court facilities was similar to H.B. 112. There was no
requirement that the county commissioners pay the expenses of justices
of the peace to attend conferences.
9)

Rules of Procedure:

No provision.

The senate adopted this measure, also in the closing days of
the session, and no action was taken in the house. The major
obstacle to the passage of legislation to improve the justice court
system was the lack of legislative agreement on any plan which would
apply uniformly throughout th~ state.
Summary of Previous Studies
The judicial studies made since World War II achieved many
positive results, even though many of the recommendations made
were rejected or deferred for further study; possibly the most
important contribution of these study efforts was the attention
focused on judicial problems. The inadequacy of piecemeal improvements in the administration of justice was demonstrated and,
consequently, the need for an over-all study.
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Concrete results of the previous studies include: 1) improvement in judicial salaries and retirement benefits; 2) emphasis on
a coordinated court system administered by the supreme court and the
passage of legislation to implement the court's general supervisory
contiol; 3) assistance to the supreme court through the provision
of law clerks for each justice; 4) provision for removal of physically
or ~entally incapacitated judges; 5) curtailment on the use of
judicial office for political advancement; and 6) improvement in
court services for juveniles.

-

-
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8HAPTER II
CONTINUING JUDICIAL PROBLEMS

A number of varied and complex' problems relating to the
organization and administration of justice led to the authorization
of the Legislative Council study by the General Assembly,
Supreme Court
In 1950, 218 cases were filed in the Colorado Supreme Court.
By the end of 1958, the annual filing rate had increased almost 90
per cent, to 412 cases that year. On January 1, 1950, 167 cases
were pending before the court. The number of cases pending had
almost tripled by January 1, 1959, when 483 cases were before the
courtr A large proportion of pending cases as of January 1, 1959
were not at issue; however, the proportion of cases pending which
were at issue increased steadily after 1956, when 90 of the 161
cases pending, or almost 45 per cent, were at issue. As of January
1, 1959, 295 of the 483 pending cases, or 61 per cent,were at issue.
Not only was the increase in supreme court backlog a problem
of utmost importance, but it was one which needed a fairly immediate
solution, even if only on a stop-gap basis. The provision of a
law clerk ,for each supreme court justice was expected to be of
considerable help to the court in expediting its case load, but
there was no expectation that this step alone would provide an
adequate solution.

.

a

Among suggested remedies were:
1) creation at least on a temporary basis, of an intermediate
court of appeals; 2J addition of two justices, increasing the size
of the supreme court to nine members; 3) assistance to be provided
·
by retired supreme court justices and active and retired district
court judges; 4) curtailment of the automatic right of appeal on
writ of error, at least in minor civil matters; and 5) modification
of the court's internal operating procedures, perhaps disposing of
some matters by sitting in department and making greater use of oral
argument.
None of these suggested remedies was new, and all of them
had both good and bad features. Further study was needed to
determine which of these proposals (or any other) could provide a
fairly immediate alleviation of the court's case backlog problems.
Just as important but not as immediate was the need for long-range
improvements in the judicial system to guard against backlog problems
in the supreme court in future years and the development of a program
to meet future backlog problems should they arise.
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District Courts

-.

The district courts appeared to have fewer problems than
the ~ther segments of the state court system. Increased case
loads in metropolitan districts weLe causing concern, but the
creation of the 17th and 18th judicial districts and the provision
of additional judgeships in some of these districts were helping
to alleviate the problem. There were indications, however, that
still further additions to the district bench would be needed, as
well as possible revision of judicial district boundaries more in
accord with geographic barriers and recent populatin growth. The
jud1cial department legislation provided machinery for the temporary
assignment of ,district judges outside their districts. The only
other matters relating to district courts suggested for further study
were a change in the method of judicial selection and the elimination
of trials de !12.Y.Q_ on appeals from cou.nty courts.

,,.

County Courts
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There has been general agreement that trials de novo in
district court on county court appeals should be eliminated, but it
is doubtful that, given the existing situation in most county courts,
all trials de novo could be eliminated without working a hardship on
some litigants. With the exception of Class I and II counties, county
judges are not required to be lawyers, and less than one-third of the
county judges in the 51 smaller counties are lawyers. Often in these
small counties, it is difficult to get a court reporter so that a case
transcript can be prepared. The elimination of trials de novo in
appeals from county courts in these small counties would deprive
litigants of having a full trial before a lawyer judge; further, the
difficulty in obtaining court reporters decreases the possibility
that there would be an adequate transcript upon which to appeal on
the record. For this reason, trials de novo have been viewed as
necessary to insure each litigant an acfequate judicial hearing.
Nevertheless, this process is susceptible to being taken advantage
of by some attorneys who would use the county court trial as a
"fishing expedition" to gather information which will be useful when
the case is retried on appeal to the district court. A substantial
number of civil cases within the county court's jurisdictional limit
of $2,000 ar~ filed initially in district court, to avoid double trials.
While there is a $2,000 limit on civil actions in county
court, all probate matters are tried, regardless of the amount of the
estate involved. Further, the county court hears all lunacy and
juvenile matters. It is argued that to be tried properly, these
matters should be heard by judges who are- lawyers. It would be
extremely difficult, however, to require all county judges to be
attorneys, considering the present organization and jurisdiction of
county courts. The present level of county judges' salaries in the
51 smaller counties ranging from $734 to $5,600, is too low to attract
many attorneys, especially as they would be required to give up
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probate practice (usually a major source of attorneys' income in
small counties). On the basis of the case load in most of the
smaller county courts, it would be difficult to justify much of an
increase in judges' salaries; and many counties do not have the
resources to finance increased expenditures for county courts. In
at least five counties there are no resident attorneys.
Possible Solutions
. Several solutions to county court problems have been offered,
all of which would alter the existing county court structure. These
proposals have included: 1) consolidation of justice and county
courtsJ 2) creation of a separate circuit court system;
3) elimiation of county courts in smaller counties and transfer of jurisdiction
to district courts; 4) consolidation of counties for judicial purposes;
and 5) consolidation of county court jurisdiction in district courts.
Despite the many criticisms of county court operations a~d
personn~l, opposition has been expressed in several areas to the
elimination of county courts. These objections have resulted from:
1) a desire to keep governmental functions as local as possible;
and 2) the accessibility of the county court
the judge,is usually
well known and his office is.usually open on an informal basis.
Justice Courts
Many of the criticisms made of the county court apply to
justice courts a~ well. Very few -- about five per cent at the most
-- of Colorado's justices of the peace are attorneys. Some have
adequate quarters in which to hold court -- usually in a courthouse
or municipal building, but the majority hold court in their own
homes or places of business, in inadequate surroundings for the proper
respect of the.judicial process. Not only are most of the justices
of the peace without legal training, but many do.not even have copies
of the statut~s.

.

'

The justice court has been a stepchild of county government.
Even though counties benefit financially from the fines collected
in justice court actions, county commissioners for the most part have
been reluctant to furnish justices of the peace with adequate courtroom facilities, copies of the statutes, and even necessary supplies.
It is very difficult even to get qualified lay citizens to
run for the position of justice of the peace. The low compensation
involved and the.low esteem in which justice courts are generally
held discourage qualified candidates. Justices of the peace are still
paid from the fees of their office and very few justices in the small
counties have enough business to realize more than $300 or $400
annually. The replacement of the fee system by annual salaries
would not solve this problem, because in• some of the sparsely-populated

:,
. .'
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areas of the state, it would take the combined case load of several
counties to justify a salary adequate for a full-time position.·
Elimination of the fee system would, however, remove any motivation
(conscious or unconscious) to find defendants guilty in order to
insure that law enforcement officers would continue to bring cases.
During the past 20 ye·ars, the justice court has become
primarily a traffic court, and a large proportion of civil cases
are small collection agency actions. Most people who come in
contact with the courts do so through justice court appearances •
Tbeir unsatisfactory experiences in justice courts color their
attitudes toward other levels of the court system and to the judicial
process.
The dockets of both county courts and district courts reflect
a surprisingly large number of civil cases which are within the $300
justice court jurisdictional limit,
One of the original functions
Gf the justice court was to provide an easily accessible tribunal to
hear limited civil actions without need for an attorney or costly
pleadings, keeping these minor cases out of the higher level trial
courts,
Even with all of their shortcomings, there has been a
surprising resistance in the past to elimination of justice courts.
Reasons for this resistance include: 1) accessibility of justice
courts, especially in traffic cases; 2) need for a court where
actions on small claims can be brought cheaply and simply and without attorneys; and 3) tradition -- justice courts have been firmly
entrenched in our judicial system since frontier days.

",.
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Domestic Relations - Juvenile Cases
In recent years there has been an increase in juvenile
delinquency and dependency actions and in domestic relations cases
(divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, custody). While it is
commonly assumed tha~ the highest rate of delinquency is found in
urban areas, this is not necessarily the case, as was shown by the
juvenile case analysis made by the Colorado Legislative Council
Children's Laws Committee. In its report to the 42nd General Assembly,
195~ the committee stated:!
These data on juvenile delinquency cases
in Colorado courts in 1957 show that
delinquency is not a problem limited
mainly to Denver and the other metropolitan
area~. Denver and the Class II counties
had the greatest number of cases; however,

,,.
1.

...

Juveniles in Trouble, Probation-Parole-Mental Health, Colorado
Legislative Council, Research Publication No. 25, December
1958, pp. 5 and 6.
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many of the smaller counites had a
higher incidence of delinquency than
the larger ones when compared with
estimated county population and with
school population in the 1956-57 year.
Sixteen counties had a higher incidence
of delinquency in 1957 in relation to
population than did Denver: Adams, El
Paso, Las Animas, Mesa, and Pueblo were
the only Class II counties in this group.
The others were Chaffee, Fremont, Gilpin,
Huerfano, Jackson, Moffat, Montezuma,
Ouray, Park, Saguache, and Teller.
District and county courts in the more populous areas are
usually better able to handle juvenile and domestic relations matters
than are the courts in the rural areas, which have fewer of these
cases~ In some of the larger judicial districts, one judge is
assigned to domestic relations cases, although he may preside in
other matters as well. In the 2nd Judicial District (Denver), a
marriage counseling service is operated as an adjunct of the court.
There is no specialization in domestic relations in the smaller
judicial districts.
The larger county coJrts and the Denver Juvenile Court have
judges who are lawyers and probation departments staffed by qualified
full-time officers. For the most part, these counties have taken
advantage of the state aid program for juvenile probation to augment
their staffs. The smaller counties do not have adequate probation
services. All of the 51 counties with less than 25,000 population
had part-time, and usually untrained, probation officers in 1957. 2
These counties do not have enough juvenile cases to justify
a full-time probation officer, but in most areas of the state, two
to four adjacent counties could group together to employ one. In
the state aid legislation passed in 1959, permission was given
counties to group together in any combination which would result in
a population of 25,000 to be eligible for state aid in the hiring
of a full-time probation officer meeting the standards set forth in
the act.3 None of the 51 smaller counties has acted to take advantage
of the state aid provisions, even though one of the major purposes of
this legislation was to improve probation services in these counties.
2.
3.

•
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Ibid.,p. 7. The current probation situation in the smaller
counties i~ very much the same as in 1957, according to the
data collected during the docket analysis made for this study.
22-8-9, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended by Chapter
73, Session Laws of Colorado, 1959.
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Considerable concern has been expressed by the Children's
Laws Committee, the League of Women Voters, and others interested
in juvenile problems in the ability of judges in these small counties
to handle juvenile cases adequately and to work with schools, social
agencies, and other community resources in solving juvenile problems.
For this reason, there has been considerable interest in the creation
of specialized courts throughout the state with jurisdiction in
juvenile cases.
The relationship of domestic and juvenile problems, and in
soIDe instances overlapping court jurisdiction, has led to the
recommendation that these specialized courts be given jurisdiction
over domestic relations as well. Jurisdiction over both juvenile
and domestic relations cases was also advocated to assure a sufficient
case load in less populous areas to justify a full-time, specialized
judge, without encompassing too many counties to make the plan
feasible. Sentiment has been divided as to whether these courts
should be part of either the district or county courts, or be entirely
separate.
There are three major objections to establishing a completely
separate court system to handle juvenile and domestic relations cases:
1) It would add another court system and thereby compound the
difficulties in achieving integrated judicial administration. 2) In
some areas there would still be an insufficient number of juvenile·
and domestic relationscases to justify a full-time judge, so that
even if one judge heard all these cases, he should still have other
assignments to utilize judicial time fully. 3) Complete separation
would result in a system of courts which might lose sight of the
judicial function for which they were created and take on social
agency attributes, to the detriment of proper administration of justice.
Opposition to any change has also been voiced in some rural
areas, where it is felt that the advantage of close relationship
between the judge, law enforcement officials, and members of the
community are greater than the provision of a more qualified judge
and other court personnel who would be less accessible and not as
well known locally.

•
•
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Judicial Selection
Selection of judges by some method other than partisan
election has been advocated by the Colorado Bar Association and
others for several reasons: 1) Judges should be removed from
political pressures. 2) Judges running for office on a partisan
ticket can often be defeated because of a general sweep by either
major party, regardless of their fitness for and performance in
judicial office. 3) The general electorate usually knows nothing
of the qualifications and ability of the men runn1ng for judicial
office; often not even their names are known. 4) The development
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of a qualified judiciary depends on good initial selection, adequate
salaries, and tenure in office based on performance; partisan election
often results in the best-qualified candidates being defeated.
Elimination of judicial select1on by partisan election has
been opposed for the following reasons: 1) The people should have
the right-to elect judges in the same way as they do members of the
executive and legislative branches. 2) Tenure offers protection
to inadequate members of the judiciary .. 3) Most methods of selection
are as political in nature as partisan elections, except that the
contro~ is taken away from the people.
As stated previously, one plan for changing the method of
judicial selection was offered as part of an over-all amendment to
the Judicial Article by the Colorado Bar Association in 1949. This
proposal outlined on page 23· above was defeated by the General Assembly
along with the other provisions of the proposed amendment.

•

Unofficial Selection Plaqs. In some Colorado judicial
districts a sort ~f unofficial appointment plan is in operation. In
the 6th.and 7th judicial districts, which have two judges each, the
district bar associations and the two political parties have had a
tacit agreement that each party will c~ntrol one judgeship, and the
candidates are recommended by the bar.
In the 13th Judicial District,
which is a one-party area, the bar association and the predominant
political party agree on the candidates for the two positions.5
Prior to the 1960 general election, 27 of the 39 district
judges (69.2 per cent) then holding office had been appointed initially by the governor to fill a vacancy. Of these 27, 20 had stood
for election at least once (prior to 1960). Ten of these 20 had never
had election opposition. Two had had opposition two of the three times
they stood for election. One had had opposition in two of four general
elections. The remaining seven all had had election opposition, with
four of this seven from Denver. With almost 70 per cent of the district bench appointed in the first instance and election opposition
concentrated in Denver and urban area counties, the selection of district judges by partisan election has been modified considerably in
recent years. The situation is somewhat the same for county judges,
4.

5.

The 6th District includes ftrchuleta, Dolores, La Plata, Montezuma,
and San Juan counties; the 7th includes Delta, Gunnison, Hinsdale,
Mesa, Montrose, Ouray, and San Miguel. That this sort of arrangement exists was borne out by comments made by judges and attorneys
in the areas at the regional meetings held by the Legislative
Council Committee on the Administration of Justice. This balance
was upset in the 6th District in the 1960 general election, however, when the Democrats had two candidates and the Republicans
one for the two judgeships.
The ~3th District includes Logan, Morgan; Phillips, Sedgwick,
Washington, and Yuma counties. This method of selecting judges
was discussed at the Fort Morgan meeting of the Legislative
Council Committee on the Administration of Justice,· November 30,
1959.
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as there is very little opposition except in the 12 largest counties,
even though very few county judges are appointed in the first instance. On the other hand, there have been relatively few supreme
court appointments, and each supreme court judgeship is strongly
contested at the general elections .

.

There is a difference of opinion as to whether a change in
the method of judicial selection or court reorganization should be
the first step in improving the administration of justice, even
though there may be general qgreement that both are needed.

-

The: argument is made that a judicial system is no better than
the caliber of its judicial personnel and good judges can improve the
operation of any court system. In reply, it is stated that improved
judicial selection can be meaningful only when such selection is made
to a well-designed court organization. In general, in other states
it has proven disastrous to judicial 'reform measures to combine a
~ew method of judicial selection and court reorganization in the same
proposal .

•

State-Local Jurisdiction

•

•

•

Prior to the Merris decision by the Colorado Supreme Court, 6
the peace and order of Colorado's towns and cities were maintained
by local ordinances, which often included jail sentences as penalties
for violations, as well as fines. As the result of a long series of
Colorado court interpretations, ordinance violations were considered
civil in nature and were tried as civil cases without the constitutional protections given a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Consequently, it was the accepted practice for municipalities to try
ordinance violators without providing such rights as protection
against double jeopardy, trial by jury, presumption of innocence,
and the requirement for the establishment of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
It was also common practice for municipal ordinances to
regulate matters which were already made criminal by state statute.
This was particularly. true with respect to home rule cities, which
exercised their power pursuant to Article XX of the Constitution; it
was thought that this provision gave home rule jurisdictions more
extensive rights of self-government and enabled them to regulate
matters concurrently with the state. Because this interpretation
had never ieally been tested in the courts, Colorado home rule cities
passed numerous regulatory ordinances covering traffic violations
and a multitude of other criminal acts already prohibited by state
law.
Both of these municipal practices were affected drastically
by the Merris decision.
6.

Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colorado 169, 323 P. 2d. 614.
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The Merris Decision
On March 17, 1958 the Colorado Supreme Court decided the
case of Canon City v. Merris. The court affirmed the judgment of
the Fremont County Court, dismissing the prosecution's complaint
for violating a Canon City ordinance pertaining to driving while
intoxicated. The supreme court based its decision on two separate
grounds:· 1) Violation of ,municipal ordinances which have a counterpart state criminal statute punishing the same conduct must conform
to the constitutional requirements of criminal procedure. 2) Since
the or~inance in question was one of "state-wide concern" and consequently one which home rule cities have no power to regulate, it
was invalid; the power of home rule cities to regulate is limited
to local or municipal matters only.
It was the second finding st~ted above, as well as subsequent court decisions involving the same point, which has caused
concekn over what constitutes state and local jurisdiction. The
first finding of the court has been complied with in subsequent
municipal court actions; these actions are now treated as criminal
in nature and defendants receive their constitutional protections,
including the right to trial by jury.
State-Wide Vs. Local Concern. The majority opinion in the
Merris case made only slight reference to the distinction between
matters of state-wide and local concern, but it was quite clear
that the court considered this reason a sufficient one for holding
the Canon City ordinance invalid. Justice Albert Frantz, speaking
for the majority of the court, asserted that Article XX, Section 6
of the Colorado Constitution did not permit home rule cities to
supersede state law where the matter involved was one of state-wide
concern. "Applications of state law or municipal ordinance, whichever pertains, is mutually exclusive," according to Justice Frantz.
He went on to say that while it is difficult to determine what is
of local and municipal concern, the operation of a vehicle by one
who is unde·r the influence of intoxicating liquor is of state-wide
concern. Justice O. Otto Moore, in his special concurring opinion,
added, "the home rule cities. have not been ·del~gated the power to
legislate in this matter of state-wide concern." But neither opinion
offered much more in explanation as to what matters are of statewide concern.
City attorneys advised their authorities that many existing
city ordinances regulated in the area of state-wide concern and were
therefore invalid by reason of the Merris case. However, since
the real meaning of the term "state-wide concern" wa.il..d have to await
subsequent court interpretations -- probably on the case by case
basis -- most municipalities were advised to continue prosecutions
under existing ordinances until they were declared invalid by court
decision.
By reversing long-standing legal precedents, the court altered
considerably the criminal jurisdiction of municipalities. The most
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disturbing problem to municipal governments was the determination
of the extent of their power to enact penal ordinances. The subtle
legal problems that arose in this connection were defined by
Professor Austin Scott of the University of Colorado Law s hool.
The problems observed by Professor Scott are listed below:

7

....

..

1)

What types of conduct, other than drunken
driving, are matters of "state-wide concern"
as to which the state may have exclusive
jurisdiction (at least if it wishes to exercise
it) to regulate by statute; and what types of
conduct are of "local or municipal concern"
over which a home rule city may have
exclusive jurisdiction (if it wishes to
exercise it) to regulate by penal ordinance?

2)

Does a home rule city have power to regulate,
by penal ordinance, a matter of state-wide
concern (which is regulated by the state) as
to which the legislature has specifically
granted ordinance power to towns and cities?

3)

Does a home rule city have power to regulate,
by penal ordinance, a matter of state-wide
concern if the state itself has not chosen
to regulate the matter?

4)

Although home rule cities have no power to
regulate, by penal ordinance, state-wide
matters which the state has regulated, do
non-home rule municipalities have this power?

..

.
...

'1'

...
.,.
.,. .
'1'-

,.

•
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1959 Legislative Action. Following the Merris decision, the
Colorado Municipal League through its counsel submitted a request to
the supreme court. In its request, the league submitted a list of
offenses concerning which the court was asked to determine which
were of state and which were of local concern. The court refused
this request, stating that these matters would have to be determined
as they arose on a case-by-case basis. The municipal league then
appointed a committee of city attorneys and municipal judges to make
a study and seek a solution to the problems raised by the Merris case.
It was the hope of city officials that some way could be found to
obtain court recognition that some matters are of both state concern
and local importance, and therefore subject to concurrent jurisdiction •
Their study was directed toward possible legislative action in the
1959 session of the General Assembly.8
7.

,.
8.

Rocky Mountain Law Review, "Municipal Penal Ordinances in
Colorado," Austin W. Scott, Vol. 30, p. 268.
Senate Bill 72, 42nd General Assembly, 1st session, (1959).
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Senate Bill No. 72. In essence, the resulting proposed legislation provided that if the subject matter of a municipal ordinance
is of both municipal and state-wide concern, the existence of state
legislation thereon should not pre-empt the field, unless the statute
expressly declares that only the stat~ has such power. The bill also
provided that there could be no double jeopardy -- if a defendant was
tried by ordinance, he could not be tried by statute and vice versa.
This bill did not disturb that portion of the Merris holding which
required that defendants in ordinance violation cases be afforded
their constitutional rights when imprisonment could be imposed or
when a_state criminal statute was a counterpart of the ordinance.
The bill passed both houses with only minor amendments. Since
there was some question about its constitutionality, the governor
submitted interrogatories to the supreme court before signing it into
law.

•

The 6upreme court was confronted with several legal interrogatories by the governor -- many of which related to the constitutionality
of minor provisions of the bill. The most significant question, however, concerned whether the bill was an unconstitutional delegation
of the legislative power in contravention of Article V, Section 1 of
the Colorado Constitution. With very little explanation, the supreme
court s~ated_that Senate Bil~ No. 72 was an_unl~wful delegation of
the leg1slat1ve power and therefore unconst1tut1ona1.9
It is significant to note that the opinion of the court
In Re Senate Bill No. 72 was written by Justice Frantz, who was
also the author of the majority opinion in the Merris case. The
conclusion reached in the interrogatory opinion was consistent with
his Merris case opinion. In the earlier Merris decision, he found
the area of local concern and the area of state-wide concern to be
mutually exclusive. In speaking for the majority in the interrogatory
opinion, he apparently concluded that if these areas are mutually
exclusive, it is impossible for the legislature to delegate a part
of its regulatory power so that municipalities can act concurrently
with the state in matters of state-wide concern. Justice Frantz
indicated that the court would not allow legislative expression to
delineate the areas of state-wide concern.
Subsequent Court Decisions. On July 20, 195~ the supreme
court decioed three cases which greatly modified the Merris decision.10
These decisions are particularly important since they seem to indicate
9.
10.

In Re Senate Bill No. 72, 339 P. 2d. 501.
City and County of Denverv. Pike, 342 P. 2d. 688; Davis v.
City and County of Denver, 342 P. 2d. 674; City and County of
Denver V. Palmer, 342 P. 2d .. 687. All these cases may be
found in Colorado Advance Sheet No. 20, 1959.
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a departure from the legal reasoning used in Canon City v. Merris
and In Re Senate Bill No. 72. Of special significance is the fact
that all three cases were decided by a vote of~ to 2, with Justice
William Doyle writing the majority opinions and Justices Frantz and
Frank Hall dissenting in all ins~ances.

...
...
,.,.

.

Denver v. Pike: The city of Denver was held to have powP-r
to regulate speed upon that portion of the Valley Highway within
the city limits, because the state (through the state highway
engineer) had contracted with the city to this effect. The court
seemed to recognize the right of the state to contract away its
power over matters of state-wide concern with the following words: 11
Under the circumstances here presented, formal
approval of the City's regulations was unnecessary.
The State had given its consent beforehand to the
regulation by the City subject to the limitations
set forth in the agreement. The right of the
City to regulate speed had been in fact recognized
by the State by allowing the City to post the
highway and enforce its ordinances. The City,
acting with the consent and approval of the
State, had the requisite jurisdiction in the
premises and it was error for the court to
dismiss the complaint.

...

...
,._

.

,,.

Davis v. City and County of Denver: This case held void a
Denver municipal ordinance which punished driving under license
suspension, because of the state criminal statute on the subject.
However, the court indicated its changing view on the power of
municipalities to regulate matters which are of state-wide concern
as well as municipal concern. In t~e majority opinion, Justice
Doyle made the following comments·

,.

To hold that matters which are general are
the exclusive preserve of the state, just
as matters local and municipal can be
regulated only by the city (once the city
has acted), would create a highly inflexible
system and would require the state or city
to obtain a continuous stream of rulings from
this Court as to whether a subject is local
or state-wide. This kind of "straight-jacket"
rule is inappropriate to the changing society
in which we live and (the Merris case) ,should
not be construed as so holding.

...

«
II

.

In this opinion, it was also held that municipalities could
be delegated the authority to regulate any matter which, although
ll.
12.

,.

v.

Denver
Pike, op. cit.
Davis~. Denver, op. cit.
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predominantly general, is one in which the municipality has sufficient
interest to warrant the delegation of power. As pointed out in the
opinion, this would bring Colorado in line with the majority of
states, which recognize that municipalities may possess concurrent
power with the state to punish harmful conduct which is of both
state-wide and local concern, a$ long as the city ordinance does not
conflict with the state statute.
The Davis decision also brought to light a new and different
problem for Colorado municipalities. The court found that there
exist~d independent grounds for holding the ordinance in question
to be void. In this connection, the court said:13
Another and independent reason for holding
that the ordinance in question is ultra vires
is the conflict in penalty which has been
pointed out. The ordinance imposes a jail
sentence of 90 days, whereas the statute
imposes a jail sentence of 6 months. This
reaso~, apart from the failure of the general assembly to manifest a consent to the
exercise of authority, furnishes a basis
for declaring the ordinance to be void.
Many attorneys wonder~d. if this meant that a municipal
ordinance was void if the penalty was not the same as that which
could be imposed under a counterpart criminal statute. The penalties
for ordinance violations are generally limited by statute (for general law cities and towns) or home rule charter to 90 days in jail
and/or a $300 fine. But most statutory criminal proceedings do not
have these same limitations. If this is the meaning of the Davis
case, then none of the city ordinances would be valid. In addition,
none of the penalties could be changed until new legislation was
adopted by the legislature or until charter amendments are secured
by a vote of the people. If this is the case, it would seem that
the decision in the Pike case might have been different since the
statutory penalty for speeding was quite different from the ordinance
penalty.
The Court's Most Recent Views. On March jB, 1960 in Retallack
v. Police Cburt of the City of Colorado Springs,l the supreme court
deviated further from its holding in the Merris case. The court
upheld a municipal ordinance which punished reckless driving where
the violator exceeded the speed of 55 miles per·hour in the city
limits, in spite of the state statute covering reckless driving.
The opinion in this case was written by Justice Edward Day with a
special concurring opinion by Justice Doyl~, and dissents by Justices

13.
14.

Ibid.
Retallack v. Colorado Springs, Colorado Bar Association Advance
Sheet No. 15, 1960.
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Frantz and Hall. This reflection of court sentiment included the
following statement:15
It is to be noted that although the Merris
case did establish ~he offense of drunken
driving to be of state-wide concern and
governed by state statute, the most significant contribution to law in this state
which arose out of that case was a guaranty
to all citizens that trials for municipal
violations in municipal courts would be in
accordance with criminal process. That
being the case, no person charged under a
municipal ordinance can be prejudiced by
leaving as much of local law intact as can
be done without violating individual rights
or undermining state sovereignty.

--

-

•

•

Less than three months later, the court ruled in Gazotti
v. City and County of Denver that the subject of larceny was not a
matter of local or municipal concern over which the City and County
of Denver can exercise jurisdiction by virtue of provisions of
Article XX of the Colorado Constitution.16 The question arose over
a Denver. ordinance providing that: It shall·be unlawful for any
person to take and carry away or attempt to take and carry away,
with intent to steal or purloin or convert to his own use or
possession, anything of value to the owner.
In his majority opinion, Justice Moore cited Colorado
statutes on larceny and referred to the Merris case and the subsequent decisions (cited above) except Retallack v. Colorado
Springs, and stated that these cases pointed "inescapably to the
conclusion that the subject of the ordinance involves a matter of
state-wide concern covered by a state statute as distinguished from
a matter of local and municipal concern."17
Justice Hall in a special concurring opinion referred to
the Retallack case in which. the court determined reckless and
careless driving to be matters of local concern. He stated that
the Retallack case and the Gazotti case were parallel and the same
arguments applied to both. He added that if there are substantial
grounds for distinguishing between the two cases, those reasons
should be stated.

«

•

15.
16.

-

17.

Ibid .
Gazotti v. City and County of Denver, Colorado Bar Association
Advance Sheet, June 13, 1960, Vol. 12, No. 20, p. 561.
Ibid.
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In another concurring opinion, Justice Doyle discussed the
difference between the Retallack and Gazotti cases. He stated that
the proper question in the Gazotti case is: "whether larceny is a
matter of exclusively local concern (i.e., where the interests of
municipalities so• outweigh the intsres1:S of the state as to preclude
any state control of the activity within the municipality); and'if
it is not, whether on balance the interest of the state as a whole
are so ~reat as to require that it retain sole legislative jurisdiction over this matter of 'state-wide concern.'"18
He pointed out that the City and County of Denver had
sougnt to define an offense which has been recognized from earliest
common law as a part of the inherent sovereignty of the state and
that the seriousness of the crime requires: 1) a uniform definition
of the penalty; and 2) larceny be included among those crimes which
are exclusively within the power of the state. He added that these
features are not present in the Retallack case, wherein local interests
justify a holding that reckless driving is susceptible to local
legislative jurisdiction.
The Status of Municipal Jurisdiction. The present status
of municipal jurisdiction is difficult -- perhaps impossible -to determine. It should be emphasized that many questions raised
by the Merris decision still remain for court interpretation, and it
may be a long time before the extent of the power of municipalities
to enact penal ordinances can be delineated with the same certainty
as before the Merris case. Analysis of the cases already decided
leads to the following alternative possibilities:

J
C

J

.

1. The Areas of State-Wide Concern and Local Concern are
Mutually Exclusive; the State Cannot Delegate its Power to Regulate
over Matters of State-Wide Concern. This is the view expressed in
the Merris case and appears to be the present view of a minority
of the court -- Justices Hall and Frantz. This view appears to
allow little, if any, room for concurrent state and municipal jurisdiction. Furthermore, it would appear that there can be no exercise
of aut~ority in matters of stat~-wide concern by municipalities -even where such authority is. delegated to municipalities by the
state through the legislature. What is of state-wide concern and
what is of local concern can only be determined by the particular
characteristics of the matter regulated and a careful application
of the state constitution. Under this theory, the regulation of
drivers' licenses and related driving offenses are exclusively
reserved for the state; but the regulation of speed limits within
municipal boundaries are exclusively a matter of local and municipal
concern.
18.

Ibid.
,l

.
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2. Authorit to Reoulate Matters Predominant! of As O osed
to Exclusive Statr-Wide Concern but Also of Local and Munici al
Importance may be Delegated to Municipalities. This view, expressed
by Justice Doyle in the Davis case, is a recognition that areas of
both state-wide und local concerm may be regulated by municipalities
if the state consents to such local regulation. But where the
delegation has not been specifically made, such as i& the case in the
parking of vehicles, flow of traffic through control signals, creation
of one-way streets, and regulating speed and traffic intersections,
it must be concluded that this auLhority has been pre-empted by the
state and has been withheld from the municipalities.
3. Municipal Ordinances Regulating Matters of State-Wide
Concern Concurrentl with the State and Valid Unless Such Provisions
Re ulate in those Areas of Exclusive State-Wide Concern and or
yndermine State Sovereignty. The mo~t recent opinion of the court
suggests that municipalities can regulate concurrently with the state
in matters of state-wide concern -- even without the consent of the
state. However, in no event can local authorities regulate in matters
of exclusive state-wide concern (such as the regulation of driver
licensing and larceny), nor may local ordinances interfere with state
sovereignty. In those areas regulated by the state, which also have
features of local concern, municipalities may pass valid ordinances
consistent with state law.

Conclusion: As previously indicated, the present status of
municipal jurisdiction may be contingent on any one or a combination
of the above theories. However, the three views described above
reflect chronologically the changing position of the court majority.
,.

...

....

A study of all cases arising from the Merris case seems to
indicate that the court has changed from its original holding, that
matters of state-wide concern and matters of local concern are
mutually exclusive. The court has taken a more moderate position
regarding the power of municipalities to enact penal ordinances •
There is a recognition that _the state has the power to delegate the
necessary authority to regulate matters of both state-wide and local
concern to municipalities. It is also possible that the most recent
view implies the validity of penal ordinances which do not regulate
in the field of exclusive state interest and do not conflict with
the exercise of state sovereignty, regardless of legislative
delegation by the state.

«
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CHAPTER III

...

JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION -- THEORY AND PRACTICE
A Brief History
Court organization and efficiency have been matters of great
concern since the Civil War. Eastern states found that their court
systems (based closely on British judicial organization), with a
multi~ude of courts, overlapping jurisdictions, and (in some states)
separate courts of law and equity, resulted in a costly and timeconsuming judicial process and the inefficient use of judicial manpower. The problems were somewhat different in the newer states of
the mid and far west. Even though these states established simpler
and more functional court systems than the eastern states, they found
the efficient administration of justice hampered first, by wide
expanses of area, limited population, and poor transportation and
communications systems, causing the creation of a variety of minor
courts to serve local areas, and later by rapid increases in population and economic expansion, which overburdened their judicial
systems.
During the period from 1860 to 1900, efforts at improving
the administration of justice were concentrated on meeting problems
as they arose as expediently as possible, and little thought was
given to overhauling the basic judicial structure to anticipate
future needs. Under the authority to set up inferior courts usually
conferred on state legislatures following the precedent of the
federal constitution, arrears in the courts of general jurisdiction
could be dealt with by setting up new courts, by creating ne!
circuits or districts, or by adding to the number of judges.

l

The states were usually more restricted in approaches to
reducing appellate case backlogs, because for the most part their
constitutions had somewhat detailed and rigid provisions as to the
ultimate courts of review. 2 Remedies either required constitutional
amendment or were lim1ted to whatever arrangements could be made by
the legislatures within the constitutional limitations. -For this
reason, the supreme court commlssion plan and the creation of intermediate courts of appeal proved the most widely used methods of
relieving the burden of the final court of appeal, although constitutional amendment was required in a number of states before an
intermediate court could b~ created.
As a consequence of the piecemeal appraoch taken to solve
judicial problems,_ most states, regardless of the court organization
with which they began, faced the 20th century with a non-integrated,
multi-level court system with overlapping jurtsdiction, presenting
1.

2.

Pound, op. cit., p. 194.
Ibid.

,;
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numerous possibilities for multiple trials and appeals. That this
situation still exist~ is illustrated by the following comment on the
Alabama court system.
Stemming from the legtslative power to
create courts "inferior to the supreme
court," there ha~ bloomed a plant of
marvelous variety and profusion. Combine law and equity, civil and criminal
jurisdiction in any reasonable proportions;
engraft at random rules of procedure from
circuit courts: probate courts, and justice
of the peace courts; add a few special
rules of procedure not to be found in
any other Alabama court. Such a court
would be at home in Alabama for there
are many such creations ... in existence
today.

.

.,.

-

The conspicuous defects of most state court systems at the
end of. the last century have been defined as :4
... was-tt.e of judicial manpower, waste of
time and money of litigants and public
time and money because of hard and fast
jurisdictional lines ill defined and
frequently changed before judicial
decision could draw clear bounds, hard
and fast terms raising unnecessary
techhical questions and wasting the time
of the courts, piecemeal handling of
single controversies simultaneously in
different courts and general want of
cooperation between court and court and
judge and judge in the same court for
want of any real administrative head •

...

.,._

.

Approaches to Court Reorganization Since 1900

•

While many states (especially those with populations still
predominantly rural) created additional minor courts or altered the
jurisdiction of those already in existence during the first two
decades of the twentieth century, a different approach to efficient
administration of justice and elimination of court congestion was
being considered. Court unification with judicial administrative
control and the elimination of unnecessary minor courts with overlapping jurisdiction was looked upon as the best way to handle

C

•
~

'

.

3.
4,

Alabama Law Review, "Reorganization of Court Structure," Phillip
Smith and Neil H. Graham, Fall and Spring 1958, Vol. 10, p. 189.
Pound, op. cit., p. 252.

\
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judicial business. In part, support for this approach resulted from
the success of the federal court system reorganization which took
place in the latter part of the nineteenth century and from the
consolidation of English General Courts in 1875 •

.

Improvement in the means of transportation, increased population,. and the population shift from rural to urban in many states
eliminated much of the need for the minor courts which had been
created during the previous twenty to thirty years. As these minor
courts became less important there was a marked drop in the quality
of aspirants for these judicial positions, with an equal reduction
in the quality of justice dispensed in these courts.
Unfortunately, the changing conditions which reduced the
need for these courts did not result in elimination of these courts
or curtailment of their jurisdiction .. In fact, as the more important
courts of original jurisdiction became overburdened because of
incr~ased litigation, these minor courts in many instances were given
increased jurisdiction (a good example is the conversion of justice
courts into traffic courts), without any change in the judicial
framework to accommodate a greater case load, and without central
administrative organization and control.5

JII

•

-

The heavily-populated states of the east, with more separate
specialized courts than states in the midwest and west, felt strongly
the effects of separate overlapping jurisdictions. The work of
courts of review was greatly increased by appeals concerning which
lower court had proper jurisdiction.6
Recognition of the inadequacies of the minor courts led to
the right of appeal through trials de novo in higher courts of
original jurisdiction. In most instances these courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the minor courts from which appeals were
made. Substantial increases in the number of trials de novo also
produced congestion and delay in the higher level courtse>f°original
jurisdiction.
5.

6.

Both Dean Pound in the work P.reviouslv cited and Judge Harvey
Uhlenhopp, Iowa Law Review, 'Judicial Reorganization in Iowa,"
Fall, 1958, Vol. 44, No. 1, and other writers on the subject
make much of this point. Examples are cited of overworked judges
and court congestion in growing metropolitan areas while rural
judges at the same court level had much smaller case loads. In
most states there was no expeditious method to effect transfer
and assignment of judges according to work-load needs.
This was especially the case in New Jersey where prior to court
reorganization in 1948, there were separate courts of law and
equity. See Rutgers Law Review, "New Jersey's Court System,"
Volume 2, No. 1, 1948, p. 64-73.
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As was indicated earlier, not all states felt the impact of
these changes on their court systems at the same time. Court
structures in the states which were experiencing relatively slow
growth in population and urbanization were, of course, able to
function within the existing framework for a longer period of time.
Even these states have had con$iderable court congestion and delay
sin~e the second world war, and in many the problem became complicated
further by the rapid development of one or two metropolitan areas
while the remainder of the state retained its rural character.

..

.
As court congestion multiplied in state after state, members
of the bench and bax, legislative committees, and interested lay
groups made studies which led to recommendations designed to improve
court efficiency. While these studies and recommendations varied
according to local conditions and the time at which the study was
made, in general they had the following as primary goals:

...

1) elimination of at least some inferior courts of specialized
jurisdiction and removal of concurrent jurisdiction wherever possible;

.

.

...

"".

2) administrative control of the judicial system through the
chief justice of the highest state court with the help of an adequate
administrative staff;
3) streamlining of the judicial system to effect the concept
of one trial and one appeal; and
4)

,.

better judicial selection.

Judge Laurance M. Hyde, Missouri Supreme Court, made the
following comment on the shift in emphasis from a number of separate
courts to a more unified court system.?
LPreviously ... courts and judges were isolated
from each other and most state judicial departments were composed of a group of completely
separate courts. Court systems lacked unity and
flexibility; There was no real responsible head
to the system, and provisions for transfer of
judges were lacking or inadequate. If some courts
were unable to keep up their dockets while others
had insufficient work, there was neither responsibility
nor authority to do anything about it. The usual
remedy was to add more local or specialized courts
but this only added to the inefficiencies and
inequalities of a hodgepodge of s~parated courts .
These coDditions were the principal cause of many
ca.ses being decided on technicalities of juris-

...

_

.,
•
•

-

7.

Notre Dame Lawyer, "Essentials of a Modern State Judicial System",
Judge Laurance M. Hyde, Vol. 30, 1954-55, pp. 228 and 229.
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diction, venue and trial and appellate procedure,
instead of on the merits. In many states, at
least until very recently, courts have continued
to operate almost as completely separated and unrelated as in pioneer times; and this has usually
resulted in congestion of do~kets causing unnecessary expense and delay to litigants. Modern conditions require a flexible, unified system and
that is the real remedy. Our courts should no
longer be handicapped in efforts to maintain
public respect for the law by being forced to
_ attempt to keep up with the pace of modern
business and industry without the organization
and facilities to do so.

"

l"his trend of proposing unified trial courts with special
divisions where needed rather than se,parate special trial courts
has been accompanied by the premise that the reduction in the
numbez of trial courts with overlapping jurisdiction and in trials
de .lli2.Y.Q. would obviate the need for intermediate courts of appeal
in all but the most populous states.
Present Approaches to Judicial Reorganization
The administration of justice in a democratic
society -- and democratic government generally
is a dynamic thing, constantly responding to
changed conditions and to the changed demands
of the people. A court system embodying the
latest principles of judicial organization and
management today may become outmoded within a
generation and oQerate to defeat justice rather
than promote it.8

:

Recommendations for court reorganization have had as a common
goal an efficient, flexible judicial system manned by qualified
judges and other court personnel, with speedy and competent litigation
as the end product. This hap been the case even though the recommendations have varied according to state economic, population, and
political conditions, constitutional limitations, and the time at
which the recommendations were made.
General Principles
Perhaps Dean Pound has enumerated general principles which
should govern court reorganization:9
8.

9.

Administration of Justice in Connecticut, David Marr and Fred
Kort, Institute of Public Service, University of Connecticut,
April 1917, p. 14.
Pound, op. cit., pp. 275-276.
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••. The controlling ideas should be unification,
flexibility, conservation of judicial power, and
responsibility. Unification is called for in
order to concentrate the machinery of justice
upon its task, flexiQility in order to enable
it to meet speedily and efficiently the
continually varying demands made upon it,
responsibility in order that some one may
always be held and easily stand out as the
official to be held if the judicial organization
is not fuctioning the most efficiently that the
law and the nature of its tasks permit. Conservation of judicial power is a sine~ non
of efficiency under the circumstan'c'es of tne
time. There are so many demands pressing upon
the government for expenditure of public money
that so costly a mechanism as the system of
courts cannot justify needless and expensive
duplications and archaic business methods.
Moreover, waste of judicial power impairs the
ability of courts to give individual cases the
thorough going consideration which every case
ought to have at their hands. Administrative
organization of the entire system ••. and
responsible superintending control of the
whole is as important as the reform of procedure upon which the profession and the
public have concentrated their attention for
a generation.
As indicated above, studies and recommendations made during
the past twenty to thirty years have revolved around a unified
court system as the means of achieving the desired goal; but a
unified court system has meant different things in different states.
For example, in New York it took the form of a six-layer court
system with two courts of appeal and four court levels of original
jurisdiction. In Iowa and Wisconsin it has mean a two or threelevel judicial system with one court of appeals, and in both of these
states reorganization plans have been modified to retain at least
a portion of the existing minor court system. In Alaska, it has
meant a two-level court system, with the possibility of additional
minor courts as needed. The New Jersey court system, considered a
model for reorganization, has four levels of courts •

•
Judicial Selection
In most of the recent court reorganization studies, the
assurance of a well-qualified judiciary as free as possible from
external pressures has been considered a goal equal to that of
providing a unified, flexible court system. The election of judges
has received continued criticism from advocates of judicial reform,
whose objections may be summarized as follows: The election or
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defeat of a judicial candidate usually has nothing to do with his
judicial qualifications or experience, because the electorate is
usually unaware of his fitness for judicial office. The elective
proce~s subjects a judge to unnecessary political pressure and results
in his spending an inordinate amount of time trying to retain his
office. A well qualified judiciary depends on careful initial
s~lection and tenure based on competent performance of judicial
duties; neither can be assured when judges are elected.

..

No recommendation for judicial reform meets as much opposition
as proposals to do away with the election of judges. In some states,
such proposals have either been deleted or postponed in order not to
jeopardize court reorganization. The election of judges is stoutly
defended as being as integral a part of the democratic process as
the election of executive officials and legislators.

0

Amerrcan Bar Association (Missouri Plan)
Considerable study has been given to the development of a
judicial selection plan which would combine the best ingredients of
an appointive system with some sort of review by the electorate. The
American Bar Association Plan, adopted in 1937, represents one such
approach.~O Judicial vacancies would be filled by appointment by the
governor or other elected official or officials, but from a list
submitted by a committee composed of high judicial officers and of
other citizens who hold no other public office. If further check
upon the appointment is desired, such check may be supplied by the
requirement of confirmation of appointments by the state senate or
both houses of the legislature. The appointee, after a period of
service, should be eligible for reappointment periodically, or
periodically go before the people on his record with no opposing
candidate, the people voting upon the question, "Shall Judge ____
be retained in office?"
A number of objections have been raised
to this proposal, the most significant of which are: 1) While the
power of selection is placed on an official responsible to the
people, his choice is limited to_those candidates suggested by a
committee which is not publi.cly responsible. 2) If voters do nqt
have sufficient knowledge to determine the best-qualified judge
~hen offered two choices, they cannot be expe~ted to have sufficient
knowledge to evaluate properly a judge's performance in office.
3) The absence of an alternate choice in such referrals to the
electorate will result in little voter interest, with the result
that a judge's retention . in office will depend on the opinion of a
v~ry small number of people, which defeats the purpose of this provision.
10.

This plan is now commonly known as the Missouri Plan since the
general provisions were incorporated in the Missouri Constitution
in the revision resulting from the constitutional convention of
1945.
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Present Methods of Judicial Selection
There are four methods used by the 50 states for the selection
of judges of appellate and major trial courts: partisan election ·
non-partisal election, election•of legislature, and appointment.ll
.
Partisan Election. Nineteen states: Alabama, Arkansas,
COLORADO, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia.
~

-

Nonpartisan Election •.. Eighteen states: Arizona, California
(trial courts only), Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Election by Lefislature. Four states: Rhode Island (supreme
-court only~ South Caro ina, Vermont, and Virginia.
Appointment. Twelve states: Alaska, California (appellate
judges only), Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas (supreme court
only), Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Rhode Island (trial courts only).
The twelve states with appointed judg~, may be divided into
three categories:
1. Appointment by Governor with Senate approval:
Delaware, Hawaii, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.'

Connecticut,

2. Appointment by Governor with approval of Special Council
or Commission: California, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.

,

3.

Mis 2ouri Plan:

Alaska, Kansas, and Missouri.

The operation of judicial appointment plans by the states
within each category_ is discussed in detail below.
Appointment by Governor -- Senate approval:

,

11.

Three states use different methods of selection for appellate
and trial court judges. California's appellate judges are
appointed and its trial court judges elected by non-partisan
ballot. Rhode Island's supreme court is elected by the legislature and its trial court judges appointed. Kansas supreme
court judges. are appointed under the Missouri plan and trial
court judges are elected on partisan ballots.
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Connecticut. There are no statutory restrictions on the submission of nominations by the governor, nor is he required to consult
any other group or council prior to placing judicial nominations
before the senate. Court of common pleas judges are appointed for
four~year terms and superior court judges and justices of the supreme
court of error are appointed for terms of eight years. There is
mandatory retirement for all judges at age 70.

..

Delaware. Supreme, superior court, and orphan's court judges
are appointed for 12-year terms. There are only two restrictions on
judicial nominations placed before the senate. First, judges must be
citizens and learned in the law. Second, there are political
restrictions. No more than two of the three supreme court justices
shall be of the same major party; at least one shall be of the other
major party. No more than three of the five superior court and
orphan's court judges shall be of the same major party; at least
two of the five shall be of the other major party.

•

Hawaii. The new constitution provides that the supreme and
circuit court judges shall be nominated and appointed by the governor
with the advice and consent of the senate. Supreme court justices
are appointed for seven-year terms and circuit court judges for sixyear terms. Retirement is mandatory at age 70.
New Jersey. Supreme :court, intermediate appellate court, and
superior court judges are appointed initially for seven-year terms.
Upon reappointment they serve until retirement at age 70 contingent
upon good behavior. As a matter of tradition, confirmation of
judicial nominations is initiated by the senator from the nominee's
home district. If confirmation is initiated in this way, it is
almost always confirmed as senatorial courtesy. If the home district
senator does not make the motion for acceptance, the nomination usually
is not confirmed. In order to be eligible for judicial appointment,
the following qualifications must be met: U.S. citizenship, ten
years' New Jersey residence, learned in the law with ten years' legal
experience, good character, and bar membership.

•

j

.•

Rhode Island. This appointive system is similar to that
used for federal courts. Superior court judges are appointed for
life terms by the governor with senate confirmation. Although supreme
court judges are elected by the legislature, they also have life
terms.
Appointment by Governor -- Special Council or Commission
Approval:
California. This plan actually is a hybrid, because it incorporates one of the main features of the Missouri Plan -- namely, that
appointed judges are required to run for re-election on their records.
Supreme court and district court of appeals judges are appointed
initially by the governor with approval of the Commission on Qualifications. Initial appointment is for 12 years. The California
Commission on Qualifications is presently composed of the chief
justice, the presiding justice of a district court of appeals, and the
attorney general.
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Massachusetts. Supreme, superior, and district court judges
are appointed by the governor with consent of the executive council
for life terms, subject to good behavior. The council consists of
e.ight members in additio~ to the lieutenant governor. These eight
members are elected by district on a partisan ballot for two-year
terms. The only requirement for council eligibility is Massachusetts
residency f~r five years •

.

...

.

►
...

I ,.._

...
.,,.

Maine. Supreme and superior court judges are appointed for
seven-year terms by the governor, with consent of the executive
council. The council consists of seven members who are chosen
biennially by a joint ballot of senators and representatives. The
only·qu~lifications for serving ~n the council are U.S. citizenship
and Maine residency.

.

New Hampshire. This state follows the same procedure• as its
neighboring states, Maine and Massachusetts. Appointment is also for
a life term, as in Massachusetts. The council consists of five
members who must meet the same qualifications as members of the
New Hampshire senate. These council members are elected biennially.
Judges may be removed by action of the legislature, but it cannot
initiate such action. The governor must bring the matter before the
legislature, and he must gain council approval to take such ittion .
Missouri Plan:
Alaska. The three supreme court justices are appointed by
the governor from a list submitted by the judicial council. Each
supreme court justice is subject to approval or rejection on a nonpartisan ballot at the first general election held more than three
years after his appointment. Thereafter each supreme court justice
is subject to approval or rejection every tenth year. Superior
court judges are appointed and stand initial election in the same
manner. Subsequent election or rejection is at six-year intervals .

,._

,..

.,.

,

•

Kansas. Supreme court judges are appointed by the governor
from nominations submitted by a non-partisan supreme court nominating
commission. The commission submits three nominations for each
vacancy. Each supreme court justice so appointed holds office until
the first general election at least 12 months after his appointment.
Each judge runs on his record on a non-partisan ballot. If approved
by a majority of those voting, he serves a six-year term, when once
again he is placed on the general election ballot for confirmation.
The nominating commission is composed of 13 members. The chairman
is selected at large from the Kansas bar by its members. One member
of the bar is elected by the bar membership in each of the six
congressional districts. One non-lawyer is appointed from each
congressional district by the governor.
Missouri. Supreme court justices, court of appeal judges,
and circuit court judges from Jackson (Kansas City) and St. Louis
counties are all appointed initially by the governor from nominations

,.
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submitted by special commissions. After one year in office, they run
for re-election on their records. Upon re-election supreme court
justices serve for 12 years and the other judges for six years. The
selection commission for the appellate courts is composed of the chief
justice of the supreme court (chairman), three lawyers elected by the
bar, and three laymen appointed by the governor. The members other
than the chief justice have staggered six-year terms and are not
eligible to succeed themselves.

..

The selection commissions for the two circuit courts have
five ~embers each. They are the presiding judge of the court of
appeals in the county where the court is located, two laymen appointed
by the governor and two attorneys elected by the bar. The legal and
lay members serve six-year staggered terms and are not eligible to
serve again.
Judicial Reform in Other States
In many states in which court studies have been made, it has
taken a number of years to put the resultant recommendations into
~ffect. Often these changes when adopted were not as extensive as
had been proposed, and in some states, court reorganization proposals
are yet to be acted upon favorably, even after years of study.
Court studies in other states have taken two different
approaches. Either study is made of the entire court system and its
administratipn, or a portion is studied, such as minor courts, administration and procedure within the existing court structure, or
judicial selectioh and tenure. Experience in most states has shown
that fractional improvements may not be too successful unless considered in respect to the system as a whole. Often further problems
are created which were not anticipated at the time limited improvements were adopted:
It is perhaps fallacious to attempt to remedy
one particular area of the judicial system
when it is the whole creature that needs
treatment. Ideally, for reform purposes, the
system should be considered as a whole. Only
in this manner can the most efficient system
be evolved. It is rare, however, that such
a sweeping reform has been instituted. Mostly
improvement has come in bits and pieces, in
one area or another, without consideration of
the effects of that improvement in light of
remaining defects. 2

12.

Alabama Law Review, "Reorganization of Court Structure"•PP· 141
and 142.
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Court Reorganization in Other States
Connecticut. Court reorganization has been under study in
Connecticut for over thirty years, beginning with the formation of
that state's judicial council i~ 1927.13 Since that time the court
system has been the subject of study by a series of bar association
committees, legislative committees, and little Hoover commissions,
in addition to the judicial council. From 1950 until the present
time, several proposals for reorganizing and unifying the court
system have been before the Connecticut General Assembly~ Portions
oj these proposals have been adopted, but no reo~gan~zation plan has
gained complete acceptance. In 1953, the chief Justice was ~ade
head of the judicial department, and the supreme court was given
rule-making powers. In the 1959 legislative tession, a minor court
reorganization plan was adopted. Under the new law which will take
effect January l, 1961, the 66 municipal courts and the 102 justice
courts will be abolished and replaced by a new 44-judge state-Operated circuit court.14
·
As noteworthy as these changes appear to be, the_y are_
only a small segment of all the reorganization plans which have been
before' the legislature in various forms since 1950. After court reorganization had failed to pass in 1953, the Connecticut Legislative
Council was given the two proposals then before the legislature for
further study. During 1954-55, the Council held a series of meetings
around the state on these two proposals a~g found that the public had
little concern with court reorganization.
From 1956 through the
present time, judges, members of the bar, and interested legislators
have attempted to stimulate public concern and support. This was done
through the joint efforts of the League of Women Voters and the formation of a citizens' committee which was headed by a retired $Upreme
court judge, who directed the 1943 Connecticut court study.lb
Wisconsin. In Wisconsin, court reorganization has been
under study since 1913. The Wisconsin Judicial Council made its
first proposal for complete reorganization in 1955. It recommended
a constitutional amendment providing a judicial system organized
on a tw?-court basis -- a supreme court as the court of appeals,
and a circuit court with complete original jurisdiction to handle
all matters then heard by circuit and statutdry courts and justices
of the peace.17 This proposal, with a modification which reinstated
the justices of the peace, was approved by the legislature in 1955,
but was defeated in 1957 when it was reintroduced for the necessary
13.

14.

)

15.
16.
17.

Journal of American Judicature Society, "Court Reorganization
in Connecticut", David Marra,Vol. 4l, No. 1, June 1957, p. 6.
Journal of American Judicature Society, Vol. 42, No. 6, April
1959, p. 199.
Marrs, op cit., p. 13.
Ibid.
Approval of a proposed constitutional amendment at two successive
legislative sessions is required before it c~n be placed on the
ballot.
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second approva1.l8 The problem was then referred back to the Judicial
Council for further study, with instructions to submit a new plan to
the 1959 legislature.
The new plan which was adopted by the legislature in 1959
provided a court organization consisting of the supreme court, circuit courts, county courts, and justices of the peace. Specialized
statutory courts were abolished and their functions taken over by
the expanded county court system. Jurisdiction of justices of the
peace would be restricted and greater administrative control would
be placed with the supreme court and chief justice.19
At the same legislative session, preliminary approval was
given to two proposed constitutional amendments affecting the courts.
The first would restrict any person over 70 years of age from becoming a judge of a court of record and would require mandatory retirement
for any judge of a court of record who had attained that age. 2 0 At
prese~t this restriction and retirement provision applies only to
supreme court justices. Also included was authorization for the
supreme court to assign former supreme court justices and other
former judges of courts of record on a temporary basis to serve as
.judges of any court of record. The second proposed constitutional
amendment would give the legislature the authority to provide by
law for the specialization of judges in certain types of judicial
matters in multi-judge circuit courts.21
New Jersey. The New Jersey court reorganization program
which was adopted by constitutional change in 1947 has been considered a model for other states, as have the study and the campaign
for public support which preceded its adoption. Yet, the peculiar
nature of New Jersey's court system prior to reorganization and the
population density and geographic compactness of that state have
little resemblance to conditions in the midwest and Rocky Mountain
areas. What is relevant about New Jersey's achievement is not the
exact nature of the results, but the thoroughness of the reorganization plan and the means by which it was achieved.
The court reorganization of 1947 was the end product of a
sustained effort of 16 years, and this effect was just the la
in
a series of attempted judicial reforms dating back 100 years.
Governors, members of the judiciary, and lawyers of renown were
associated with these earlier attempts, but their efforts were
thwarted by the lethargy of those in sympathy and by the intense
activity of those opposed.23

21

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Wisconsin Ju~1cial Council, op. cit., pp. 4 and 5.
Chapter 315, Laws of Wisconsin, 1958-1959.
Joint Resolution No. 37, Laws of Wisconsin, 1958-1959.
Joint Resolution No. 42, Laws of Wisconsin, 1958-1959.
Rutaers University Law Review, ''New Jersey's New Court System,"
Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1948, p. 62.
Ibid.
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Prior to reorganization, the New Jersey court system was
closely patterned after British judicial organization, with separate
courts of chancery and law and a multitude of minor courts with overlapping jurisdiction. There was a significant volume of appellate
cases whose disposition turned ~~lely on the jurisdictional cleavage
between law and equity courts. 24 Many times litigants were forced
to resort to several courts before their controversy could be fully
adjudicated. In one case (involving $2,500 on an insurance policy}
the litigants had to go through nine trials and appeals lasting eight
years to settle the question. In another, the litigants were compelled
to go through five separate hearings in various courts and then found
tnemselves back where they started.25

"'

....

The reorganization plan was designed to reduce the number
of courts, eliminate the barrier between law and equity, simplify
appellate procedure, and provide centralized administrative control •

...

There were three basic principle$ which guided the committee
which drafted the new judicial article:26

...

First: Unification of Courts. By this
means, the judicial system is simplified
and the condition for economical and
efficient administration established.
It is the sole known technique for
abolishing jurisdictional controversies
which delay justice and waste the time
and money of litigants and courts.

\,, ·,

Second: Flexibility of the Court System.
By assignment of judges according to
ability, experience and need, and apportionment of judicial business among courts,
divisions, and parts according to the
volume and type of cases, judicial resources
can be fully utilized and litigation
promptly decided.

.

"\
\

,_

Third: Control Over Administration,
Practice and Procedure by Rules of Court.
Exclusive authority over administration,
and primary responsibility for establishing rules of practical procedure, secures
businesslike management of the courts as a
whole and promotes simplified and more
economical judicial procedure.

\

I
I

\

V

~

'

~

,..

.

.>

.._

24.
25.
26.

Ibid., pp. 72-73.
Rutgers University Law Review, "Progress in New Jersey Judicial
Administration," Vol. 3, No. 2, June 1949, p. 161.
"New Jersey's New Court System," pp. 75-76 .
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The New Jersey judicial article now provides for a supreme
court, superior courts, county courts, and inferior courts of limited
jurisdiction. Inferior courts and their jurisdiction may be.
established, altered or abolished by law.· The sup,reme court is
given the authority to make rules g6verning the administration of
all courts and, subject to law, .the practice and procedure in all
such courts.27
·

I

The superior court· is the court of original general jurisdiction and also has a~ appellate division. The county courts' _
juri~dittion includes the jurisdiction formerly exercised by five
other courts. Each county court may have more than one judge.28
Pursuant to the inferior court authority given it by the judiciar
article, the New Jersey legislature established a state-wide ~ystem
of municipal courts to .handle'pdlice, traffic, and small claims
matters.
·
I

'

Appeals ·from the·cQunty:and ~uni6ipal couits lie to the
appellate ·division of the'sup~rio~ court. App~als which mai be ~aken
to the supreme court are limited to the follow~ng: l) cases determined
by the appell,te divisioh of the superior court involving~ cbnstitutional question (either state or federal); 2) casei in which
there was~ disse~t in the _appellate division of the superior court;
3) capital cases; 4) ·on certif_ication by the supI'eme court to tl)e
superior court, and where provided by rule of the supreme court to
county ~ourts and other inferior courts; and 5) sue~ causes as may
be provided by law.29
·
Judges are not appointed for a specific superior or county
court and may be ~ssigned anywhere in the state. A judge may receive
a permanent assignment~ but may be called upon to assist temporarily
in another court. To assist in the assignment of judges, th~
.
compilation and. analysis of judicial statistics, and in administ~ative
matters,_ the judicial administrator's office was established •. ·
·
Within two ·years the new court system:had _enabied a smalle~.
number of judges to dispose ,'of more _than 5'0 per cent more cases
i~ the same pe~bod _than di~ the old system and in a much smalle~ '·
time per case.
_
_
_
·_
.
. ·
_
27.
28.
29.
30.

The Judici~l Articles of the. Forty-Nine States, Compiled for
Commi.ttee on a Model Judicial .Article Section of Judicial
Administra~ion, A~erican Bar Association, 1959, unpaged.
Ibid.
Ibid.
"Progress in .l'~ew Jersey Judicial Administration," p. 178. Comparative. figures·_showed appeals were being disposed of in 21
days as compared with 134 under the old system and in similar
time periods 3,741 cases were disposed of under the new system
as compared with 2,442· under the old.
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Iowa. The Iowa court reorganization plan was based on a
study which originated in 1955. Iowa's judicial system originally
was extremely simple with only two general courts: the supreme
court for appellate review and the district court as the trial court
of general jurisdiction. In addition~ two minor .tribunals
mayors'
coutts and justice of the peace courts -- were establi~~ed to keep
the peace and settle minor disputes in outlying areas.
Had the Iowa court structure remained basically a two-level
system and had improvements been made in the minor courts to meet
changing conditions, there would have been no need for a major overhaul of the judicial structure; instead, additional courts were
added, and nothing was done to improve the ju$tice of the peace courts.

.
.

,...

....

.....
._

,,

,.

...

,.
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The urban shift in population and a change in litigation habits
resulted in disproportionate case loads in the different judicial
districts. Litigants settled a greater proportion of cases out of
court, and, as a result, in most places there were fewer trials .
some localities had become so populous, however, that in spite of
the reduction in trials, the district court could not meet the
demand~32 But the district court was not expanded or contracted to
meet the changing conditions in each particular area. In places where
litigation lessened, the court was left at its same size. Where
population became dense, the .state fell into the error that the
framers of the judicial article had avoided: separate independent
trial courts were created.33 As a result, Iowa's trial courts
eventually consisted of the following: district courts, superior
courts, municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts,
and mayors' courts. No improvements were made in the minor courts,
which gradually tell into disrespect even though traffic cases
increased the need for an adequate minor court system.
The Iowa reorganization plan was designed to produce a unified
court system and in effect is a return with some modification to the
two-level judicial system originally written into the Iowa constitution. All trial courts would be abolished except the district
court, which would become a two-level court. One level of the
district court would handle felonies, probate matters, and civil
cases over $2,000. The second level (presided over by associate
district judges) would handle all minor court cases and misdemeanors
including traffic offenses. Both sets of judges, however, could
preside on either court level as needed~
A simplified small claims procedure was recommended for all
civil cases not exceeding $100. Appellate review of minor cases
where no constitutional or legal questions are involved would be
made by one supreme court justice rather than by the supreme court
sitting in department or en bane. The Missouri plan was recommended
for the selection of judges.-

.
...

;.

31.
32.
33.

Uhlenhopp, op. cit., p. 7 .
Ibid., p. 8.
Ibid.·

>.
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The reorganization recommendations met with considerable
success in the 1959 Iowa legislative session. All of the proposals
were adopted except the creation of the new minor court system
(district court, second level) which would have abolished the 1,400
courts of limited jurisdiction.
Three recommendations were put into effect through legislation,
but the bulk of the changes could not be effected without constitutional amendment. Such an amendment was approved during the
1959 legislative session and must again be approved in 1961 before
placement on the ballot at the 1962 general election. Of the legislation passed, one act authorizes the chief justice to call
judicial conferences. Another empowers the supreme court to adopt
rules for the adninistration of all inferior courts in the state.
The third abolishes Iowa's rotating chief justiceship and provides
that the supreme court shall select (rom among its members a chief
justice to serve for the remainder of his term on the court.

..

4.

The proposed constitutional amendment as approved by the
legislature would bring about a number of changes. It would give
the supreme court administrative control of inferior courts and
permit the legislature to set salaries and qualifications for judges.
The legislature would establish a mandatory retirement system for
all judges. Finally, the amendment would provide that supreme
court justices and district judges be appointed by the governor
from lists submitted by nominating commissions.34
Idaho. The proposed judicial reorganization in Idaho 1s
of special significance to Colorado, because the present court
system is very similar to that of Colorado. Idaho has a supreme
court, district courts, probate courts (which are located in each
county and have similar jurisdiction to Colorado county courts), and
justices of the peace. In June of this year, the Idaho Bar Association Committee on Reform of Inferior CQurts made the following
recommendations after a two-year study.J5
1) Justice of the Peace Courts: These courts should be
made courts of record with no change of jurisdiction and be renamed
county courts. These county courts would have as many judges as
each county desired to provide. The judges of these courts should
receive salaries adequate enough to attract lawyers to the position,
or in those counties where lawyers are not available, the bestqualified lay judges.
2) Probate Courts: These courts should be abolished and
their jurisdiction transferred to the district courts, with the
provision of additional district judges where necessary. This jurisdiction includes probate, ~ental health, and juvenile matters.
34.
35.

State Government News, Council of State Governments, Vol. 2,
No. 5, May 1959, p. 6.
The Advocate, "Reform of Inferior Courts, Second Amended Reports,"
Idaho State Bar Foundation, June 1960, pp. 10-12.
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District court clerks would be given surrogate powers to handle
uncontested probate matters. Transfer of this jurisdiction to the
district court would insure that all matters would be heard by lawyer
judg~s, would eliminate trials de D.Q.Y.Q., and would provide a better
solution on a district basis for many practical problems relating to
mental health and juvenile delinquency. Detention facilities for
delinquents and court investigation and probation services provided
on a district basis would result in greater efficiency and economy.

-

<

'

-

3) Constitutional Amendment: A proposal to amend the
judicial article should be submitted at the 1961 session of the Idaho
Legislature, so that it can be referred to the voters in 1962. The
present constitution inhibits any substantial judicial reform. The
proposed amendment, patterned after the Hawaii and Alaska constitutions,
would allow by legislation such reforms of courts inferior to the
supreme court as might be desirable, ,while at the same time preserving
the district courts. Presently, justice of the peace courts, prob-ate courts, and municipal courts are, in a sense, constitutional
courts, and nothing substantial can be done until this situation
has been changed. This is especially true with respect to probate
courts, because most probate court jurisdiction cannot be transferred
to district courts until the constitution is amended.
The committee also recommended that: 1) further study be given
to the family court act and proposed rules of procedure for traffic
cases; 2) the legislature be requested to employ attorneys and
research personnel to draft the necessary legislation to accomplish
the recommended reforms and to make a detailed study of court case
load data and finances; and 3) a new bar association study committee
on judicial reform be created to carry on the work of the present
committee, with such committee not limited to inferior courts.36
Other States. Judicial reorganization studies have been made
recently or are currently being made in several other states including:
California, Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and
Rhode Island. All of these studies are aimed at: 1) simplifying
the existing court structure; 2) providing coordinated administrative
control under the supreme court through the chief justice; 3)
eliminating trial delay and unnecessary expense; and 4) assuring a
better-qualified judiciary through improvements in selection, salary,
and tenure.
In Florida, a five-year study by the Judicial Council has
resulted in a recommended constitutional amendment which would
overhaul the judicial article. This proposal is designed to simplif~
the court system and provide for greater flexibility and efficiency. 7

36.
37.

Ibid.
The Florida Bar Journal, ''A Proposal for Trial Court Revision,"
March 1959, pp. 1-50.
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A special committee of the North Carolina Bar Association
made a three-year study of that state's courts, at the request of
the governor. This committee made several recommendations and has
drafted the constitutional revision of the judicial article necessary
to put these changes into effect. Abolition of all minor courts and
replacement by a new district cqurt system were recommended. The
judicial system would consist of three court levels, all part of a
unified court system with central administrative control residing
in the supreme court. The superior court would be the trial court
of general jurisdiction and the new district court system would have
the jurisdiction currently exercised by the justice of the peace
courts, juvenile and domestic relations courts, and an assortment of
other minor tribunals. Magistrates would be appointed by the district
court to assure prompt hearing of minor civil matters and traffic
offenses, with the proviso that upon request of litigants or
defendants, cases would be heard by a district judge rather than a
magistrate.38

.

.•

< ..

The Oregon Interim Committee on Judicial Administration has
made several recommendations designed to improve court administration
and to reorganize and improve trial courts. These include the transfer of county court functions to the circuit court, the addition of
circuit judges, changes in some judicial district boundaries, and
abolition of justice of the peace courts. Jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace courts would be exercised by new district courts
which would be courts of record. The judges of this new court would
be assisted by commissioners having the authority of m~ijistrates
regarding preliminary hearings and the taking of bail.
The interim
committee also recommended increased judicial salaries, mandatory
retirement for judges, and judicial selection by the Missouri plan. 40
In Ohio, the state bar association has been studying court
problems for a number of years. In 1959, the legislature authorized
the Ohio Legislative Service Commission to make an extensive court
study. The authorization of this study followed by two years a
study made by the Ohio Legislative Service Commislion of minor court
problems, which resulted in the replacement of justices of the peace
by a new minor county court system. The Kentucky Legislative Council
is also making a study in that state. Both New York and California
have had legislative interim committees studying judicial organization,
administration, and procedure. 4 1
38.
39.
40.
41.

Report of the Committee on Improvin9 and Expediting the Administration of Justice in North Carolina, North Carolina Bar
Association, December, 1958.
Third Annual Report, Oregon Judicial Council, 1958.
Ibid.
The work of these committees is not reported upon here because
the population and complex court problems of these states
severely limit the application of recommendations of these committees to Colorado.
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Minor Court Reform. In addition to Ohio, several states have
studied and replaced or modified their courts of limited jurisdiction
in recent years. California placed its justice courts on a judicial
district basis and required all justices of the peace to be attorneys.
Massachusetts and Rhode Island se-veiely limited the powers of justices
of the peace by transf•iring mqst of their authority and jurisdiction
to other courts. Maine, Tennessee, and Virginia took steps to
strengthen justice of the peace courts by reducing the number of
justices, eliminating the fee system, and making certain changes in
jurisdiction. Minor court studies have also been made or are still
i~ process in Arizona, Illinois, Montana, Utah, and Washington. The
Illinois study resulted in a constitutional amendment to reorganize
the minor court system. This amendment was defeated narrowly at the
1958 general election.42
Summary

-.
"'

.
,.

.,.
•

There has been a general pattern in the recent judicial
reorganization studies made by some 15 states, regardless of special
problems and the existing court structure. In all of these studies,
attention·has been directed toward the consolidation and simplification
of the judicial structure. The proliferation of trial courts resulted
largely from the creation of statutory courts over the years to meet
specific needs of the time. Improvement .in judicial administration
has been a major concern, as has been the problem of securing a
qualified judiciary. With respect to the latter, judicial selection,
salaries, tenure, and retirement have been given considerable study.
In some states, it was found that minor court revision could
not be made witho~considering changes in other levels of the court
system as well, e.g., in Idaho and North Carolin~. Generally, the
problems on the supreme court level were large appellate case loads
and lack of administrative control of the over-all court system.
Generally, few ·problems were found with respect to the highest state
courts of original jurisdiction. In most states, recommended changes
were confined to the provision of additional judges, modification of
judicial district boundaries, and administrative coordination. In
states with large, sparsely-populated areas, it was found that minor
courts could be upgraded satisfactorily only by adding to the jurisdiction of the highest trial couri and by abolishing the various
courts of least jurisdiction and replacing them with a new minor
court system.

.

A Fresh Appro~ch
The recent admission of Alaska and Hawaii to the union has
given these states several advantages in drafting their judicial

,.

42.

This summary of minor court changes is taken from. Justice Courts
in Colorado, Chapter III, pp. 55-64.

,.

.
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articles. The experiences in other states with problems resulting
from complex and restrictive constitutional judicial provisions
indicated what to avoid. Recent judicial studies and theories of
judicial administration have pointed to the types of court structures
and judicial articles which are most•desirable. Hawaii and Alaska
took advantage of this experience and information; the judicial
articles of both states and their court systems are models of
simplicity and flexibility.

The Alaska judicial article created a two-level court system
consisting of the supreme court and the superior court, which is the
trial court of general jurisdiction. While the article sets the
~number of judges for both the appellate and trial divisions, it provides that the number of supreme court justices may be increased by
law Ypon the request of the supreme court. The number of superior
court judges may be changed by the legislature without supreme
court request.43
In addition, section one of the judicial article provides
that the legislature may establish courts other than those expressly
authorized in the constitution. This section also gives the legislature the authority to prescribe court jurisdiction. There has
been some disagreement over the language in this section with some
fear that these provisions may subordinate the judicial branch to
the legislature. The opinion has been expressed that the sections
which provide that the supreme court shall have final appellate
jurisdiction and the superior court shall be the trial court of
general jurisdiction may be held to limit legislative restrictions
on jurisdiction.44

,

y

I

While this section gives the legislature authority to
establish additional courts, it also contains a provision to insure
against the creation of fragmentary minor courts over which no
control can be exercised by the supreme court. It does this by
providing that the co~rts shall constitute a unified judicial
system for operation and administration. Further, section 15 gives
the supreme court rule-making power governing the administration
of all courts as well as practice and procedure in all civil and
criminal cases in all courts. These rules may be changed, however,
by a two-thirds vote of both legislative houses.
Section 16 provides that the chief justice shall be the
administrative head of all courts, with poY-er to transfer judges
from one court or~ division thereof to another for temporary service.
The chief justice shall also appoint an administrative director with
43.
44.

The complete Alaska judicial article is contained in Appendix A.
Journal of the American Judicature Society, "A-Model Judiciary
for the 49th State," Thomas B. Stewart, Vol. 42, No. 2, August
1958.
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the approval of the supreme court. The Missouri plan for the appointment of judges is also incorporated in the judicial article, as is
the establishment of the Alaskan j 11dicial council.
The Alaska judicial arti~le ls claimed by its supporters to
incorporate the principles of judiciJl organization proposed and
backed by the American:Bar Association, the American Judicature
Society, the Institute of Judicial Administration, and other professional and civic groups.45
During the 1960 session, the Alaska legislature; acting pursuant to its power to create inferior courts and define the jurisdiction thereof, established a system of magistrate courts to handle
minor civil matters and misdemeanors. The magistrate courts are under
the administrative supervision of the superior court and the superior
court judge or judges in each judici~l district appoint the magistrates.

...
,.
,..

Hawaii

...

,.

I

-·

.
"

Hawaii's judicial article also establishes a basically twolevel court system, by providing that the judicial power of the state
shall be vested in one supreme court, circuit courts, and such
inferior courts as the legislature may from time to time establish. 4 6
These courts have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be
provided by law.
The Hawaii supreme court has five members, as compared with
Alaska's three. Authority is not contained in the judicial article
to increase the number of supreme court justices; rather, the chief
justice is given the power to assign circuit court judges to serve
temporarily on the supreme court when necessary .
Judges are appointed rather than elected, but instead of
the Missouri plan, the judicial article follows the New Jersey system
of selection. Judges are appointed by the governor with consent
of the senate. Supreme court justices are appointed for seven-year
terms and circuit judges for six-year terms. The age of mandatory
retirement is set at 70 years .

•

•

,.
'.

The chief justice is designated as administrative head of
the courts and he is given the authority to assign judges from one
circuit court to another for temporary service. The chief justice
is required to appoint a judicial administrator, with the approval
of the other supreme court justices. The judicial article also
confers upon the supreme court the power to promulgate rules and
regulations in all civil and criminal cases for all courts, relating
45.
46.

Ibid.
The complete Hawaii judicial article is contained in Appendix B.

~
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to process, practice, procedure and appeals, which shall have the.
force and effect of law. These and a few closely related provisions
comprise the whole of the Hawaii judicial article.
The relative lack of rigid r~strictions in the judicial articles
of Alaska and Hawaii and the wide latitude given the legislature make
it possible to meet changing demands on the judicial system without
constitutional change. While it is always possible that the legislatures of the two states might use this authority to create a
multitude of trial courts, it seems highly unlikely in light of present thinking on judicial organization. With the exception of small
civil matters and misdemeanors which can be handled by a closely
supervised minor court system, there should be no need for additional
courts. The creation of additional judgeships and the relocation of
judicial district boundaries as needed should provide adequately for
increased case loads in the court of general trial jurisdiction.

....

.

·,

4

Some Tools of Judicial Administration
Office of Judicial Administrator 4 7
Even after judicial reorganization is accomplished• and a
simplified court structure established with administrative control
placed in the supreme court, proper steps must be taken to keep the
modernized judicial machinery in working order. Provision of
additional judg~s on a permanent basis or on temporary assignment,
changes in rules and procedures, and recommendations for legislation
should be based on a continuing accurate analysis of prevailing
conditions on all levels of the court system. That the chief
justice needs staff assistance to administer the court system
adequately is demonstrated by the constitutional and/or statutory
provisions in 24 states for the office of judicial administrator,
who is appointed either by the chief justice or the supreme court
en bane and serves at the court's pleasure.48

•

j

'

1

•

It is usually the responsibility of the court administrator
to collect and analyz~ the judicial statistics necessary to provide
the chief justice with current information on how the system is
functioning, and to indicate problem areas. In addition, the judicial
administrator conducts special studies, such as the use and advantages
of pre-trial conferences, various techniques of docket coordination
in multi-judge courts, and changes in rules and procedures.
47.
48.

The work of the Colorado judicial administrator's office was
cre;ited in 1959.
Alaska, Cali{o.1·nia, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mas~achusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.

'
'
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In states such as New Jersey or Alaska which have a unified
court system with appointed judges, the judicial administrator may
prepare the budget for the whole judicial system and be responsible
for the hiring of clerical personnel throughout the system as well
as for the operation of their offices, In other states where local
funds provide a portion of the trial court's budget and clerks and
similar personnel are appointed by the trial court judge and are
responsible to him, the functions of the judicial administrator
are more limited.
Besides the functions for which he is responsible to the
chief justice and the supreme court, the judicial administrator also
assists the trial c6urts and their staffs and provides consultation
and research upon their request. His office should be not only
the source of information on the operation of the court system in
his state, but also a clearing house for material on court operation,
administration, procedures, and studies in other states as well,

.

Judicial Statistics

.

One of the most necessary adjuncts to good judicial administration is the collection and analysis of judicial statistics.
These statistics, of course, do not present a complete picture of
how the courts are operating; measurements of quantity do not reflect
judicial quality, nor all productive use of judicial time. Within
limitations, however, judicial statistics show trends in case loads,
for example, point to conditions which may need further study, and
indicate where temporary assignment of judges may be needed or where
the permanent addition of judges might be desirable.

,.

The Ohio State Bar Association in its report on the administration of justice in that state made the following comment on the
use of judicial statistics:49

,.

The ultimate function of judicial statistics
is to make available information that is
necessary to an understanding of the work of
the courts and the promotion of efficiency.
Properly collected and compiled statistics
can be used by those with administrative
responsibility to see that court business
is being properly executed, and in apportioning judicial work and assigning judges; and
by legislatures in considering appropriations
and the need for additional judges. Statistics
are also of value in measuring the need for and

.
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49.•

The Ohio Judicial System and the Administration of Justice,
Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal
Reform, Ohio State Bar Association, May 1951, p~ 40,
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effect of procedural reforms, and in assisting the effectiveness of both criminal and
civil justice; the statistics must be properly
collected and compiled. Good statistics are
invaluable; misleading a~d false statistics
are worse than none at all. The heart of the
whole proble~ of the accuracy and reliability
of judicial statistics is the manner in which
information is kept and reported by individual
courts.

.:

As indicated by the above comments, the validity and usefulness of judicial statistics depend on an accurate standardized
court record system and uniform reporting by court clerks. To
achieve this result, a standard record-keeping system should be
designed to meet the needs of each le_vel of courts and the statistical
rep9rts should be a by-product of this system. It is not unusual
for courts of the same level to have different methods of recordkeeping and statistical compilation. The problem of achieving
uniformity in this instance is further complicated if the
statistical information requested cannot be compiled easily from the
records normally kept by the court. This problem can be avoided
by assisting court clerks in developing a more efficient recordkeeping system which will also provide easily the information desired
by the judicial administrator's office.
Judicial Councils and Judicial Conferences

, I

The establishment, on a permanent and continuing basis, of
an agency representing the courts, the bar, and the lay public, or
a conference of representative judges of all the courts, is a highly
valuable means to insure continuing surveillance and improvement of
judicial administration.50 The state of Ohio is generally credited
with being the first to establish a judicial council by statute
in ·1923. Judicial councils have since been created in a majority
of states.51 In some states, judicial councils have accomplished
little, but in others the studies and recommendations of judicial
councils have made a significant contribution. For example, court
reorganization proposals in Florida, OregQn, and Wisconsin resulted
from extensive judicial council studies.52 In addition to studies
and recommendations for court reorganization, judicial councils
make studies with respect to court rules and procedures and statutory
revision. In one state, Alaska, the judicial council is given the
50.
51.
52.

Improvement$ in Judicial Administration: 1906-1956, Sheldon P.
Elliott, Institute of Judicial Administration, New York
University, April 20, 1956, p. 6.
Ibid., p. 9.
The work of the Colorado Judicial Council, which was in
existence less than two years, has already been covered.
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responsibility of making nominations to the governor from which he
makes judicial appointments.53 Judicial councils also serve useful
functions in the dissemination of information concerning the administration of justice and in providing liaison between the courts,
attorneys, the legislative and eve(.utive branches of government,
and the general public.
In a number of states, including Colorado, judicial conferences
have been authorized either by statute or by supreme court rule. All
of the judges of one level of courts meet at least once annually with
the supreme court to discuss administrative and procedural problems,
to-make recommendations for improvement, and to consider proposals
advanced by other groups, such as special studies committees and bar
associations, also concerned with judicial administration.
These judicial conferences provide a means of considering
mutual judicial problems and of coordinating efforts for improvement
io the administration of justice. In some states, Colorado included,
annual conferences are held for court clerks as well. At these
meetings, standardized procedures can be considered and adopted and
clerks given assistance and consultation on the problems involved
in running their offices.

,.

•

53.

Article IV, Section 5, Alaska Constitution.
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IV
JUDICIAL PROBLEMS IN COLORAOO:
EXAMINATION AND MEASUREMENT
Organizing the Study
At its organizational meeting, the Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice decided that the first phase
of its study should be an examination of court conditions and problems
throughout the state. The information gathered and compiled as the
result of such an examination would provide a basis for evaluating
previous proposals for improving the courts and perhaps might lead to
the formulation of an entirely new approach to Colorado's judicial
problems.
Judicial Statistics
A major problem confronting the committee as it began its
study was the lack of reliable and complete judicial statistics.
(The offlce of judicial administrator had been created, but the position was not filled until September 1959, three months after the committee began its work, and it was an additional six months before that
office's statistical program was in full operation.) The committee,
therefore, directed the Legislative Council staff to make a complete
docket analysis of the supreme court and all district and county
courts. Statistical data on justice of the peace courts had already
been compiled as a result of a docket analysis made in connection with
the Legislative Council justice court study.
Three Council staff
members spent almo~t six months in the field on a full-time basis,
visiting every district and county court in the state and compiling
statistics on court activity. As a result, for the first time an
over-all statistic~! analysis was compiled on the operation of
Colorado's courts.

J

Docket Analtsis. The docket analysis was designed to produce
several kinds of da a for evaluation and use by the committee. These
data included: 1) case load by court and type of case; 2) number of
appeals; 3) number of jury trials; 4) number of contested matters;
5) number of cases settled out of court; 6) number of cases filed in
a higher court in which a lower court has concurrent jurisdiction;
7) case disposition, including time from filing to disposition and
time from issue to disposition; 8) case load trends in proportion to
population and number of judges; and 9) continuances, use of pretrial conferences, and related matters.
·
1.
2.

For a detailed statistical presentation on the operation of
Colorado's justice of the peace courts, see Justice Courts in
Colorado, Chapter III, pp. 32-54.
A continuing statistical program has been established by the
judicial administrator for the district and county courts, and
these data will be available on an up-to-date basis in the future.
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In addition, specific information on criminal cases was included, such as sentencing, use of probation, court appointed attorneys, guilty pleas, pre-sentence investigations, and elapsed time
from filing and arraignment to disposition. All cases filed in the
calendar year 1958 were included in the analysis; in addition, certain summary data w re compiled for 1950, 1954, 1957, and the first
.six. months of 1959. 3
Regional Meetings
In conjunction with the docket analysis, the committee held a
series of regional meetings around the state, to which judges, other
court officials, legislators, lawyers, and interested citizens were
invited. These meetings were held in Glenwood Springs, Alamosa,
Grand Junction, Durango, La Junta, Pueblo, Fort Collins, Fort Morgan,
Golden, and Denver. The docket analysis was coordinated with the
regional meeting schedule, so that the preliminary results of the
---docket analysis for the area in which the meeting was held were
available to the committee immediately prior to the meeting .
. The major topics discussed at these regional meetings in. eluded the following:

3.

A.

Court Organization Proposals - Trial Courts
1. Elimination of county courts in 29 smallest
counties, jurisdiction to be transferred to
the district court
2. State-wide consolidation of county and district
courts
3. Establishment of a system of family courts as
a division of district court to handle all
juvenile and domestic relations matters
4.
Solution to the justice court situation:
a. consolidate with county courts
b. reduce number of J.P.'s, set qualifications,
etc.
c. direct supervision by a court of record
d. other
5. Election or selection of judges, tenure, retirement
6. If present district - county court structure is
retained, possibilities for closer coordination
between courts
7. Lawyer and/or non-lawyers judges with respect to county,
justice and municipal courts
8. Judicial district consolidation or boundary changes

B.

Court Organization Proposals - Appellate Courts
I. Present supreme court backlog
a. temporary solutions
b. long run-solutions

July 30, 1959 was used as a cutoff date to provide uniformity
of information. The field work on the docket analysis began
in July 1959 and was terminated in January 1960.
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2.

3.

C.

D.

Appeal procedure generally
a. appeal as a matter of right
b. supreme court certiorari power
c. one trial - one appeal
d. trials d e ~ oh appeal in trial courts
Appeal court organization
a. intermediate court if needed - number of judges·
department or en bane
b. supreme court - number of judges - department
or en bane
c. trial courts - appeals from justice and county
courts

Court Procedures - Trial Courts
l. Case backlog
a. existence of same
b. method (and/or rules) for clearing docket of
dormant cases
c. handling of continuances
2. Use of pre-trial conferences
3. Statutory court terms
a. satisfactory or should be changed
b. followed or ignored
c. established by court rule (supreme or district
court) or set by statute
4. Standardized court rules
a. need for same
b. who should promulgate
5. Judicial time spent in chambers
a. informal matters
b. formal matters (kinds of cases which require
such treatment)
6. Judicial time spent on water adjudications, other
difficult cases

j

Court Administration - Trial Courts
1. Need for a standardized reporting and record system
2. Court personnel
a. desirability of combining clerical functions
of county and district courts with one clerk
to serve both courtsb. use of court clerks for minor judicial matters

A number of subjects which related to the handling of criminal
cases were also covered at the regional meetings. These topics
included: sentencing, present practices and need for change; uniform
rules of criminal procedures; legal definition of insanity; preliminary
hearings; probation and pre-sentence investigations; representation

•
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by counsel, court appointed attorneys and need for public defender
system; and detention and court services for juveniles.4

Regional Meetings:

.

...
.,._

Comments and Recommendations

. Approximately 400 persons attended the ten regional meetings
held by the committee. These included: supreme court justices;
district judges; county judges; municipal judges; justices of the
peace; other court personnel, such as clerks, reporters, and pro·bation officers; district attorneys and members of their staffs;
personnel of the state adult parole department; legislators; attorneys,
many of whom were officials or members of bar association committees
studying related matters; members of the League of Women Voters
Committee on Courts; representatives of the press; and interested
citizens. The following summary is a digest of the most pertinent
discussions which took place at these meetings and the recommendations
which were made to the committee. This summary is organizad by major
topic and reference is made to each regional meeting.
Consolidation of District and County Courts

\,
-;

',,

·-

Attorneys were generally neutral toward the proposal while
stressing the necessity of avoiding the opposite extreme; the
creation or continuation of more courts than are necessary, expecially
in the small counties. An alternate recommendation was made for !

\..,

~·

\_
.

.,

"·

Glenwood Springs. 5 District judges were either opposed or
neutral on this proposal. Opinion was expressed that an additional
district judge would be needed to handle the increased case load in
the 9th Judicial District (Garfield, Rio Blanco, and Pitkin counties).
The consolidated case load in the 14th Judicial District (Grand,
Moffat, and Routt counties) might be handled without the addition of
a second district judge. County judges (none of whom present were
attorneys) were generally opposed to consolidation. It was stressed·
that small case loads do not reflect the amount of work done by
county judges. A considerable amount of time is spent on informal
matters -- counseling in domestic relations and juvenile cases and
in helping attorneys and others in checking files and records. The
opinion was expressed that the county court was more accessible to
the people than the district court and for this reason the county
court performed a needed local service. Consolidation would require
additional district judges, although court clerks with surrogate
powers could probably handle most probate matters expeditiously in
one-judge, multi-county districts with small case loads.

t

Some of these matters, along with the docket analysis infoirmatfion
.compiled on criminal cases, are included in the last sect on o
this report which covers the criminal code and re~ated matters •
5. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice,
Meeting of July 24, 1959.

4.
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counties under 10,000 population. In these counties, it was proposed
there be only one court to handle the business of the district,
county, justice of the peace, and municipal courts, presided over by
a lawyer judge.
Alamosa.6 District judges were in disagreement on the suitability of consolidation in the 12th Judicial District (Alamosa,
Conejos, Costilla, Mineral, Rio Grande, and Saguache counties).
Opposition was expressed by one district judge because additional
judges would be needed to handle the increase in case load. The other
distri~t judge was of the opinion that consolidation would be
successful, if the district court clerk in each county could handle
tre administrative and clerical work involved in probate matters.
He pointed out that almost all trials in the 12th District counties
are heard in district court anyway at the present time. Four of the
six county judges present (none of whom were attorneys) opposed
consolidation for the same reasons expressed at the Glenwood Springs
meeting. One of the four agreed that one judge could handle both
courts with sufficient clerical help, but doubted that the quality of
justice would be improved as a result. Two countV judges felt there
was considerable merit in the proposal, especially in small counties.
The consensus of o~inion of attorneys present was that the
public favored retention of a minor court system, but that the
inadequacy of both the county and justice of the peace courts had
.
caused loss of public respect. The·real question, therefore, was
whether it was possible to improve t'he personne1 and procedures while
retaining the present system or whether reorganization was the only
possible solution. Two possible approaches to reorganization w~re
suggested. The first followed along the lines suggested by the
committee: consolidation of district·and county court jurisdiction.
With such consolidation a third judge would be needed in the district
and.it was suggested that this judge specialize in domestic relations,
juveniles, and probate matters. At the same time that consolidation
took place, a new minor court system should be created to handle
small civil matters and misdemeanors such as traffic violations;
perhaps this court could be under the supervision of the district
court. The second suggestion was the creation of circuit county
courts or the consolidation of county courts in the San Luis Valley.
Under such a proposal only two judges would be needed to handle the
county court business in the six counties and perhaps dispose
of most justice court cases as well.
Grand Junction. 7 Generally the judges and attorneys present
either were noncommittal on the consolidation proposal or expressed
some opposition. One of the two district judges present, who favored
6.
7.

•
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Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice,
Meeting of August 10, 1959.
Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice,
Meeting of August 28, 1959.

.
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consolidation, stated that even though the 7th Judicial District
covered seven counties (Delta, Gunnison, Hinsdale, Mesa, Montrose,
Ouray and San Miguel), he did not consider travel in the district
excessive and the consolidated case load could be handled with the
addition of a third district judge. If county courts were retained
with their present jurisdiction, he recommended that trials de !22.Y.Q_
to the district court be eliminated and a bottom dollar limit be
placed on civil cases which could be filed in district court.
Of the four county judges present, three of whom were attorneys,
twp were neutral toward the proposal and two were opposed, generally
because of the reasons cited at the Glenwood Springs meeting and
because they felt that the district court would not be able to handle
juvenile cases adequately.
The lawyers present felt that the matter deserved further
study, but pointed out that the area and geographic barriers within
the 7th District posed some problems. They felt that there hadn't
been any particular problems in county courts with lawyer judges, but
that in the other four counties of the district, many cases were filed
in district court rather than county court so that trial would be
before a lawyer judge. Even in those counties with lawyer judges,
cases were often filed in district court to avoid trials de novo
on appeal from the county court.
- --·
Durango. 8 Both district judges (6th Judicial District:
Archuleta, Dolores, La Plata, Montezuma, and San Juan counties) were
in accord with consolidation if an additional judge were added to
take care of ~he increased case load. One of the two district judges
proposed that consolidation be accompanied by the creation of a
family court division of the district court to try all domestic
relations and juvenile matters. Some of the attorneys present were
in agreement with the consolidation and family court division proposals. One went even further and recommended that the state undertake
the total financing of a consolidated court system, in order to insure
a sufficient number of adequately-trained probation officers and
clerical employees. A suggestion was made that all juvenile and
domestic relations matters be transferred to the district court and
that justice courts be consolidated with county courts, which would
retain the remainder of their present jurisdiction. Of the three
county judges present (two of whom were attorneys), one favored
consolidation, pointing out that the county court business in Archuleta
county could be handled by a district judge one day a month. The
other county judges emphasized the specialized nature of the county
court's jurisdiction and recommended that the county courts be
upgraded and judicial salaries increased.
8.

Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice,
Meeting of September 11, 1959 .

\
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Pueblo.9 The district judges were neither stongly in
f~vor of nor opposed to the proposal. As an alternative one district
judge proposed that a minimum limit of $1,000 be placed on civil
actions which could be brought in district court and that county
judges be required to be attorneys. ,Many of the attorneys present
stressed the difficulty in finding lawyers willing to take a county
judgeship in small counties.
In contrast, most of the county judges present (especially
those who were from more populous areas and who were attorneys)
favored consolidation. It was pointed out that one judge could
handl~ the combined case load in the 3rd Judicial District (Huerfano
and Las Animas counties) and that it was a waste of judicial manpower
to have both a district judge and two county judges. If consolidation
is not considered favorably, then attention should be directed to
changing judicial district boundaries. One county judge felt that a
separate court with probate jurisdiction was needed for accessibility,
but agreed that the district judge could handle these matters in
smalf counties one day a week.
One county judge felt there was no need for two courts, even
in heavily-populated areas, especially if there were a family court
division of the district court and a judge could be selected or
elected specifically for that division. Another county judge
favored consolidation, but as a~ alternative suggested that counties
be consolidated for judicial purposes. In El Paso county, an
additional county judge or a superior court similar to Denver's is
needed because of the increase in judicial business. Because of the
large area included within the 4th Judicial District (Douglas, El
Paso, Elbert, Kit ~arson, Lincoln, and Teller counties) six judges
would be needed if the courts were consolidated and district
boundaries unchanged.10

"

i

,•

Most of the attorneys present from the Colorado Springs area
and the 11th Judicial District (Chaffee, Custer, Fremont and Park
counties) favored consolidation. While some of the Pueblo attorneys
favored the proposal, others preferred the retention of both county
and district courts, with the possibility that all juvenile and·
domestic relations jurisdiction be exercised by the district court.
La Junta. 11 Generally, district and county courts consolidation was opposed by the judges and attorneys present at the
La Junta meeting. Stress was placed on the specialized nature of
probate cases and the need to have a county judge readily available
to expedite the handling of probate matters. Again the counseling
9. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice,
Meeting of October 13, 1959.
10. As compared with three district judges at that time, and four at
pr·esent.
11. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice,
Meeting of October 23, 1959.
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f1mction of county judges was mentioned and the alternate suggestion
made that county courts be upgraded and judicial salaries increased.
One district judge favored the creation of a family court division
of the district court, but the other contended that there was an
insufficient number of juvenile.and domestic relations cases in the
two judicial districts in the Arkansas Valley to justify a separate
district court division (15th Judicial District: Baca, Cheyenne,
Kiowa and Prowers counties; 16th Judicial District: Bent, Crowley,
and Otero). The four county judges (two of whom were attorneys),
were equally divided as to consolidation. One county judge favored
the proposal if clerks could be empowered to handle routine probate
matters and there would be a sufficient number of district judges to
handle the case load and give people adequate service.
Fort Collins. 12 Only one of the three district and three
county judges,all of whom were attorneys, present from the 8th
Judicial District (Boulder, Jackson, Larimer, and Weld), strongly
-opposed consolidation. Two county judges were very much in favor
of the proposal; two district judges supported the idea, but less
enthusiastically; and one district judge had no objections. The
elimin_ation of trials de .!lQ.Y.Q. was cited as a positive advantage of
consolidation. It was felt that the. addition of one judge in each
of the three major counties in the district could accommodate the
increased case load. While there was no desire expressed to break
up the 8th Judicial District if the courts were not consolidated,
some of the judges and attorneys present felt they would at least
consider such a proposal more favorably if the courts were consolidated
and each of the large counties had two judges. The increased expense
resulting from having two additional district attorneys was cited,
but this expense would be offset, at least somewhat, by a reduction
in the judges' travel expenses. The attorneys reacted favorably
to the idea, indicating a willingness to consider ~ny prQposat which·
embodied the principles of one trial and one appeal and that Judges
be attorneys.
Fort Morgan. 13 There was general opposition to consolidation
from both judges and attorneys. The opinion was expressed that the
retention of county courts was necessary, and that even in those
counties in the 13th Judicial District (Logan, Morgan, Phillips,
Sedgwick, Washington, and Yuma) without lawyer judges, the county
court was doing a good job. The county judges are well known in
their home communities, and their courts are easily accessible.
Lawyer judges are not necessary except in the two largest counties
Logan and Morgan, because all contested and technical matters are
filed in the district court.

12.

,,.

Legislative Council
Meeting of November
13.· Legislative Council
Meeting of November

Committee on the Administration of Justice,
13, 1959.
Committee on the Administration of Justice,
30, 1959.
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Golden.1 4 Two of the three district judges present favored
consolidation, as did two of the four county judges (all attorneys).
One of the district judges felt that the county courts had become
accepted by the people over the yea~s and they would oppose its
elimination. He felt that the proposal needed further consideration.
The other two district judges felt that abolition of county courts
as prese~tly constituted, especially in the smaller counties, was
desirable. The clerk of the district court could be empowered to
handle probate and other administrative matters. One of the two
county judges favoring consolidation supported the creation of a
distri~t court family division. Both of the county judges opposing
consolidation stressed the strong relationship between the county
judge and the community, but one stated that the time had perhaps come
when the efficient administration of justice required consolidation.
While some of the attorneys present favored consolidation, they had
no fault to find with the present operation of county courts in the
metropolitan area (1st Judicial District: Clear Creek, Gilpin, and
Jeffe-rson counties; 17th Judicial District: Adams county; 18th
Judicial District: Arapahoe crunty). The creation of superior
courts in metropolitan counties was mentioned as a possible means of
relieving the growing burden on the county courts, if the present
court structure is retained. The· alternative of establishing
separate juvenile courts was proposed as being more necessary in
these counties under the present court organization.

•

Denver. 15 There was general agreement that· the magnitude of
the case load in the district, county, and juvenile courts in Denver
necessitated the retention of three separate courts, especially
since the county and juvenile courts were held in high respect by
attorneys and citizens.
Minor Court Reform (including consolidation of county and justice courts)
Glenwood Springs. In general, there was opposition from
judges, justices of the peace, and attorneys to eliminating justice
courts. All thought the number of justices of the peace should be
reduced, justices should be placed on a salary, and given both preservice and in-service training. One proposal that all jurisdiction
be placed in one court in small counties has already been discussed.
One justice of the peace who is also a district court clerk stressed
the need for minor courts, but said that in small counties there was
no need for both a justice court and a county court.
Alamosa. Only one of the county judges offered no objections
to handling justice of the peace jurisdiction in the county court.
Two of the county judges said that they had the time to hear these

,

.
~

14.
15.

Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice,
Meeting of December 18, 1959.
Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice,
Meeting of March 18, 1960.
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matters, but that it would be inconvenient to have minor civil cases
filed in count.y court. The district attorney felt there should be
at least one justice of the peace in each population center. As one
solution to the problem, he suggested that municipal court jurisdiction
in the larger cities be expanded lo include justice court cases,
Some of the municipal judges in these cities are attorneys, which would
improve the quality of justice. Justice courts should be accessible
to the district attorney and members of his staff, although they never
appear in justice court unless there is opposing counsel. The justices
of the peace present made recommendations similar to those offered at
the Glenwood Springs meeting. The attorneys concurred in the need for
a minor court system but felt that overhaul was necessary, with both
county court-justice court consolidation and a new minor court system
under the supervision of the district court considered as possible
approaches.

,.
...

..

Grand Junction. Opinion was equally divided between those
who wished to abolish justice of the peace courts and those who
wished to improve or modify the system. There was no agreement, however, on what sort of a system should be adopted to replace justice
courts. It was suggested that the small claims jurisdiction of justice
courts be increased, the number of justices of the peace be decreased,
and that all other justice court jurisdiction be transferred to county
court. This would leave the justice court to function as a small
claims court, while criminal cases would be tried in county court,
assuring the defendant that his rights would be protected and
elim~nat~ng trials de novo on criminal appeals. A training pr~gram
for Justices of the peace and better procedures in jury selection
were offered as remedies by attorneys who favored the retention of
justice courts.

i

<

..
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Durango. Geographic problems were cited as a major obstacle
to the effective consolidation of county and justice courts. The
county judges were in agreement that the addition of justice court
cases to their present jurisdiction would impose an undue burden on
their courtsr some of the attorneys favored such consolidation, however. The proposal was also made that a separate court should be
established with traffic case jurisdiction. The district attorney
and members of his staff said that justices of the peace were
necessary for the posting of bond and preliminary hearings in rural
areas.

,.
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Pueblo. The lack of rules of procedure in justice court
cases, inadequate courtroom facilities, untrained justices of the
peace, and the expense and delay involved in trials de !lQ.Y2_ to the
county court were all criticized; but there was no agreement on how
to solve these problems. Suggestions included: reduction in the
number of justices of the peace, supervision by a court of record,
transfer of all cases in which a jury trial is requested to the
county court, requirements in large counties that justices be attorneys
and paid an adequate salary, and elimination of the fee system .

.,.

.
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La Junta. Except for two of the county judges present, there
was general opposition to consolidating county and justice courts or to
eliminating justice courts, The two county judges who favored the
proposal felt that justice court jur.isdiction and/or administration
could be handled adequately by the county court as long as some
allowances were made for distances and convenience. While the
difficulty _in getting justices of the peace who were attorneys in most
of the small Arkansas Valley counties was recognized, the attorneys
present favored retention of justice courts even with non-lawyer judges.
They recommended that efforts be made to improve the system through a
reductiop in the number of justices and elimination of the fee system.
Fort Collins. Several recommendations were made for modifying
or eliminating justices of the peace. These were to: 1) combine
municipal and justice courts on a precinct basis similar to the
California minor court system, with home rule cities participating
if they so choose; 2) to raise the civil jurisdiction to $1,000 and
have ma..gistrates supervised by the district court; 3) to set
qualifications and have magistrates appointed instead of elected; and
4) to reorganize the minor courts, increase jurisdiction, and make
them courts of record to eliminate trials de !lQYQ_.

...

Fort Morgan. Elimination of minor courts was opposed, as was
the suggestion that magistrates be appointed by district judges on
the grounds that the protection of fair appellate review might be
prejudiced if the appeal were heard by the judge who appointed the
magistrate who heard the case initially. It was pointed out that the
bar association assist in the selection of justices of the peace in
Morgan county and that the district judges and members of the bar
are available to advise justices of the peace on legal questions.
Golden. The precinct consolidation adopted in Jefferson
county, which reduced the county to one justice precinct with two
justices of the peace was viewed favorably as a step in the right
direction, but additional recommendations were made. Two district
judges favored placing justice courts or magistrates under the supervision of the district court, with one of the two recommending that
magistrates be appointed by district judges as well, in the same way
that federal judges appoint commissioners. Several attorneys supported
the creation of superior courts in metropolitan counties, with
original jurisdiction in misdemeanors and concurrent civil jurisdiction with the county court, except for probate, me~al health,
and juvenile matters. Each county should have a sufficient number of
superior court judges to handle the case load efficiently and the
courts should be located conveniently. The judges of these courts
should receive an adequate salary, be required to be attorneys, and
be prohibited from practicing law.

.
•

.

.
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Denver. Justice court jurisdiction in Denver is exercised by
the municipal court, all judges of which are attorneys. The recommendation was made that this jurisdiction be retained by the Denver
M~nicipal Court under any reorganization plan considered by the commit!ee, because of the large case load. The present flexibility in
assigning judges, and the appointment rather than election of
municipal judges.
- 88 -
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Supreme Court Backlog and Appellate Jurisdiction
Glenwood Springs. The suggestion was made by the district
judges that perhaps a monetary limitation should be placed on the
right of appeal in civil cases u~less a legal or constitutional
question is involved. This had been done in other states and didn't
appear to be an infringement of justice. The practice of writing
an opinion in each case was cited as one reason for the delay, but
both district judges said that written findings were helpful and that
the failure to provide written findings might be unfair to the parties
in._volved. These findings are also useful to the trial court and aid
it in making better decisions. All of the attorneys present favored
retention of appeal to the supreme court as a matter of right. They
did not feel that Colorado needed an intermediate court of appeals,
because of the state's small population. As an alternative, they
proposed making the size of the supr~me court flexible, so that
justices might be added if and when needed.

-

-

-

Alamosa. The district judges and most of the attorneys
agreed that the delay was caused in part by written opinions in each
case, but felt that these opinions were instructive to both bench
and bar. Memoranda opinions were suggested in minor cases, however.
One district judge suggested that an intermediate court of appeals
be established, with present district judges sitting from time to
time on the intermediate appellate court. Some of the attorneys
disagreed with this proposal, pointing out that if appeal was a
matter of right, the intermediate court's docket would soon be in
the same condition as the supreme court's. Conversely, if appeal
to the intermediate court were limited, then how could the expense
of establishing and maintaining such a court be justified? Speedy
disposition of appellate cases is a desired goal, but not at the
expense of careful consideration of the issues involved.
Grand Junction. The use of memoranda opinions on minor
cases and the creation of an intermediate court of appeals were two
suggestions to reduce the supreme court backlog. District judges, if
available, could serve on the intermediate court. The jurisdiction of
the intermediate court should be limited to lesser civil and criminal
matters and further review by the supreme court should be limited
as well; if further appeal can be made to the supreme court in all
cases heard by the intermediate appellate court, nothing is gained
by its creation.
Durango. Both district judges favored the creation of an
intermediate court of appeals on a temporary basis, but felt that
it would not be needed once the supreme court case load became
current. The use of memoranda opinions was also advocated, and there
was general agreement among judges and attorneys that there should
be no limitation on the right of appeal to the supreme court.
Service by district judges, either on an intermediate court or to
assist the supreme court, might be necessary on a temporary basis,
but attorneys would oppose the loss of trial judges' time in the
district on a long term basis.

- 89 -

Pueblo. There was general agreement that an intermediate
court of appeals should be used only as a temporary measure and for
that reason any constitutional revision should not include a provision for an intermediate appellate court. Some way should be
found to restrict appeals from the intermediate court to the supreme
court without impeding justice. Unless this is done, the intermediate
court might merely provide an additional delay in having an appeal
adjudicated. In the opinion of some of the attorneys, the longterm solution to the supreme court's backlog problems lies in
internal procedural changes, such as more extensive use of oral
argume~t, use of memoranda opinions, and justices sitting in
departments Tather than en bane on most cases.

•

La Junta. Two recommendations were made favoring the creation
of an intermediate appellate court and an increase in the size of the
supreme court. There was a differen½e of opinion among attorneys
favoring an intermediate court as to whether appeals to this court
should be final. Some favored limiting the kinds of appeals which
may be taken to the intermediate court, with that court's decision
either to be final or subject to certiorari review by the supreme court.
Others felt that appeal to the intermediate court should be allowed in
all cases, regardless 6f whether further appeal could be taken to the
supreme court. There was no objection to district judges either sitting on an intermediate court or assisting the supreme court, as long
as this service did not involve the judges from the 15th and 16th
districts.
Fort Collins. There was no general agreement on any method
to reduce the supreme court backlog. There was some expression of
favor for the creation of an intermediate court of appeals, at least
on a temporary basis. The three district judges opposed having
district judges sitting on an intermediate court on the grounds that
district judges should not be sitting in judgment on the decisions
of other district judges. Further, such service by district judges
could easily result in an increased backlog in the trial court. As
an alternative it was suggested that the right of appeal be limited.
A proposal by the judicial administrator that district judges assist
the supreme court in opinion writing met with limited enthusiasm.
There were two objections: 1) that the district judge would be
functioning as a law clerk, \Jhich would be a waste of judicial manpower; and 2) that opinions should be written by members of the court
and district judges should not write opinions unless participating
with the status of a supreme court justice.
Fort Morgan. There was considerable opposition to the use
of district judges to write supreme court opinions. The district
judges felt that it was unwise for trial and appellate judges to work
too closely together. Fear was expressed that district judges would
not be available for trial court work in their home districts. It
was suggested that appellate review was the responsibility of judges
elected for that purpose. It was also felt that the district judges
would have insufficient time to handle opinion writing adequately.
As alternatives it was suggested that either the right of appeal be
limited or an iniermediate appeals court created.
- 90 -

•

•

•

...

.

.

.
,,.
...

Golden. In general, the judges and attorneys present stated
they would go along with the proposal to have retired supreme court
justices and district judges assist the supreme court by writing
opinions. After some consideration, this plan seemed more feasible
as a·temporary solution than either an increase in the size of the
supreme court or the creation of an intermediate court of appeals.
Both of these alternatives were considered too costly and not
necessary in the long run. There was some concern that district
judges might neglect trial work under this plan, and that although
it was only a temporary measure it might become permanent. The
co_ncensus of opinion was that support should be given to any workable
plan to reduce the supreme court backlog and that the use of outside
judges for opinion writing was the best suggested thus far.
Denver. Opinion was mixed but generally favorable to having
district judges write opinions to assist the supreme court in
reducing its backlog.l61t was recommended that the plan be discontinued as soon as the court becomes current. There was no
recommendations for an intermediate court of appeals because of the
expense involved and because Colorado was too small a state to need
an intermediate appellate tribunal.
Election'or Selection of Judges

I

.
.
.,.
.,..

Glenwood Springs. The attorneys present favored the adoption
of the Missouri plan for judicial selection, although one qualified
his endorsement by stating that the Missouri plan would be satisfactory
only if competent judges were selected in the first place. In his
opinion, it would not be easy to remove judges from office under the
Missouri plan, but that it was still preferable to having judges
participate in politics.
Alamosa. The two district judges.differed on the election or
selection of judges. One favored the continuation of election and
pointed out that the people of Colorado had been offered a number of
selection plans in the past and had rejected all of them. It was
his opinion that once a judge is elected and demonstrates competence
in office, he is usually returned with bi-partisan support. The
other district judge felt that judges should be appointed and meet
certain standards to remain in office. He did not favor any particular method of appointment, however . .Most of the attorneys favored
the appointment of judges and stressed that all judges should be
learned in the law. They felt that the quality of justice would not
be improved until non-lawyer judges were prohibited on all levels of
the judicial system insofar as practical.
16.

•
.

~

.

This proposal was authorized and an appropriation made therefore
by the 42nd General Assembly, second session (1960). See
Chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960 •

.
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Grand Junction, The present method of unofficial selection
in the 7th Judicial District was explained, Each party controls one
judgeship and the bar association decides upon candidates when a
vacancy exists. Some of the lawyers felt that this system was a
poor substitute for a state-wide judicfal selection plan, although
it was unlikely that any plan proposed would be acceptable to the
.
electorate-. Some of the district and county judges preferred retention
of judicial election, but others favored some other method but were
not sure that a selection system could be worked out which would
offer much substantial improvement.
Durango. Most of the district and county judges favored
removing judges from politics, but would favor judicial selection
only if appointees were referred to the people from time to time to
determine whether they should be retained in office. It was pointed
out by the attorneys that the district bar association and the two
political parties usually agreed on district judge nominations in
the same manner as in the 7th Judicial District. As an argument
against the selection of judges, the federal judicial system was
referred to as autocratic as the result of life appointments.
Pueblo. The attorneys favored removing judges from politics,
so that even if they were elected it should be by nonpartisan ballot.
Tenure was stressed as an important inducement to get qualified men
in judicial office. Even though a large number of judges are reelected continuously, election still does not provide enough assurance
of tenure. The national trend has been toward judicial selection, and
the constitutions of Alaska and Hawaii were cited as examples. Most
of the district judges present, although appointed in the first instance,
favored election of judges.
La Junta. The district judges favored some modification of
the present system such as a nonpartisan ballot~
It was pointed out
that it is difficult for judges to find campaign issues and that
voters often lack knowledge of judicial officials. On the other hand,
neither judge would favor a system where it would be difficult to
remove incompetent judges from office. On the other hand, the attorneys present favored the partisan election of judges, although a few
would be willing to consider some method of appointment for supreme
court justices. They stated tt,at election by-and-large had resulted
in qualified judges in the Arkansas Valley and that once judges demonstrated they were doing a good job they seldom had election opposition.
Fort Collins. The three district judges, all of whom had been
appointed initially, had few comments except to express the opinion
that judges should be removed from political pressures; for that reason
nonpartisan .elections might be preferable.
It was stressed, however,
that whatever method of selection might be adopted, local control
should be retained. Justice O. Otto Moore remarked that the Judicial
Council had considered this subject but had reached no conclusion.
He stated that he opposed the Missouri Plan and suggested an alternative.
He proposed that judges be elected initially as at present, but after
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initial election, judges, upon completion of their initial terms of
office, would run on their record rather than against an opponent.
He felt that the people's right of selection would be retained while
at the same time providing tenure· for competent judges. In conjunction
with this proposal, he suggested mandatory retirement at age 70. Two
of the three county judges and most of the attorneys favored judicial
appointment rather than election, perhaps along the lines of the
Missouri Plan, although some of the attorneys felt Justice Moore's
proposal had considerable merit.
Fort Mor~an. There was general objection to the appointment
of judges. Int e 13th Judicial District, it was explained, judicial
candidates are normally acceptable to the bar association; and the
Morgan County Bar Association consults with the board of county commissioners on the appointment of a county judge, should.there be a
vacancy. The Missouri Plan was opposed because the appointment method
i~volved was considered more political in nature than judicial election.

C
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Golden. In addition to some support among judges and attorneys
for retention of the present method of election, several alternatives
were suggested. Two district judges and some of the attorneys favored
· nonpartisan election. One district judge favored initial appointment
by the governor with senate approval and subsequent referral to the
voters on a nonpartisan basis. Some favor was expressed for the
Missouri Plan, and one attorriey and one county judge proposed that
judges be elected on a partisan basis twice, with the second election
for a life term. The committee was cautioned against combining court
reorganization and judicial selection in the same proposal, because
of the likelihood both would be lost.
Denver. The present method of judicial election was generally
favored, although some support was indicated for non partisan ballots.
The suggestion was made that terms of district judges should be stag~
gered in multi-judge districts.
Court Procedures and Internal Operation
This section covers district court operation and includes:
court congestion and case backlog, use of pre-trial conferences, court
rules, and related matters. County courts are not included, as there
was no evidence of docket congestion, only a very limited need expressed for uniform court rules, and little comment on other operations
and procedures aside from the difficulty in obtaining a reporter if a
transcript is needed.
Glenwood Sprin s. Both district judges indicated that there
were no case ba~klogsn their districts. In either district a case
can be brought to trial within two weeks if the litigants agree they
want the case tried. In the 9th Judicial District, cases are dismissed after one year for failure to prosecute; however, attorneys
are given 30 days' notice, and any explanation by attorneys is·

1
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usually sufficient to keep the case from being stricken from the
docket. Both district judg~s make use of the pre-trial conference,
although in the 14th Judicial District pre-trial conferences are held
only in those cases which are scheduled for jury trial. In the
9th District, court rules make pre-trtal conferences mandatory, and
they are usually held two weeks prior to trial.
Alamosa. Pre-trial conferences are held in only five to 10
per cent of the civil cases in the 12th Judicial District. Formal
pre-trial conferences are not considered as necessary as in metropolita~ districts because attorneys and litigants are quite informal,
and every effort is made to get together on an informal basis prior
to trial, if anything can be gained. One judge felt that the limited
use of pre-trial conferences had been effective in settling cases,
while the other judge had had little success in this respect. Both
judges reported that any case can be.brought to trial in 30 days if
the litigants so choose. The weekly motion day is used to clear the
docket of dormant cases and to set almost immediate hearings on uncontested matters, such as quiet title suits and divorces. Both judges
recommended the appointment of a committee of district judges to promulgate a uniform. set of rules for district courts. They also stated
that the 12th District rules needed updating and revision. Most of
the attorneys agreed that cases could be brought to trial within the
time limits specified by the judges. It was pointed out that declining economic activity in:the San Luis Valley had reduced case
filings and a desire for immediate litigation.

.

Grand Junction. In the 7th Judicial District cases are dismissed if there has been no action for one year, unless cause is
shown. Both district judges stated that there was little to be gained
from forcing cases to trial. Despite the increase in filing rate, if
a case is at issue, it usually can be tried within 30 days. Extensive
use is made of pre-trial conferences by one of the judges in the district, but not by the other. The attorneys agreed that the docket
was current and that cases could be brought to trial quickly if desired,
but ihey felt that the increased filing rate might necessitate a third
judge for the district in the near future.
Durango. One district judge stated that the docket was further
behind than it should be, that there were too many old cases on the
docket in all counties in the district. He added that attorneys were
at fault in many instances, but that the court was lax in prodding
them, although there was a one-year dismissal rule for lack of action.
He disagreed somewhat with the other district judge's observation that
a case could be brought to trial in two weeks (slightly longer for a
jury trial). He said that a trial could be held that quickly in an
emergency, but only if other matters on the docket were postponed. He
said that patt of the delay resulted from the large number of motions
filed by attorneys. In 60 per cent of the cases this practice was a
delaying action. He indicated his support for a rule being considered
by the supreme court, which would require a brief statement to be filed
with each motion. The judge could accept or overrule.the motion
without a hearing after five to 10 days for review of the brief.
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The attorneys agreed that they were partially responsible
for the delay in the 6th District, but stated that some cases
had been at issue six to seven months and still had not come to
trial and that a few cases had been at issue as long as two years.
The attorneys felt that the judges should take steps to curtail
delaying tactics on the part of some lawyers and that more extensive
use-should be made of pre-trial conferences.

...

....

Pueblo. In the 4th Judicial District, the area to be
covered is so great and the filing rate so high that it is difficult
f-0r t~ ee judges to handle the case load as efficiently as they would
like.
The judges stated that cases usually can be set for trial
two or three months after they are at issue, but in keeping the
docket this current there is little time available for research
in complicated cases. The district has an automatic,dismissal rule
if there has been no action in a case for one year .

7

...

.

...

The lawyers said that it was difficult to get cases set for
trial in the 4th District during the same court term in which they
came at issue, especially if a jury trial is requested. They added
that attorneys were responsible for some of the delay, however.

I

Both the judge and the attorneys in the 11th District agreed
that there was no congestion. Cases can be set for trial within
30 days, with 60 days needed if a jury trial is requested. It was
the judge's opinion that cases not tried are usually pending for
good reason. Instead of dismissing cases for lack of action, he
sets them for trial and gives notice. This procedure is a good
way to dispose of cases, in his opinion.
The 3rd Judicial District can handle more work than the
court now has; consequently litigants can get to trial in a short
period of time if they wish.

,.

...
...

.

.

In the 10th District, the docket is usually filled two
weeks after term day, so that it is dif.ficult to get a case to trial
quickly. If a criminal case set for trial is not tried, no attempt
is made to use the available time for a civil action. A third judge
is needed but facilities are not presently available in the courthouse. The opinion was expressed that some lawyers were dilatory in
the 10th District and that the judges were too lenient. One reason
for delay in civil actions was the amount of time spent by the judges
on domestic relations cases -- estimated at 30 to 40 per cent.
La Junta. The lawyers indicated that there was no difficulty
in getting cases tried in either the 15th or 16th Judicial Districts.
In the 15th district, the judge stated that he had two cases per week
set for trial for the next five months; however, half of them would
17.

A fourth district judge was authorized for the 4th Judicial

District by Chapter 39, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960.

~-

...
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not be tried for one.reason or another, so that time would be
available if a trial were requested for a case not yet scheduled
or if a request were made to move a case up on the docket. In the
16th District, the judge said he could set a case for trial within
60 days, but it would take longer if•more than a one day trial was
anticipated. Both judges commented on the difficulty in setting jury
trials during harvest season. The judge in the 15th District sent
out "no progress'' letters on cases three and four years old when he
took office. This action resulted in numerous complaints from
attorneys who said that even if these cases were at issue it was no
concern of the judge whether or not they are tried.
Fort Collins. In the 8th Judicial District, it would be
three to four months before a case not already set for trial could
be tried, according to the three district judges. The judges
explained that the docket was filled, because there had been an
unusually high number of jury trials in recent months, including
several murder cases. The attorneys complained that often cases are
tried too quickly in the 8th District. They also objected to the
automatic six-months' dismissal rule with no notice given attorneys.
If there has been no action for six months, the case is automatically
dismissed, even if the case is at issue.
Some of the attorneys said that the district judges told
them that cases should be tried or dismissed because the supreme
court wanted the dockets kept current. Justice Moore commented that
it was not the supreme court's attitude that all cases should be
tried. The supreme court has no desire to compel trial when the
litigants don't wish to try the case. If one litigant wishes to go
to trial, then a trial should be held as soon as possible. The
judicial administrator said that the district court should keep a
close check on the docket and find out why cases are not being
brought to trial; then if there is no reason for trial, the case
should not be set; but the court has a responsibility in the matter
and should not depend entirely on the opposing counsels. In defense
of the six-months' automatic dismissal rule, the district judges
pointed out that attorneys could inform the court at any time during
the six months on the status of the case and the reasons why there
hasn't been any action, and they agreed that the court had a
responsibility to see that there is no undue delay in getting cases
to trial.
~re-trial conferences are used to a limited
district. The judges were of the opinion that they
helpful in clarifying issues in complicated cases.
felt that pre-trial conferences were not helpful as
used at present. They recommended that the federal
trial procedure be adopted.

extent in the
were extremely
Some attorneys
they were being
rules for pre-

Fort Morgan. The district judges said that the dockets were
current in the 13th Judicial District. There were some old cases,
but only because neither party had requested trial. The district
has a six-months dismissal rule without notice, except that attorneys

•

6

•

.•

.
~

~
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receive copies of the docket. The attorneys generally were in
agreement on the current status of the docket and approved of the
procedures being used on dismissal. Formal pre-trial conferences
are used only in complicated cas~s. The usual practice is for the
attorneys and judge ·to get together on an informal basis.

.

~

«

-

Golden. In the 17th Judicial District all cases at issue
have been set for trial. Because of the increased filing rate,
it was expected that starting in January 1960 it would take si~
months for a case at issue to come to trial. The attorneys commented
that the docket situation was the same in both the 17th and 18th
Judicial districts. With the addition of a judge in each of these
districts following the 1960 general election, the dockets in both
districts should become more current; although if the number of
cases filed continues to increase at the same. rate as during 1959,
there still may be insufficient judicial manpower. In the 1st
Judicial district, the judges reported that the criminal docket was
up to date and that other cases could be brought to trial in two to
four months, if not already set. The attorneys in the 1st District
were of the opinion that both the criminal and civil dockets were
current.
One of the judges in the 1st District stated that he used
pre-trial conferences in almost all civil cases and found them very
effective. The other two district judges felt that pre-trial
conferences would be more useful if the federal rules were followed.
The judge in the 17th Distritt said that pre-trial •conferences
should not be used to force settlement. He found them useful in
some cases and holds them at the attorneys' request.
I

-

Denver. The district judges were of the opinion that the
docket was fairly current, considering that the 2nd Judicial District
had over 8,000 cases filed annually. Cases are being set for trial
five to six months after they reach issue. Revised internal procedures and th~ cooperation of attorneys has resulted in a large
number of old and dormant cases either being tried or dismissed.
The committee was cautioned that a fetish for statistics should not
be substituted for judicial competence; the evaluation of justice
should not be based on the disposition rate. The complaint was
made by one of the district judges that attorneys often wait until
the day of trial to inform the court that a settlement· has been
reached. This is expensive because a reporter has been assigned to
the case and often a jury has been called, and it is a waste of
docket time, because it is difficult to substitute another trial.
A court rule was suggested requiring attorneys to notify the court
within five days of settlement.
Different views were expressed on the use and value of pretrial conferences. Several judges said they used pre-trial
conferences extensively,_and one judge said that such conferences.
were mandatory in his division. Other judges said that it depended
on the case, the circumstances, and the attorneys involved as to
whether pre-trial conferences were desirable.
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Docket_Analysis Results
While statistics do not tell a complete story of the operation
of the court system, used properly they serve a very necessary function,
not only in day-to-day judicial administration, but also in court
reorganization studies. In the opinion of the committee these data
are of assistance: 1) in describing how the court system is operating at present; 2) in pointing to particular court organization
problems; and 3) in providing a guide for the evaluation of proposals
for modifying or reorganizing the court system. The supreme court
docket analysis was considered necessary for somewhat different
reasons. It was hoped that the docket analysis would help explain
or at least describe the continued increase in the court's backlog
and that this information would be helpful in evaluating both immediate
and long run recommendations to reduce the backlog and keep the court's
docket current.

-

Supreme Court Docket Analysis
The annual case filing rate in the supreme court almost
dpubled between 1950 and 1959. In 1950, 118 cases were filed as compared with 412 in both 1958 and 1959. However, the filing rate
decreased somewhat during the flrst ten months of 1960. There were
306 cases filed during this ten-month period, and if this rate were
maintained for the remainder of the year, the annual total would be
approximately 370 cases.
On January 1, 1950, 167 cases were pending before the court.
The number of pending cases more than tripled by January 1, 1960,
when there were 523. Of course, a large proportion of pending cases
are not at issue (ready for trial); however, the proportion of
pending cases at issue has increased steadily since 1956, when 90
of the 161 cases pending, or almost 45 per cent, were at issue. As
of January 1. 1960, 318 of the 523 pending cases, or almost 61 per
cent, were at issue. This ratio increased slightly during the first
ten months of 1960. As of November 1, 275, or 62.5 per cent, of the
440 cases pending were at issue.

Case Disposition. The number of cases closed has been less
than the filing rate in each of the years from 1950 through 1959,
with the exception of 1954, when 269 cases were closed as compared
with 252 filed. In 1958, 127 fewer cases were disposed of than were
filed. The court reduced this disproportion considerably in 1959,
when 372 cases were closed and 412 cases filed. During the first
ten months of 1960, the court had disposed of 389 cases as compared
with 306 filed. If this disposition rate continues through the last
two months, disposals will probably exceed filings by more than
100 cases in 1960.
One of the major reasons for the court's great increase in
case dispositions has been the assistance in opinion writing provided
by outside judges. During the ten-month period ending October 31,
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1960,52 opinions had been written by retired supreme court justices,
district judges, and qualified county judges called in to assist the
supreme court. An additional 26 opinions were being written but had
not yet been submitted to the court. In all, one retired supreme
court justice, 24 district judg~s, and four county judges had assisted the court through October 30, 1960.

•

-

Funds to pay expenses and small honorariums to these•judges
were authorized by the General Assembly in 1960. The docket status
in each trial court is taken into consideration in determining which
j.udges are invited to sit with the supreme court. The invitations
are distributed as evenly as possible to avoid depriving any area of
a trial judge or judges for an extended period. An invited outside
judge does not have a voice in the court's decision, rather he
reviews the briefs, sits with a department of the court during oral
argument and while it deliberates its decision, and then if he is
in agreement he writes the opinion on which the court's decision is
~ased.
Written Opinions. The number of the court's written opinions
increased from 154 in 1950 to 160 in 1958. In 1959, however, the
court wrote 256 opinions, an increase of 60 per cent over the
previous year. During the first ten months of 1960, the court had
written 297 opinions, 52 of which were written by outside judges
as indicated above. If this rate were maintained for the remaining
two months, the court would have in excess of 360 written opinions
for the year.
Table I shows a year-by-year recapitulation of the cases
filed and disposed of, written opinions, and cases pending and at
issue for each year 1950 through October 30, 1960.

•

Reversals. In addition to population growth and economic
expansion, a high reversal rate has been suggested as a reason for
the increase in the number of cases filed in the supreme court. In
other words, if a litigant had a one in three or two in five
possibility of obtaining a reversal, he might bring an appeal, where
he might not if the possibility of reversal were considerably less.
An analysis of the number and proportion of reversals in cases
before the supreme court shows that from 1953 through 1959, 485 of
1,437 cases disposed of on writs of error or almost 34 per cent were
reversed entirely, and an additional 62 cases were either modified
or reversed in part. In all, slightly more than 38 per cent of the
cases before the court on writ of error during the seven years
(1953 through 1959) were reversed or modified to some extent. A
year-by-year analysis of reversals is shown in Table II.
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TABLE I
Cases Before the Colorado Supreme Court
1950-1959

.....

0
0

Year

Cases
Pending
Jan. 1

1950

167

218

1951

181

188

1952

a

199

568a

399a

169a

138

1953

169

330

499

284

215

175

1954

215

252

.467

269

198

162

1955

198

287

485

284

201

184

1956

201

90

301

502

2ql

241

161

1957

241

133

345

586

230

356

195

1958

356

221

412

768

285

483

160

1959

483

295

412

895.

372

523

246

1960b

523

318c

306

829

389

440

297d

a.
b.
c.
d.

Cases At
Issue
Jan. 1

Cases
Filed

Total
385

Cases
Closed
204

Cases
Pending
Dec. 31

Number
Of Written
O.Qinions

181

154
131

1951 ana 1952 combined.
Through October 31, 1960.
As of November 1, ·1960, 275 cases were at issue.
Includes 52.by outside judges.
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TABLE II

...

Number of Reversals, Cases Heard on Error
Colorado Supreme Court 1953-1959

...

-

.

Per cent of Reversals

......
""·
..._

.,,._

.....

...

Ye2 r
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
l,958
1959

Number
Disposed
On.Error
210
222
233
193
173
180
226

Total
Through
1959
1,437

Reversals
74
68
59a
51b
62
86
85

485

%

Affirmed
In
Part And
Revised
Modified In Part Total c

%

35.24
30.63
25.32
26.42
35.84
47.78
37.61

3
1
4
1
1
1
1

4
8
7
2
6
6
17

81
77
70
54
69
93
103

38.57
34.68
30.04
27.98
39.88
51.67
45.50

33.75

12

50

547

38.06

~.
a.
b.
c.

Includes 1 disapproved.
Includes 1 judgment reversed on petition for rehearing.
Includes all cases reversed, modified and reversed in part.

,.
,.

--

.
•
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A relatively high reversal rate, however, does not necessarily
lead to an increase in cases taken on writ of error to the supreme
court. Nebraska's supreme court, for example, has a reversal rate
similar to Colorado's and yet the number of cases appealed annually
is about one-half the number· in Colorado. In part, this difference
might be explained by the fact that Nebraska's population and economic
growth has been very small in the past decade, especially when compared with Colorado's. Even with a population approximately 83 per
cent of Colorado's, it might be expected that the filing rate in
Nebraska would be less than 83 per cent of Colorado's, even with a
similar reversal rate, but more than 50 per cent if the reversal rate
was a definite causal factor in the number of appeals filed.
In the long run, the reversal rate probably would not be an
important factor in the number of cases filed. It might be expected
in states with high filing rates that eventually the reversal rate
might be reduced, because of the number of unmeritorious matters
appealed to the supreme court. Conversely, if there are a small
number of cases appealed, it might be assumed that there would be a
higher proportion of meritorious matters, which could increase the
reversal rate.

J.
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Source of Cases Filed in Su reme Court. In 1959, 87.5 per
cent oft e cases i ed int e supreme court originated in the
district courts, and almost nine per cent originated in the county
and superior courts. Almost four per cent of the cases were original
proceedings. As might be expected, the largest number of appeals
(144 or 35 per cent) originated in ilie 2nd Judicial District
(Denver)l where 40 per cent of all district court cases are docketed.
Other districts in which the number of appeals exceeded five per
cent of the total cases filed in the supreme court for the year were
the 1st, 8th, and 18th Judicial Districts. Table III shows the source
and ty.pe of cases filed in the supreme court in 1959.
These data are useful only for descriptive purposes. In and
of themselves they provide no reasons for the increase in supreme court
filings. In the course of making the supreme court docket analysis,
attention was focused not only on the courts where appeals originate
but upon the trial judges as well. It was decided that any analysis
made on this basis would be extremely presumptuous for several reasons:
1) Some cases would be appealed regardless of the trial judge. 2)
Some trial judges, because of their experience and reputation, may
preside over more difficult cases than others. 3) Some trial judges
may have a considerably greater number of cases before the supreme
court, because they handle a greater volume of judicial business. No
conclusions can be drawn from the number of supreme court reversals
per trial judge either,because supreme court opinions often change
with the changing complexion of the court.

•

,

Delay in Case Disposition. By the end of 1959, the average
delay between the time a case became at issue before the supreme
court and was disposed of was 20 month~.
(Half of the cases were
disposed of more quickly and half took longer). 18 The last analysis
of pending cases at issue before the supreme court was made in 1959
and was based on the 311 cases at issue as of September, 1959. Of
these 311 cases, the earliest had come of issue in the third quarter
of 1957. Only 21 cases, less than seven per cent, were at issue
prior to 1958, and almost half of the 311 cases became at issue in
1958. In other words, one-half of the pending cases were at issue
at least ten months, as compared with 20 months from issue to final
disposition. This information is shown in Table IV.

18.

Judicial Business of Colorado Courts, 1959, Annual Report of
Judicial Administrator, Denver, p. 12.
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TABLE III
Source and Type of Cases Docketed in Supreme Court during 1959
Metropolitan
District Courts
1st
2nd
4th
8th

Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.

(Golden)
(Denver)
(Colorado Springs)
(Boulder, Greeley,
Fort Collins}
10th Dist. (Pueblo)
17th Dist. (Brighton)
18th Dist. (Littleton)
Total-Metro. Dists.

Cases AQQealed
Orig.
Proc.

% of

Civil

Crim.

23
113
16

4
21
4

2
10
0

144

27
·9
7
17

3
9
0
3

5
0
2
6

35
18
9
26

4.4

212

A4

25

281

69.0

I
0
2
0

6
1
5
10
3

1.4
.25
L-2
2.4
.7

14

3.4
.5
4.4

Total
29
20

Total

7.1
35.4
4.9
8.6
2.2
6.4

I-'

0

w

Non-Metropolitan
District Courts
3rd
5th
6th
7th
9th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th

Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.

Total-Non-Metro. Dists.
District Court Total
County & Superior Courts
Other - Original
Total for State

4
1
2

4
2
8
2
12
2
6
3

1
0
1
6
0
6a
0
6
0
2
4

l

0
0
0
0
0
0

·2
18
2
8
7

.5
1.9
1.7

46

26

4

76

18.5

258
34
0
292

70
0
0
70

29
0
16
45

357

87.5
8.6
3.9
100.0

34

·1&
407

a. Writs of error from denials of habeas corpus from state penitentiary.
Source: Judicial Business of Colorado Courts 1 1959, Annual Report of Judicial Administrator.

..

TABLE IV
Cases at Issue
Before Colorado Supreme Court
As of September 30, 1959
Date Became
At Issue

Number of Cases

Per Cent
of Total

1957
3rd quarter
-4th quarter
Total
1958
1st quarter
2nd quarter
3rd quarter
4th quarter
Total
1959
1st quarter
2nd quarter
3rd quarter
Total

32
46
35
38
151

10.29
14.79
11.25
12.2
48.53

48
33
58
139

15.43
10.61
18.65
44.7

Grand Total

311

7
14
21

2.25%
4.5
6.75

Type of Cases at Issue. Priority is given by the supreme
court to criminal cases and workmen's compensation cases. Only four
criminal cases and one workmen's compensation case were at issue and
undisposed at the time this analysis was made. Table V shows the
type of cases at issue as of September 1959, according to the time
these cases became at issue. Of the categories enumerated, money
demand cases show the greatest number -- 50, or 16 per cent of the
total. ~Ihirty-nine or 12.5 per cent were personal injury cases. C6ntract cases and cases involving local governmental units totaled 24
each or almost 8 per cent. Property, probate, and domestic relations
cases each a~counted for more than six per cent of the total.

--

Time Lag - Filing to Issue. Another factor in the delay in
disposition of cases before the supreme court is the length of time
it takes for cases to be ready for trial (at issue). At the time the
1959 analysis was made, half of the cases took more than 5.2 months
from filing to issue, with the average for all cases, 6.3 months.
Forty-eight cases or 15.4 per cent of the total took three months or
less from filing to issue; 144 cases or 46.3 per cent took from three
to six months; 106 cases or 34 per cent took from six to twelve months;
and only 13 cases or 4.2 per cent took more than one year. Of these
latter 13, three cases took two years or more from filing until issue.
When the delay from filing to issue is added to the time from
issue to disposition, it shows that the average case disposed of by
the suprc~e court by the end of 1959 had probably been filed 25 to 26
months i:,1·1:.•viously.
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TABLE V
Cases At Issue Pending Before the Colorado Supreme Court
By Type of Case, As of September 30, 1959
Time When Cases Became At Issue
1957
3rd 4th

T::t:Qe of Case

I-'

0
(J1

?ers9nal Injurya
Tort 0
Money Demand
Contract
Municipal and
Local Gov't.c
Water kights
State Agenciesd
Property
Domestic Relationse
Probate
Otherf
Not Showng
TOTAL

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

_Q_ _g_ Total

1st

2nd

_g_ _g_ _g_ _g_

4

4

3

5

l

l

l

l
l

3
3

7
4

1

1958
3rd 4th

100.00

46

33

58

139

l

3

3
2
4

l
l

l

11
2

46

35

38

32

311

151

2
5
6
2
4
7

21

7.71
3.86
2.90
7.40
6.11
6.75
14.79
9.97

6
13
3

3

14

24
1'2
9
23
19
21
46
31

·3
5
2

l
l

7

.12.54%
4.18
16.08
7.71

2
3
5
3
5
5

l
l
l

2

39
13
50
24

12
3
6
10
7
12
23
10

2

4

17
5
23
11

8
6
3
12
11
9
21
17

2
2

l

7
2
8
5·

l
l

4
3

3

l

3
2

l

l
l

6

2

18
7
26
13

2

l

Total

5
2
.8
3

l

4
2
7

4
10
4

5

4

2
2

6

l

3
4

l

2

3
l

Per Cent
Of Cases
At Issue

19571959
Total

5
3
8
3

3

l

1959
2nd 3rd
Total . l _Q_ _g_
1st

l

Includes auto.
Other damages.
All cases involving municipal, county, school districts and special districts.
All cases involving the state of Colorado and its agencies.
Includes divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, custody, dependency, etc.
Includes the few criminal cases not disposed of.
Not indicated in docket book.

District Courts

...

Almost 20,000 cases were filed in the district courts during
1958. The number of cases filed by judicial district ranged from
97 in the 5th District (Eagle, Lake, and Summit counties) to 8,842
in the 2nd District (Denver). Of particular note is the variation
in the number of cases filed per judge in the different judicial districts. In the urban districts (1st, 2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th, 17th, and ·
18th) and in the 7th District (western slope), the number of cases
filed per judge ranged from 395 (8th District} to 884 (Denver). In
the other 10 districts\ the highest number of cases filed per judge
was 341 (11th District); nine of the districts had fewer than 300
cases filed per judge. The 5th District was again the lbwest, with
97. Together the seven urban districts and the 7th District accounted
for 84 per cent of the cases filed in 1958, with 45 per cent of the
state total filed in the Denver Dist~ict Court.
The differences in judicial district populations and in population per judge are very similar to the variations in case filing.
The seven urban judicial districts each have more than 100,000 population, according to the 1960 preliminary census figures; Denver is
the most populous with 491,409. Except for the 7th District with a
population of 93,803, none of the other judicial districts outside
the urban area has a population of more than 65,000. Three judicial
districts (5th, 9th, and 14th) have fewer than 20,000 residents.
These three districts also have the smallest population per judge.
The largest population per judge is in the 17th and 18th districts,
more than 100,000; however, both these districts will have a second
judge in January, 1961.
Table VI shows the number of district court cases filed by
district in 1958 and the number of cases filed per judge, district
population, and population per judge.

•
,.

.

•

.

L •

Trend in District Court Filings, 1950-1958. Slightly in
excess of 5,000 more cases were filed in the district courts in 1958
than were filed in 1950. This increase of 36.5 per cent was five
per cent greater than the state's population growth during the same
period. The three judicial districts (1st, 17th, and 18th) with the
greatest population growth also had the largest increase in the number
of cases filed. The increase in case filings was concentrated in the
metropolitan districts and the 7th District. Together, these eight
districts accounted for almost 87 per cent of this increase, or
4,476 cases. Although five judicial districts lost population, only
two ·of these, the 3rd and 15th, had a decrease in the number of cases
filed. The number of cases filed decreaseM by one-third in the
3rd District and by one-sixth in the 15th. The other three districts
(12th, 14th, and 16th) which lost population each had an increase of
approximately 10 per cent in the number of cases filed. Table VII
shows a comparison of cases filed and population in 1950 and 1958
by judicial district.

I

- 106 -

TABLE VI
District Court Case Load and Population per Judge,
by Judicial District, Cases Filed in 1958

....

...

...

.-"

District.~./

Populationb/

Total
Cases.
Filed

·.

1st
2nd
3rd
·· 4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th

130,957
491,409
27,611
165,603
13,773
38,427
93,803
200,020
19,377
117,547
31,328
38,258
65,252
16,222
24,530
35,283
119,793
112,836

1,196
8,842
234
1,481
97
508
983
1,186
253
964
341
340
544
198
298
269
778
845

1,742,029

19,357

"

'

....

Total

"'

...

.
~'

"

•
•

•
10

,.
;

,,.
~

1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th

District
District
District
District
District
District
District

Population
per
Judge

Cases
Filed
per Judge

3
10~/
1
3
1
2
2
3
1
2
1

43,652
49,141
27,611
55,201
13,773
19,214
46,902
66,673
19,377
58,774
31,328
19,129
32,626
16,222
24,530
35.283
119,793
112.836

'398. 7
884.2
234.0
493.7
97.0
254.0
491.5
395.3
253.0
482.0
341.0
170.0
272.0
198.0
298.0
269.0
778.0
84S,0

45,843

509.4

2

2
1
1
1
1cl
1cl
38

Clear Creek, Gilpin, Jefferson
Denver
Huerfano, Las Animas
Douglas, Elbert, El Paso, Kit Carson, Lincoln, Teller
Eagle, Lake, Summit
Archuleta, Dolores, La Plata, Montezuma, San Juan
Delta, Gunnison, Hinsdale, Mesa, Montrose,
Ouray, San Miguel
8th District
Boulder, Jackson, Larimer, Weld
9th District
Garfield, Pitkin, Rio Blanco
10th District
Pueblo
11th District
Chaffee, Custer, Fremont, Park
12th District
Alamosa, Conejos, Costilla, Mineral,
Rio Grande, Saguache
13th District
Logan, Morgan, Phillips, Sedgwick, Washington, Yuma
14th District
Grand, Moffat, Routt
15th District
Baca, Cheyenne, Kiowa, Prowers
16th District
Bent, Crowley, Otero
17th District
Adams
18th District
Arapahoe
b/ Based on 1960 preliminary census figures.
II Denver had only 9 judges during 1958 and the 1st, 17th, 18th districts
had a combined total of 3. The judges added in 1959 in these districts
are included above to show a more current and realistic relationship
between districts, as the 1959 case filings were similar although
slightly higher than 1958, according to the report of the judicial
administrator.

:1
J,

Number
of
Judges
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TABLE VII
Trend in District Court Case Loads,

Cases Filed in 1950 and 1958, by Judicial District

Di§trict!.I

J/
~I

195al2,/

1st 2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th.
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th

59,826
415,786
36,451
99,770
11,773
31,338

52,125

130,957
491,409
27,611
165,603
13,773
38,427
93,803
200,020
19,377
117,547
31,328
38,258
65,252
16,2~2
24,530
35,283
119,793
112.836

Total

1,325,089

1,742,029

82,334

161,330
17,990
90,188
28,977
45,963
63,627
18,849
29,256
39,272
40,234

•
1

Cases Filed

Population
1950

~

Percent of
Increase

-

118.9
18.2
24.3

66.0
17.0
22.6
13.9
24.0

7.7
30.3
8.1
16.8
2.6
13.9
16.2
10.2
197.7
116.5
31.5

Percent of
Increase

1950

1958

539
6,998
348
1,055

1,196
121.9
8,842
26.4
234 - 32.8
1,481
40.4
97
51.6
508
58.3
56.5
983
1,186
32.1
46.2
253
57.0
964
1.8
341
340
12.6

64

321
628
898
173
614
335
302
449

180
358

243

260
417
14,182

.,,
e
JI

...
~

II,.

II

544

21.2

10.0
198
298 - 16.8
10.7
269
778
199.2
102.6
845

.

i9,357

36.5

~,.

Present judicial district composition used for both 1950 and 1958
to provide uniformity, although some counties were in other districts
in 1950.
Based on 1960 preliminary census figures.

•

;.

•

Cases Filed by Major Category, Almost 53 per cent of the cases
filed in the district courts in 1958 were civil actions. Domestic relations accounted for 35 per cent and criminal cases for 12 per cent.
There has been a significant increase in the number of domestic relations cases. These cases (including divorce, separate maintenance,
annulment, and custody actions) increased 53 per cent since 1950 as
compared with almost 28 per cent for civil cases and 34 per cent for
criminal. The highest proportion of domestic relations cases is found
in the urban districts, principally the 1st, 4th, 10th, 17th and 18th.
The highest proportion of criminal cases (although not the largest
number of criminal cases} is found in the 3rd, 7th, 12th, 13th, and
14th districts. In only one district, the 5th, civil actions accounted
for more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in 1958, and in only one
district, the 10th, civil actions constituted less than 40 per cent of
the cases filed.

•

ii
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Table VIII shows the number of civil, domestic relations, and
criminal cases filed in 1958, by judicial district and by the counties
within each judicial district. Table IX shows a comparison of civil,
domestic relations, and criminal cases filed, by judicial district in
1950 and 1958 •
In two districts (1st and 17th~ there was more than a
100 per cent increase in civil cases filed. Both these districts
had large increases in the number of domestic relations actions
filed, as well. In the 17th District, 4.5 times as many domestic
rel:-ations cases were filed in 1958 as in 1950. Two districts, the
6th and 10th, had more than twice as many domestic relations cases
filed in 1958 as in 1950, and four others (1st, 5th, 7th, and 18th)
had increases of more than 100 per cent. Three districts had more
than 100 per cent increase in criminal cases filed. These districts
were the 4th, 14th, and 18th. Fewer districts had large increases in
. the number of civil cases filed. The 1st, 17th, and 18th were the only
dtstricts with increases substantially above the increase for the state
as a whole. Four of the five districts which lost population since
1950 also had a reduction in the number of civil cases filed. The
12th District had a small gain in the number of civil cases filed,
despite a loss in population. The 3rd District was the only one in
which there was a reduction in all three categories -- civil, domestic
relations, and criminal. The.12th District had a small decrease in
criminal cases, and the 11th and 15th districts also had reductions in
the number of criminal cases filed.

,._

.

....

...

,

,.

Case Disoosition. An analysis was made of the elapsed time
between filing and disposition, based on cases filed in 1958. At the
time this analysis was made (in the latter half of 1959), almost
75 per cent of the civil actions filed in 1958 had been disposed of,
as had 85 per cent of the domestic relations and criminal cases. This
time analysis, therefore, does not indicate the elapsed time on all
disposed cases, i.e., those filed prior to 1958. If these cases were
included, the average time from filing to disposition would be greater.
The average time from filing to disposition would also be greater had
it been possible to include the elapsed time on those 1958 cases which
were not disposed of until 1960. With these qualifications, however,
this analysis gives an indication of how rapidly the cases filed in a
given year progress to conclusion, because it is based on almost
80 per cent of the cases filed in 1958.
Within this 80 per cent, the average time from filing to
disposition for civil cases was 4.4 months; for domestic relations
cases it was 4.5 months; and 1or criminal cases, 3.5 months. The
2nd Judicial District, because of its large case load, had the greatest
average elapsed time for all th~ee types of cases: civil, 5.8 months;
domestic relations, 6.2 months; and criminal, 5.2 months. Generally,
the average time from filing to disposition was greater in the urban
districts, but in one rural district (the 16th), the elapsed time for
domestic relations cases was only one-tenth of a month less than in
the 2nd. In most of the districts (both urban and rural) the average

If
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TABLE VIII
Number of Ca&es by Major Category Filed in Di&trict Court& in 1958,
by County and Judi~ial District
121stris;t& ang C2yn;Uflii

ls:t Di§t1:1s;t

Clear Creek
Gilpin
Jeffer&on
Total
2ad 12htds;:t
Denver

J1:g Di§tds;t

£1ill
!:!s2.a.
Elli

Cdmlnal

!:!2...

££1....

!:!s2.a.

Elli

13
3

22.4
12.5

8.6
8.3

40
19
~78
637

69.0
79.2

2.L..2

!Q...£

53.3

~g2
4 8

39.1

5
2
84
91

5,101

57.7

2,934

33.2

38
74
112

40.0

14

~

47.9

32

49

50.0
84.2
42.l
62,5
44,8

14
3
623
8
11

25.9
15.8
48.0
20,0
28.9

Huerfano
La& Anima&
Total
~:tb Dls:tdSi:t
Douglas
Elbert"
El Paso
Kit Car&on
Lincoln
Teller
Total
2:tb District
Eagle
Lake
Summit
Total
6th District
Archuleta
Dolores
La Plata
Montezuma
San Juan
Total
7th Dist;rict
Delta
Gunnison
Hinsdale
Mesa
Montrose
Ouray
San Miguel
Total

34
9
214
162
12
22
500

Boulder
Jackson
Larimer
Weld
Total

214
10
177
121
552

ath D1st;r;:1s;t

D2muUc R~lati!;!!Jlii

27
16
546
25
17
2~
657

;C!

Total
No,

7.6

58
24
1,114
1,196

807

9.1

8,842

14. 7

43

45.3

~

30

~

31. 2

95
132
234

13
0
128
7
10

24. l
0
9,9
17,5
26.3

54
19
1,297
40
38

20.9

73

...1.....2.

33

44,4

664

2

1i...2.
44.8

160

2

--2&
10.8

1,481

65.2
60.0

26, 1

2
7

8,7
15 .6

61.8

6
11
8
25

23
45
22
97

13
13
104
130
3
263

65.0
59.l
50.2
51.2
60.0
51.8

44

34. 1
65,4
81.8
46,9
58.5
54,6

15
27
18
60

li&

2bl.

2.2.d.

25.8

12

3

~

6
5
78
87
2
178

30.0
22.7
37.7
34.3
40.0
35.0

1
4
25
37

5.0
18.2
12.1
14, 5

0

_Q_

67

13,2

20
22
207
254
5
508

22
10
2
146
82
5

17.1
19.2
18.2
32,0
29.6
22.7

Q

~

63
8
0
96
33
5
2
210

48.8
15.4
0
21.l
11. 9
22.7

129
52
11
456
277
22

50.9

273

47,8
41.7
53.2

181
5
107
133
426

~

46,5

24,4

ll.a,Q

27,8

40.4
20.8
32.1·
~

35,9

53
9
49
97
208

12.4

ll.-..2

983

11.8
37.5
14, 7

448

17.6

.

,

.

C'.

-

-jl

.

,,,

,.,

•

•

3'2

21.3

~

•

24

333
J81
1,186

~

~

,is
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TABLE VIII
(Continued}
Pi§trict§ ~ad c2uati1§
9th District
Garfield
Pitkin
Rio Blanco
Total
10th District
Pueblo
11th Bistrict
Chaffee
Custer
Fremont
Park
Total
12th District
Alamosa
Conejos
Costilla
Mineral
Rio Grande
Saguache
Total
13th District
Logan
Morgan
Phillips
Sedgwick
Washington
Yuma
Total
14th District
Grand
Moffat
Routt
Total
15th District
Baca
Cheyenne
Kiowa
Proweri:;
Total
16th District
Bent
Crowley
Otero
Total
17th District
Adams
18th District
Arapahoe

'
,,,__

Grand Total

llill
.!:£L.,
llit...

DQm~s:Uc RelaU2ns

•-

ft

,.

~~

SL

!:!2..a.

.!:£L.

27.5
11.6

21.8
7.0

21. 7

31
3
2Q
54

50.7
81.4
54.4
56.9

39
5
ll
55

359

37.2

453

47.0

51
9
91
17
168

52.0
69.2
45.3

28
4
89
6
127

28.6
30.8
44.3
20. 7
37.2
27.5
15.9
14 .8
50.0
27.0

49.3

~

21.3

152

15.8

964

19
0
21
46

19.4
0
10.4
20.7
13.5

98
13
201
22
341

25
12
9
0
25
lQ
81

22.9
27.3
33.3
0
25.0
18.5
23.8

109
44
27
6
100
54
340

45
52
6
8
6

24.2
26.8
22.2
21.l
12.0
12,2
22.6

186
194
27
38
50
42
544

15.2
34.8

46
66
86
198

2

49.6
56.8
51.9
50.0
48.0

25

~

49_. 7

30
7
4
3
27
19
90

83
103
11
19
32
36
284

44.6
53.1
40.8
50.0
64.0
73.5
52.2

58
39
10
11
12
7
137

31.2
20.1
37.0
28.9
24.0
14 .3
25.2

123

29
32
46
107

63.l
48.5
53.4
54 .o

10
11
20
41

21.7
16.7
23.3
20.7

7
23
2Q
50

51
15
31
72
169

54 .8
71.4
75.6
2Qd
56.7

32
4
5
45
86

34.4
19.l
12.2

10
2
5
26
43

28
18
87
133

53.9
52.9

14
4

169

~

26.5

ll..2
28.9

2

~

25

~

30.9

10
12
31
53

382

49.1

339

43.6

398

47.1

367

10,195

52.7

6,795

49.4

83

-

111 -

26.9
11.8

l2lil
!i2..a.
142
43
68
253

54
25
14
3
48

.
!t

.!:£L.

72
35
37
144

fill&

Criminal

llit...

22.d

~

25.3

10.8
9.5
12.2
~

14.4

19.2
35.3

93
21
41
143
298

19.7

52
34
183
269

57

7.3

778

43.4

80

9.5

845

35.l

2,367

12.2

19,357

lLl

TABLE IX
District Court Case Load by Type of Case F;iled,
1950 and 1958, by Judicial District
District~/

.....
.....
I\)

~/

I{

Civil
1950

1958

1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th

304
3,943
189
512
45
231
358
510
109
355
155
149
254
122
218
142
157
228

637
5,101
112
657
60
263
500
552
144
359
168
169
284
.107
169
133
382
398

Total

7,981

10,195

Percent of
Increase
109.5
29.4
- 40. 7
28.3
33.3
13.9
39.7
. 8.2
32.1
1.1
8.4
13.4
11.8
- 12.3
- 22.5
- 6.3
143.3
74.6
27. 7 ·

Domestic Relations
Percent of
Increase
1958
1950

1950

166
2,436
78
468
10
54
134
240
29
146
91
70
122
39
-79
61
61
155

468
2,934
49
664
25
178
273
426
55
453
127
90
137
41
86
83
339
367

181.9
20.4
- 37.2
41.9
150.0
229.6
103.7
77.5
89.7
210.3
39.6
28.6
12.3
5.1
8.9
36.1
455.7
136.8

69
619
81
. 75
9
36
136
148
35
113
89
83
73
19
61
40
42

4,439

6,795

53.1

Criminal
Percent of
Increase
1958
91
807
73
160
12
67
210
208
54
152

31.9
30.4
- 9.9
113.3
33.3
86.1
54.4

40.5
54.3
34.5
- 48.3

46

81
123
50

-

34

53
57
80

1,762

2,367

34.3

43

Present judicial district composition used for both 1950 and 1958 to provide
uniformity, although some counties were in other districts in 1950.
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68.5
163.2
- 29.5
32.5
35.7
135.3
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elapsed time was less than four months for civil cases and slightly
more than four months for domestic relations cases. Criminal cases
were usually disposed of in less than three months •
Table X shows the average.elapsed time from filing to disposition for civil, domestic relations, and criminal cases in each judicial
district •
Some of the averages shown in Table X need further explanation.
Both the 6th and 12th districts had very low average times between
filing and disposition for civil cases; but these averages were based
on'the disposition of only 60 per cent of the civil cases filed, as
contrasted with 75 to 80 per cent in most other districts. In those
districts where the highest proportion of cases filed were disposed of,
the elapsed-time average reflects actual docket conditions much more
accurately.
The low average elapsed time for criminal cases in some of the
rural and mountain districts, such as the 5th, 9th, and 14th, is a
consequence of a small number of cases being filed initially, with a
high proportion of these resulting in guilty pleas being entered upon
arraignment, which made it possible to dispose of these cases without
tria 1.
Since the more complic~ted and contested cases usually take the
longest time from filing to disposition, these elapsed-time averages
are based largely on dismissed and non-contested actions. In all
judicial districts, almost 30 per cent of the disposed civil cases were
dismissed. These cases were dismissed usually for one of three reasons:
out-of-court settlement, action dropped by the plaintiff, or lack of
action resulting in the invocation of automatic dismissal rules.
Slightly less than 57 per cent of the disposed civil cases were noncontested matters such as default judgments. Less than 12 per cent
were non-jury contested cases, and in two per cent of these dispositions,
jury trials were held.
There was also a large proportion of non-contested and dismissed
cases in domestic relations actions. Almost 65 per cent of the disposed
domestic relations cases were non-contested, and 26 per cent were dismissed. Only nine per cent of these cases were contested, with jury
trials held in only .2 per cent.
The 8th District had the highest proportion of civil cases
dismissed, 37 per cent; and the lowest proportion, 13 per cent, was
in the 11th District. These statistics reflect the information given
the _committee at its regional meetings. The judges in the 8th District
reported that the district had an automatic dismissal rule, which
applied to cases which had been inactive for six months. In the
11th District, the judge does not dismiss cases for lack of action;
instead, these inactive cases are set for trial unless notification
is received from the attorneys •

~-
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TABLE X
Average Time from Filing to Disposition,
Civil, Criminal, and Domestic Relations c;ses
Filed in 1958, by Juditial District~
Disti:ic;t .

Civil
!!12.....

1st
2nd,
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th
All Distri tsb/
All Cases.£7

Dom~s:tic R~la:tions
mo,

4.6
5.8
3.1
3.3
3.4
2.0
2.6
3.5
3.0
2.1
2.4

1.8
3.2
2.8
3.0
2.9
3.1
3.1
3.1
4.4

;ti

~

C;riminal
mo,

5.1
6.2
5.0
4.3
3.2
3.5
3.1
4.0
3.1
2.5
2.7
2.6
4.3
4.0
3.6
6.1
4.3
2.9

4.4

3.9
4.5

2.6
3.5

•

5.2
4.0
2.5
1.6
2.1
2.1
2.3
1.1
3.2
1.8
1.6
2.1
•9
3.0
1.5
4.0
3.5

~

...

-1,

.

~

,.
.._

.

al In months.

b/

Unweighted average for all districts.

cl Weighted according to number of cases.

The 2nd District had the largest number of jury trials, 70,
but this number represented less than two per cent of the civil case
dispositions. Three rural districts (3rd, 5th, and 12th) had the
greatest proportion of jury trial dispositions, but in none of the
three did jury trials exceed five per cent of total dispositions.
Generally, the urban districts had the highest proportion of contested
non-jury dispositions for both civil and domestic relations cases.
Table XI shows the number of disposed civil cases (filed in 1958) for
each judicial district, according to the type of disposition. Table XII
shows similar data for d6mestic relations cases.

,
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TABLE XI
Type of Disposition, Civil Cases Filed in 1958, by Judicial District
Number
of Cases

IH~:tx:is;;:t
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th

I-'
I-'

lJ1

Total

Qi f Sl~Hi ed a /
502
3,686
90
512
47

Dismissedb/
No,
Pct.
149
1,190
15
123
10

84

29.7
32.3
16.7
24.0
21.3
29.0
28.5
37.0
25.2
21.7
13.3
17.2
27.1
27.0
19.2
23.0
29.9
32.2

2,243

29.6

155

45

354

101
176
31
56
16
17
66
23
30
25
86

476
123
258
120
99
243

85
156
109
288
261
7,564

Non-Contested
No,
Pct.
234

2,095
52
306
28
95
197
228
83
158
84

69
144

52
110
68
172
116
4,291

Contested
Non-Jur:y:
No.
Pct.

46.6
56.8
57.8
59.8
59.6
61.3
55.7
47.9
67.5
61.3
70.0
69.7
59.3
61.2
·70.5

100
331
19
67
7

62.4

14

59.7
44.5

56.7

28
57

12.8
9.7
21.8

19
70
4
16
2
1
13
12
1
6
2
5
1
0
3
2
2
4

867

11.5

163

14
43

60
8
38
18
8
32
10
13

19.9
9.0
21.1
13.1
14.9
9.0
12.1·
12.6
6.5
14.7
15.0
8.1
13.2
11.8
8.4

al Cases filed in 1958 which were disposed of by the latter half of 1959.

bl

Contested
Jur:y:
No,
Pct,

Includes cases dismissed for lack of prosecution, settled out of court, etc.

3.8
1.9
4.4

3.1
4.2

.7
3.7
2.5
.8
2.3
1.7
5.0
.4

0
1.9
1.8
.7
1.5
2.2

♦

TABLE XII
Type of Disposition, Domestic Rela~ions Cases Filed in 1958, by J~dicial District

District
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th

......
......

a,.

Total
a/

9.I

Number
of Cases 1
Dis12osed~
435

2,738
46

533
25
143
204

385
24

333
96

56

127
28
60

-'

Dismissedb/
No,
Pct,
113
738
19
134

5
36
47

133
1
51
17
17
45
4

306

12
25
87
56

5,884

1,540

47

298

26.0
27.0
41.3

25.2
20.0
25.2
23.0
34.5

247

1,846
23

17
176
189
3,804

64.6

18
98
133
204

4.2

22

259
69
35
66
16

20.0
53.2"
29.2
18.3
26.2

56.8
67.4

50.0
64.5
72.0
68.5
65.2
53.0
91.6
77.8
71.9
62.5
52.0
57.1
70.0
36.2
59.1
61.8

344

15.3
17.7
30.4
35.4
14.3

-......

Non-Cont~s:ted -"
No,
Pct,

42

Contested
Jur:t
No,
Pct,

Contested
N2n-Juri:

No:-----

~

75
149

17.2

4
54

8.7
10.1
8.0
6.3
11.8
12.5

2
9
24
48

1
23
10

5.4

15
8
6
5
35
61
531

9.0

4

0

0

0

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

4.2

6.9
10.4
7.1
11.8
28.6
10.0
10.6
11.7
19.9

0
5

.2
.2

0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

.

.8
0
0
0
0
0

0

0
7

.2

Cases filed in 1958 which were disposed of by the latter half of 1959.
Includes cases dismissed for lack of prosecution, settled out of court, etc.
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Concurrent Jurisdiction, The county courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the district courts in civil cases in which the amount
in controversy is less than $2,000. The justice court'i concurrent civil
jurisdiction is limited to cases not involving real property or amounts
in. excess of $300. In theory, such concurrent jurisdiction should keep
these relatively less important matters out of the district court. An
analysis was made of the civil cases filed in the district courts in
1958 to determine how many fell within the jurisdiction of either the
county or justice courts.
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More than 3,000 (30.4 per cent) of the 10,195 civil cases filed
in the district courts in 1958 involved amounts within the jurisdiction
of either the county or justice courts. Seventy-seven per cent of
these 3,103 cases could have been brought in the county courts and the
remainder in either county or justice courts. In three districts, the
civil cases which could have been brought in .a lower court equalled or
exceeded one-third of all civil actions filed (2nd District, 39 per cent;
13th District, 38 per cent; and 16th District~ 33.l per cent). These
minor civil cases accounted for less than 15 per cent of the filings
in only three districts (5th, 8th, and 17th). Table XIII shows the
number of civil cases filed in 1958 in each judicial district which
could have been filed instead in either county or justice courts •

..
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TABLE XIII
Number of Civil Cases Filed in 1958,
Under $2,000, by Judicial District
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District

Total
Civil
Cases

No.
Under
$300

1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th

637
5,101
112
657
60
263
500
552
144
359
168
169
284
107
169
133
382
398

34
479
13
15
2
12
25
11
4
11
6
8
14
6
9
7
13
19

92
1,513
12
112
6
68
119
69
24
58
32
31
94
14
26
37
38
70

126
1.992
25
127
8
80
144
80
28
69
38
39
108
20
35
51
89

19.8
39.0
22.3
19.3
13.3
30.4
28.8
14 .5
19.4
19.2
22.7
23.l
38.0
18.7
20.7
33.l
13.3
22.4

10,195

688

2,415

3,103

30.4

Total

No.
$300-$2.000

:l-..;J·
,,.._

--~
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Total
Under
$2,000

44

Pct.
of Total
Civil Cases

County Courts
More than 25,000 cases were filed in county courts in 1958;
43 per cent (10,860} of the total were filed in Denver.19 Four other
countfes beside Denver had more than ~,000 cases filed, Arapahoe,
El Paso, Jefferson, and Pueblo; and five counties had between 500
and 1,000. cases, Adams, Boulder, Larimer, Mesa, and Weld. Only one
other county (Las Animas) had more than 300 cases filed; five counties
had between 200 and 300; nine counties had between 100 and 200; and
38 counties had fewer than 100.
Probate actions accounted for the largest number of cases
filed in all counties (32 per cent}; and in 30 counties, at least
50 per cent of all cases filed were probate. Juvenile cases accounted
for almost 30 per cent of the total; civil actions, 18 per cent; mental
health cases, 10 per cent; criminal cases, slightly more than 5 per cent;
and domestic relations matters, 4.6 per cent. Table XIV shows the number of cases filed in each county court in 1958, according to the type
of case.
Trend in County Court Case Loads 1950-1958. The number of
cases filed in county court increased 58 per cent between 1950 and
1958. Generally, this increase was concentrated in Denver and the
five counties with more than 100,000 population (Adams, Arapahoe,
El Paso, Jefferson, and Pueblo}. Denver and these five counties
excluded, the other 57 counties had an increase in county court cases
filed of only 3.5 per cent, which was less than the 5.7 per cent average population growth of these counties during the same period. Twentynine counties had fewer cases filed in county court in 1958 than in
1950. These included 26 of the 36 counties which lost population
during the same period. Seven counties which had fewer residents in
1958 had slight increases in the number of cases filed in county
court. A comparison could not be made for three of the counties
which lost population, because 1950 case load information was not
available. Table XV shows a county-by-county comparison of population and cases filed in county court for 1950 and 1958.
Relationship between Case Loads and Judicial Salaries. An examination of Tables XIV and XV indicates the wide variation in county court
case loads between the 12 largest counties and the remainder of the
state. To a certain extent, this variation is recognized in the
statutes setting the salaries of county judges.20 In Denver, the only
Class I county, the county judge receives a salary of $12,500.21 In
the other counties, judicial salaries are as follows:
19.
20.
21.

The totals for the state and Denver include the cases filed in
the Denver Juvenile and Superior courts, whose jurisdiction is
exercised in the rest of the state by the county courts.
56-2-3 and 56-2-4, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended.
The judges of the Denver Juvenile and Superior courts each
receive $12,000.
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TABLE XIV
C:;i GeS

rounty

r ·iv'·· l

Ne\. --· f'ct.

Filed in County Courts in lG":>8, by Type of Case

Domestic
r:Platiom.
iln.
Pct.

l\d.irn'.

1:)1)

12.fl

/\ la~'io~.;1
Arn1)t,ho~:

31
1':l 1

26. ':J
1'1 .8

4

14. 3

3

11

LLB
17.9

4

16.0
16. 1
6.7
8.9
13. 9
13.2
7. 1
7,7

46

11.3
22.0
26.3

35
204
13

12
79
20
7
10
2
4
8
l
14
425
4
23
14
2
2
14
l
8
4
17
105
3

7.7
11. 1
10,8
15. 3
4. 1
15.5
0
22.2
26.1
66,7
4.2
50.0
19.6
6.9
12.3
9.0
18.2
17. 1
9.8
4.3
2.8
22.6
0
12.8
41.l
11.6
4.1
4.9
14. 3
16. 7
18.2
7.1
8.7
20.8
7.7
17 .4
14.4
2.9
16. 7
35.0
1.9
34.8
11.4
18.4
12.8
3.1

42
32
3
0
77
0
5
17
0
l
7
0
2
l
3
10
151
4
3
9
0
2
0
5
l
6
1
62
0

.5
16.2
5.3
16.7
15.9
0
7. q
0
3.2
6.9
4.9
7,7
7,5
7,0
9.8
6.5
0
10.8
0
5.3
8.9
0
.6
3.5
0
8.3
2.3
21.4
6.3
7.4
7.7
2.3
9.3
0
16. 7
0
9.4
4.3
17.2
1.1
7.6
0

4,625

18.4

1,152

4.6

,\rchuleta
Paca
Bent
Boulder
Chaffee
Cheyenne
Clear Creek
Conejos
Costilla
'Crowley
Custer
Delta
Denver!2/
Dolores
Douglas
Eagle
Elbert /
El Paso.£.
Fremont
Garfield
Gilpin
Grand
Gunnison
Hinsdale
Huerfano
Jackson
Jefferson
Kiowa
K,i t r:arson
Lake
La Plata
Larimer
Las Animas
Lincoln
Logan
Mesa
Mineral
Moffat
Montezuma
Montrose
Morgan
Otero
Ouray
Park
Phillips
Pitkin
Prowers/
Pueblo!:!.
Rio Blanco
Rio Grande
Routt
Sagu;iche
San Juan
San /.'.iguel
Sedgwick
Summit
Teller
Wa~hington
Weld
Yuma
Total

12
120
22

2
8
11
'5
2
l
31
2,391

5
6
6
4
261

9
23
0
12
18
2
8
2
205
2
10
7
41
102
32
2
6
161
0

'57
3
116

0
8
1
3
2
'5
0
0

2
3
2
78
1
24
1
9
11
0
15
0
33
2
4
6
17

6. l
2.6
11.3
10.7
5.0
0
6.2
5.9

Menta 1
Tncornnp+pnt.

Pct.

"
~h
S6
16

lP-1
J')

cl

sl!

13

,t6. ''.,
'J'i. 0

14. 3
6.2
19.4
9.9
10.9
6.7
11. 1
'5. 1
0
7. 1
0
12.0
9.6

11
111
2,508

21.0
6.4
9.3
5.4

4
34
24
24

13
74

2. '5

4

13.2

0
2
0
33

1,038
4

5
5
2
236
26
9

44

40
319
67
l '5
2'5
38
20

-~

w)

lU.H

(,

?TT

'.>7 .1
7. l

Tl
2

10
l

} '.). '1

6

l . 'l

l

143
21
8

19.1
15. 3

4(,
4

2

,1 f,.

26.6

5
19
24
9
19
51
378
69
8,085

32.l

7,486

2
1
0
18
2
86
1
5
9
16
49
37
1
26
48
1
9
9
21
16
22
3
l
l
0
12
296
5
17
4
6
2
0
3
2
4
14
61
8
2,490

9.9

44

48
124
279
124
35
122
272
4
50
45
85
97
141
8
15
31
8
82
569
36
59
48
44

84.6
40,4

23. 1
21.0
43.6
44.4
64.9
33.8

61.5
52.8
36.8
35.2
50.7
33.3
47,l
0
33.1
69.0
54.3
61.5
54.6
46.7
38.l
76 .1
57.5
38.3
80.0
53.2
23.4
49.4
57.l
69.9
57.l
62.5
70.4
57.1
51.3
27.9
69.l
44.7

<:r imi n;il

9

29.8

'I. l
',. l

i. {

BO
6"/

· l O. 8

n

l'L 6

3. ">
5.3

9

l l."J

10
0
83

2
35
4

HJ.",
0
4.8
4. :,
4.7
l "J. 8
0
0
0
6. q
0
6. 1
0
18.5
5 .1
1.3
2. l
2.1
2.2
.5
,7
0
4.2
4.2
'5. 9
2.3
.4
0
4.2
0
7.1
13.7
12.9
0
'5. 3
2.0
11.6
0
2. '5
7. '5
8.7
2.9
2.2
4.3
4.1

1,319

5.2

10

7
3
0
0
0
13
0
64
0
15
4
3
12
7
l
1
'5
()

4
8
10
4

1
0
l

0
1

22
263
0
7
2
8

0
1
4
2

1

2P

I. 'j
(,. 2
7. <)

l.

0
43
376
1

JJ'/

~ ~~'

..

3

4

'1:M

L,02-1

6. ·,
38.9
">. 1
7.6

2

35

Totals for county, superior, and juvenile courts.
Includes unoff ic ia 1 cases: El Paso, 231 juvenile cases plus 242 unoff ic ia 1 cases.
Criminal totals include juvenile delinquents on whom criminal informations were filed.
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Totill:.l'

!:.!0-:-· 1.,-,J .

~~?

-1:12

49.4
63.7
41. 7
47.5
45.3
39.2
59.3
55.5
46.3
71.1

19

577
136
78
7
19
35
1
89
0
347
20

3

'50.7
42.6
48,9
'50.0
27.8
48.1
52.6
67.9

Juvenile
Pct,
No,

10.0
20 2'5.3
7 18.4
7. 1
2
7.7
1
8.0
22
4,343 40,0
3 15 .B
11 14 .1
6 11. 1
5 13. '5
473 27.7
39 17.6
7
4.7
5 26.3
12 22.2
4
5.8
0
0
46 24.4
0
0
312 29.8
4 13.8
3.8
3
4
5.1
26 11.4
113 18.9
94 28.8
8,7
4
57 26.9
149 20.9
0
0
14 14. 9
34 17. 7
36 20.9
45 26.5
21 10.4
7,2
1
4.2
l
3
6.8
l
7.1
20 12.5
337 16.5
5.8
3
23 17.4
20 20.6
9 13. 0
1
8.3
6 15. 0
16 30.2
l
4.3
l
2.9
7
7.6
176 21.5
13 13.4

13.8
11.8
6. 1
15.8
3.7
1,4
0
9.5
'50,0
8.2
3.4
6.2
11.6
7.0
8,2
11.4
2.2
12.3
6.7
20.0
9.6
4.7
12.2
9.4
10.9
21.4
4.2
2.3
0
7.5
14. 5
9.7
12,Q
4. l
8.7
16. 7
0
5.7
8.7
11.4
15.2
7.5
8.3

al Does not include birth certificates.

bl

2H.6

4
")

10.7

:n.J

2rn

l n. ·1

3.3
3.3

5.4
4,6

6.n

13.7

11()

l '5
2
10

0
0
12.7
1.8
10.5
16. 7
5.6

Probate
Pct.

lli'LL

74B
137
30
90
79
38
28
13
27':J
10,860
10
78
'54
37
1,708
221
148
19
54
69
3
189
4
I ,047
29
81
78
227
C.)97

326
46
21?
712
")

q4

192
172

170
202
14
24
44
14
160
2,041
'52
132
07

6Q

l?
4 ()
'°13

23
3'.>

92
817
r17

25, l ') 7

TABLE XV
Comparison of Cases Filed in County Court
1950 and 1958
County
Adams
Alamosa
Arapahoe
Archuleta
Baca
Bent
Boulder
Chaffee
Cheyenne
Clear Creek
Conejos
Costilla
Crowley
Custer
Delta
Denver
Dolores
Douglas
Eagle
Elbert
El Paso
Fremont
Garfield
Gilpin
Grand
Gunnison
Hinsdale
Huerfano
Jackson
Jefferson
Kiowa
Kit Carson
Lake
La Plata
Larimer
Las Animas
Lincoln
Logan
Mesa
Mineral
Moffat
Montezuma
Montrose
Morgan
Otero
Ouray
Park
Phillips
Pitkin
Prowers
Pueblo
Rio Blanco
Rio Grande
Routt
Saguache
San Juan
San Miguel
Sedgwick
Summit
Teller
Washington
Weld
Yuma
Total

al

bl

~I

sl/

Population
1950

Population.2/
1958

3,963
5,716
263
10,549
1,976
55,687
3,003
8,600
6,150
14,880
43,554
25,902
5,909
17,187
38,974
698
5,946
9,991
15,220
18,074
25,275
2,103
1,870
4,924
1,646
14,836
90,188
4,719
12,832
8,940
5,664
1,471
2,693
5,095
1,135
2,754
7,520
67,504
10,827

119,793
9,868
112,836
2,612
6,215
7,356
73,670
8,227
2,720
2,656
8,216
4,217
3,932
1,275
15,363
491,409
2,134
4,792
4,658
3,665
142,643
20,048
11,913
656
3,389
5,418
218
7,771
1,737
127,645
2,374
6,860
7.066
19,005
52,887
19,840
5,180
20,220
50,196
413
6,977
13,848
18,077
21,004
23,995
1,596
1,778
4,390
2,396
13,221
117,547
5,068
11,093
5,856
4,451
828
2,935
4,230
2,049
2,463
6,568
71,726
8,840

1,325,089

1,742,029

40,334
10,531
52, 125
3,030
7,964
8,775
48,296
7,168
3,453
3,289
10,171
6;067
5,222
1,573
17,365
415,786
1,966
3,507
4,488
4,477
74,523
18,366
11,625
850

Per Cent of
Increase
197.7
6.3
116,5
- 13.8
- 22,0
- 16.2
52.5
14. 8
- 21.2
- 19.2
- 19.2
- 30.5
- 24.7
- 18.9
- 11.5
18.2
8.5
36.6
3.8
- 18.l
91.4
9.2
2.5
- 22.8
- 14. 5
- 5.2
- 17.l
- 26.3
- 12.1
. 129. 2
- 20.9
- 20.2
14 .9
27.7
21.4
- 23.4
- 12.3
17.6
28.8
- 40.8
17,3
38,6
18,8
16. 2
- 5.1
- 24 .1
- 4.9
- 10.8
45.6
- 10.9
30.3
7.4
- 13.6
- 34.5
- 21.4
- 43.7
9.0
-

- 17.0

80.5
- 10.6
- 12.7
6.3
- 18.4
31.5

Cases Filed
1950
375
172
533
NA

89
103
675
100
49
58
69
12
32
19
278
5, 904!2_/
15
66
37
31
523
222
156
15
57
82

Cases Filed
1958
934
117
1,024
28
80
67
748
137
30
90
79
38
28
13
275 1
10 86o£.
' 19
78
54
37
1,708
221
148
19
54
69

4

3

216
24
589
42
125
51
191
283
244
77
141
599

189

NA

100
109
208
135
246
23
20
48
15
205
1,257
60
153
89
88

18
26
67

NA

51
92
747
77
15,9922/

4

1,047
29
81
78
227
597
326
46
212
712

Per Cent of
Increase
149. l
- 32.0
92.l
- 11.2
- 35.0

10,8

37.0
- 38.8
70.7
14.5
216.7
- 12.'J
- 31.6
1.1
83.9
26.7
18.2
45.9
19.4
226.5
.5
-

5. 1

26. 7
- 5.3
- 15,9
- 25.0
- 12.5
-833.3
77,7
- 31.0
- 35.2
'J2.9

18.8
111.0
33.6
- 30.3
50 ,I\
18.9

5

94
192

-

172

-

170
202
14
24

-

44

14
160
2,041
52
132
97
69
12
40
53
23
35
92

-

6.0
76 .1
17.3
25.9
17.9
39.1
20.0
8.3
6.7
22.0
62.4
13.3
13.8
9.0
11.6
33.3
'J3.B
20.9

- 31.4
0

97

9.4
26.0

25,157

57.9

817

Based on 1960 preliminary census figures.
Includes 3,026 cases in Denver Juvenile Court.
Includes 4,343 cases in Denver Juvenile Court and 2,378 cases in Denver Superior Court; per cent
of increase for Denver Juvenile Court, 1950-1958, 43.5; for Denver County Court (total used here
for 1958 includes Denver Superior Court cases, which were filed in County Court in 1950), 242.3.
Does not include Archuleta, Mineral, and Summit counties, for which data werP not available.
These three counties had an estimated total of 50 cases in 1950.
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l,.:.
l

Class II A: Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, El Paso,
Jefferson, Larimer, Pueblo, and Weld

t"

Class II B:

! i·.

.
,,.

...

.•

,

Clas 9 III A: Delta, Fremont, Garfield, La Plata,
Logan, Montrose, Morgan, Prowers, and Rio Grande

5,600

Class III .B:

5,200

Huerfano and Yuma

Class III C: Alamosa, Baca, Bent, Conejos, Kit
Carson, Montezuma, Routt, and Washington

4,700

Class IV A: Chaffee, Costilla, Crowley, Douglas,
Eagle, Elbert, Grand, Gunnison, Lake, Lincoln,
Moffat, Phillips, Rio Blanco, Saguache, and
Sedgwick

4,100

Class IV B: Archuleta, Cheyenne, Clear Creek,
Kiowa, San Miguel, and Teller

3,600

Class V: Custer, Dolores, Jackson, Ouray, Park,
and Pitkin

3,000

Class VI A:

Gilpin, San Juan, and Summit

2,660

Class VI B:

Hinsdale and Mineral

,.
"

.

•

22.

Increased from $9,500 by Chapter 40, Session Laws of Colorado,
1960. $9,500 is used in this section as the salary in effect
at the time this analysis was made.

►

,.

734

When these judicial salaries, as well as total expenditures for
county court operation, are related to case loads, as in Table XVI,
the results show that county courts cost the taxpayers considerably
more per case in small counties .. This cost differential between
large and small counties points up the major economic obstacle -lack of judicial business -- to raising judicial salaries in small
counties to a level.which would attract attorneys to the position.
A comparison of judicial salaries and case loads by county classifications (based on the data in Table XVI). is shown in the following
tabulation. As shown therein, these cost differentials, however, are
offset in varying degrees in each county by several intangible factots
including: 1) the convenience and accessibility of the county court;
2) court services which cannot be measured by case load; and 3) the
importance to residents of retaining a court at the county level .

..

·•t

8,600

'

,.

[

Las Animas, Mesa, and Otero

$10,5002 2

-

.

.
,.
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TABLE XVI

,..4

Relationship Between County Court Case Loads, Judicial
Salaries, and Total Court Expenditures, Cases Filed in 1958

i

.,
County
Adams
Alamosa
Arapahoe
Archuleta
Baca

Total
Number
Cases
934
117
1,024
28
80

Bent
Boulder
Chaffee
Cheyenne
Clear Creek

67
748
137
30
90

Conejos
Costilla
Crowley
Custer
Delta

79
38
28
13
275

Judicial
Salary
$

Judie ial
Salary
Fer Case

Expenditures
Total
Per
Court
Case
Ex12enditures

9,500
4,700
9,500
3,600
4,700

$ 10.17
40.17
9.28
128.57
58.75

$32,842
8,793
28,475
4,350
7,600

$ 35.16
75.15
27.81
155.35
95.00

4,700
9,500
4,100
3,600
3,600

70.14
12.70
29.93
120.00
40.00

8,050
30,081
6,740
4,710
4,498

120.14
40.21
49.20
15.70
49.97

4,700
4,100
4,100
3,000
5,600

59.49
107.89
146.42
230.76
20.36

7,484
6,825
4,883
3,054
9,820

L

•

JI

•

•

,I

4.

~

Denver
Dolores
Pouglas
Eagle
Elbert

10,860a
19
78
54
37

36,5oob
3,000
4,100
4,100
4,100

3.36
157.89
52.56
75.92
110.81

_.s,.

74.73
179.60
174.39
272.30
35.71
__ c

3,800
5,300
5,100
4,800

200.00
67.94
94.44
129.72

.

El Paso
Fremont
Garfiei,d
~ilpin
t',rand

1,708
221
148
19
54

9,500
5,600
5,600
2,660
4,100

5.56
25.34
37.84
140.00
75.92

76,800
13,660
8,800
3,059
4,300

44.96
61. 80
59.46
161.00
79.62

•

Gunnison
Hinsdale
Huerfano
Jackson
Jefferson

69
3
189.
4
1,047

4,100
734
5,200
3,000
9,500

59.42
244.67
27.51
750. 00
9.07

6,496
990
10,687
3,280
44,108

94.14
330.00
56.54
820.00
42.13

Kiowa
Kit Carson
Lake
La Plata
Larimer

29
81
78
227
597

3,600
4,700
4,100
5,600
9,500

124.14
58.02
52.56
24.67
15.91

4,100
6,100
7,433
14,400
25,627

141.37
75.30
95.29
63.43
42.92

.,-

-

~

-\,

.:,

-

1'
i,

t,

I

'

•

•

}

-

~

Ill

•

•
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TABLE XVI
(continued)

...

.. ...

£ounty

"':

,.

...

Judicial
Salary

Judicial
Salary
Per Case

Total
Expenditures
Court
Per
Expenditures
Case

Las Animas
Lincoln
Logan
Mesa
Mineral

326
46
212
712
5

$ 8,600
4,100
5,600
8,600
734

$ 26.38
89.13
26.42
12.08
146.80

$21,000
6,100
13,100
21,269
1,389

Moffat
Montezuma
Montrose
Morgan
Otero

94
192
172
170
202

4,100
4,700
5,600
5,600
8,600

43.61
24.48
32.56
32.94
42.57

4,736
9,200
10,679
12,445
16,622

50.38
47.92
62.08
73.20
82.29

Ouray
Park
Phillips
Pitkin
Prowers

14
24
44
14
160

3,000
3,000
4,100
3,000
5,600

214.28
125.00
93 .18
214.28
35.00

3,247
5,847
9,970
3,500
10,974

231.92
243.62
226.59
250.00
68.58

Pueblo
Rio Blanco
Rio Grande
Routt
Saguache

2,041
52
132
97
69

9,500
4,100
5,600
4,700
4,100

4.65
78.84
42.42
48.45
59.42

64,107
7,742
9,705
7,293
6,345

314.09
148.88
93.52
75.18
91.95

San Juan
San Miguel
Sedgwick
Summit
Teller

12
40
53
23
35

2,660
3,600
4,100
2,660
3,600

221.66
90.00
77.35
115.65
102.85

2,758
4,033
5,070
3,247
4,780

229.83
100.82
95.66
141.17
136.57

Washington
Weld
Yuma

92
817
97

4,700
9, ::,oo
5,200

· 51.08
11. 63
53.60

9,253
31,121
6,537

100.57
38.09
67.39

«

.

Total
Number
Cases

a.

b.
c.

Combined case load for county, superior and juvenile courts.
Combined salaries for judges of the above courts.
Not compiled.

,- 'f,
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64.41
132.60
61.79
29.87
277.80

County Class
I
Class
Class II A 8 counties
Class II B 3 counties
Class III A 9 counties
Class III B 2 counties
Class III C 8 counties
Class IV ,\ 15 counties)
Class IV B 6 counties
Class
V
6 counties
Class VI A 3 counties
Class VI B 2 counties

Average Annual
Case Load

Judicial Salary
Per Case

10,860
1,114
413
191
143
101
62
42
15
18
4

$ 3.36
8.53
20.82
29.32
36.36
46.53
66.13
85.71
200.00
147.78
183.50

Probate Cases. It is very difficult to determine the amount
of county court judicial time devoted to probate matters. The number
of probate cases filed each year presents only a partial indication of
the relative importance of probate work, because many estates, guardianship,., conservatorships, etc.,remain open for a number of years and
involve court orders and hearings from time to time. Much of the
county courts' probate work is administrative, rather than judicial;
except for contested matters,:much of the work involved is
perfunctory.
It is therefore difficult to assess the additional amount of
time required to handle probate matters resulting from the filing of
new cases. Even the number of new cases filed is misleading because
this total includes small estates. These are actions involving less
than $1,500, which are brought under the small estate law, and are
usually closed after a court order authorizing the transfer of property or funds. In 1958, small estates actions constituted 45 per
cent of all probate cases filed in the county courts. In eight
cour,ties, more than 60 per cent of the probate cases filed were small
estates, and in 13 others, small estates accounted for more than
half of the new probate cases. Table XVII shows the total number of
probate cases and the number of small estates actions filed in each
county court in 1958.

•

•

A

• J

Concurrent Jurisdiction. In the secion on district courts, an
analysis was presented of the number of civil cases filed which fell
within the jurisdiction of the county or justice courts. A similar
analysis was made of civil cases filed in county courts, which were
within the justice courts' $300 civil jurisdiction. Almost 26 per
cent of the civil actions filed in the county courts in 1958 could have
been brought in justice courts. In several counties, more than 50
per cent of the civil cases filed were in this category. Table XVIII
shows both the total number of civil cases filed in each county in
1958 and the number within the jurisdiction of the justice courts.
,,,

•
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TABLE XVII

r-

.

Small Estates and Other Probate Cases
Filed in Coun~y Courts in 1958

-...

~

County

l~-

I

...
--

rl :r..

.

!

~

...

~

I"'

,._

~,.

. .,
..,

.... "'

...

r •

rr
...
~

.:

,-...

,.

•

Total
Probate
Cases

.

"-

"

Pct .
Small
Estates

Adams
Alamosa
Arapahoe
Archuleta
Baca

184
39
293
13
44

85
16
123
6
12

46.2%
41.0
42.0
46.2
27.3

Bent
Boulder
Chaffee
Cheyenne
Clear Creek

40
319
67
15
25

12
171
35
3
8

30.0
53.6
52.2
20.0
32.0

Conejos
Costilla
Crowley
Custer
Delta

38
20
19
11
111

29
12
9
2
62

76.3
· 60.0
47.4
18.2
55.9

Denver
Dolores
Douglas
Eagle
Elbert

2,508
4
34
24
24

1,127
1
N.A.
11
15

44.9
25.0
45.8
62.5

El Paso
Fremont
Garfield
Gilpin
Grand

577
136
78
7
19

205
78
38
0
4

35.5
57.4
48. 7

Gunnison
Hinsdale
Huerfano
Jackson
Jefferson

35
1
89
0
347

14
1
46
0
169

28.6
100.0
51.7

Kiowa
Kit Carson
Lake
La Plata
Larimer

20
44
48
124
279

6
20
24
53
133

30.0
45.5
50.0
42.7
47.7

.

.

Small
Estates

.,

-
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21.0

48.7

,.
ii

..

TABLE XVII
(continued)

...

County

Total
Probate
Cases

Small
Estates

Pct.
Small
Estates

Las Animas
Lincoln
Logan
Mesa
Mineral

124
35
122
272
4

81
17
35
143
2

Moffat
Montezuma
Montrose
Morgan
Otero

50
45
85
97
141

12
22
45
48
57

24.0
48.9
52.9
49.5
40.4

Ouray
Park
Phillips
Pitkin
Prowers

8
15
31
8
·82

4
6
12
1
31

50.0
40.0
38.7
12.5
37.8

Pueblo
Rio Blanco
Rio Grande
Routt
Saguache

569
36
59
48
44

325
7
18
27
21

57.1
19.4
30.5
56.2
47.7

San Juan
San Miguel
Sedgwick
Summit
Teller

5
19
24
9
19

3
10
15

60.0
52.6
62.5

12

63.1

Washington
Weld
Yuma
Total

51
378
69
8,085

65.3%
48.6
28.7
52.6
50.0

•
~

'
~

.
•
..i

->

'
4

.

~

~

4

N.A.
I,

13
137
30
3,640

25.5
36.2
43.5
45.3% 0

,ll
~

:r,

.
f

a.

Douglas and Summit counties, for which information on number
of small estates was not available, are not included.
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Table XVIII
~umber of Civil Cases Under $300, Filed in County Court, 1958

Counti
Adams
Alamosa
Arapahoe
Archuleta
Baca
Bent
Boulder
Chaffee
Cheyenne
Clear Creek
Conejos
Costilla
Crowley
Custer
Delta

r••rY

olores
ouglas
agle
Elbert
El Paso
f:remont
Garfield
Gilpin
Grand
Gunnison
liinsdale
Huerfano
Jackson
Jefferson
~iowa
it Carson

Total
Civil
Cases

No.
Under

Per cent
of Total
Civil Cases

120
31
151
4
11
12
120
22
2
8
11
5
2
l
31
2,391
5
6
6
4
261
9
23
0
. 12
18
2
8
2
205
2
10

26
11
31
0
3
5
42
7
0
6
4
0
0
l
9
626
0
l
4
0
70
5
4
0
6
6
0
0
l
48
0
4

21. 7.
35.5
20.5

$300

l I Includes both county court and superior court.

27.3
41.7
35.0
31.8
75.0
36.4
100.0
29.0
26.2
16.7
66.7
26.8
55.4
17.4
50.0
33.3
50.0
23.4
40.0

Counti
Lake
La Plata
Larimer
Las Animas
Lincoln
Logan .
Mesa
Mineral
Moffat
Montezuma
Montrose
Morgan
Otero
Ouray
Park
Phillips
Pitkin
Prowers
Pueblo
Rio Blanco
Rio Grande
Routt
.Saguache
San Juan
San Miguel
Sedgwick
Summit
Teller
Washington
Weld
Yuma
Total

Total
Civil
Cases

No.
Under

$300

Per cent
of Total
Civil Cases
42.9
24.4
21.6
3.1

161
0
12
79
20
7
10
2
4
8
l
14
425
4
23
14
2
2
14
l
8
4
17
105
3

3
10
22
l
0
3·
26
0
2
21
14
0
0
0
2
l
0
7
118
0
9
4
0
0
2
0
0
0
5
19
l

4 ,6:Z,

1,190

25.8

7

41
102
32
2
(:,

50.0
16.l
16.7
26.6
70.0

50.0
12.~i
50.0
27.8
39.l
28.6
14.3

29.4
18.l
33.3

•

.

Table XIX

.,..

Number of Justice Court and Municipal Co4rt Appeals
Filed in County Court in 1958!1
County
Adams
Alamosa
Arapahoe
Baca
Bent
Boulder
Chaffee ;.,.
Cheyenne
Clear Creek
Conejos
Crowley
Delta
Denver£/
Dolores
El Paso
Fremont
Gilpin
Huerfano
Jefferson
Kit Carson
La Plata
Larimer
Las Animas
Logan
Mesa
Montezuma
Montrose
Morgan
Otero
Park
Prowers
Pueblo
Rio Grande
Routt
Saguache
San Miguel
Teller
Washington
Weld
Yuma
Total

Ciyil

Criminal

Total

11

45

56

l
8
3
0
2
0
0
0
3
0
3

6

7
63

55
2
l

19
l
l
4
0
2

5
l

2i

l
.l
4
3
2
8

441

0

5
373
l

49

13

62

l

0

6
l
2

7
l
2

14

48

62

l
3

3
3

4

4

9

0
2

4
0
5
5
5
2

68

·o

4
4

3
4
l
0

l

l

l

2
9.
9
8
6
2
l
9

59

0

4

l
0
0

l
l
l

4
2

l

0

2

l

l
l
l
3

10

16

26

0

4
~

4

ffi

!_/ Counties in which no appeals were filed in county court include:
Archuleta, Costilla, Custer, Douglas, Eagle, Elbert, Garfield,
Grand, Gunnison, Hinsdale, Jackson, Kiowa, Lake, Lincoln,
Mineral, Moffat, Ouray, Phillips, Pitkin, Rio Blanco, San Juan.
Sedgwick, and Summit.
Denver Superior Court
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4

45

218

.

6
13

l
14

8

.

f

• .J·

•

Justice and Municipal Court Appeals. In 1958, 921 appeals from
justice and municipal courts were tried in county courts and the Denver
Superior Court. Seven hundred and four of these appeals were in
criminal cases and 218 were civil~23 Almost 48 per cent of the total
number of appeals were brought in Denver, with Adams, Arapahoe, El
Paso, Jefferson, and Pueblo counties together accounting for another
third of the total. There were no appeals brought in 23 counties.
Table XIX shows the number of civil and criminal appeals heard in each
county court in 1958.

...
...

Justice Courts. An analysis of justice court dockets was made
in 1957-1958 by the Legislative Council Committee on Justice Courts.
A summary of the data resulting from this analysis follows: 24
Approximately 60,000 justice court cases were filed in 1957,
not including the City and County of Denver. Traffic cases account
for 60 per cent of the total; civil cases, 29 per cent; and PUC
violations, game and fish violations and other criminal cases, 11
per cent. Approximately two-thirds of all justice court cases are
tried in county seats, and 85 per cent are tried within 15 miles of
of the- county seats •

....
•

.

....

TABLE XX

,,,_

....

Distribution of Counties According
to Number of Justice Court Cases Filed in 1957
More than 5,000 cases - 3 counties
Adams, El Paso, Jefferson

,.,

.

,..

3,000 to 5,000 cases - 2 counties
Arapahoe, Pueblo
2,000-3,000 cases - 4 counties
Boulder, Las Animas, Mesa, Weld
1,500-2,000 cases - 3 counties
Larimer, Montrose, Morgan

--

-

...'

l,OOO~l,500 cases - 2 counties
Douglas, Montezuma
750-1,000 cases - 6 counties
Fremont, Garfield, Huerfano, La Plata, Logan, Otero

23.

24.

.,._

Includes municipal ordinance violations.
For a more complete discussion see Justice Courts in Colorado,
Chapter III pp. 32-53 .

... •

.

•

,.
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TABLE XX
(continued)
500-750 cases - 4 counties
Chaffee, Clear Creek, Grand, Lincoln
250-500 cases - 14 counties
Alamosa, Bent, Conejos, Delta, Eagle, Gunnison, Kit Carson,
Lake, Moffat, Prowers, Rio Blanco, Rio Grande, Washington,
"-t.lma
100•250 cases - 15 counties
Archuleta, Baca, Cheyenne, Costilla, Dolores, Elbert, Jackson, Kiowa, Ouray, Park, Routt, Saguache, San Miguel, Sedwick
Summit

Fewer than 100 cases - 9 counties
Crowley, Custer, Gilpin, Hinsdale, Mineral, Phillips; Pitkin,
San Juan, Teller
Of the 78 justices of the peace included in the docket analysis
sample, more than half made less than $300 in fees in 1957; only
nine per cent made more than $2,400, including five per cent who
made the statutory maximum of $3,600.

•
"
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V

CRIMINAL CODE STUDY -- COMMITTEE PROORESS

-

......

I

•

-

' ..
..

-

►

...

The Colorado criminal code and rules of criminal procedure
were among the major subjects designated in the two joint resolutions
authorizing the administration of justice study,l There were several
reasons why a study of the criminal code was considered necessary,
While numerous changes ~ave been made in the criminal code over the
years, much of the language and many of the provisions are archaic
because there has never been a complete revision, Recent studies
of probation, parole, and correctional institutions have called
attention to wide variations in sentencing and the lack of relationship between length of sentence and the offender's prospects for
rehabilitation, Other related subjects upon which recent attention
has been focused include the definition of criminal insanity and
the provision of counsel for indigent defendants.
Rules of criminal procedure were included in the study because
no such rules had been adopted in Colorado, although the supreme court
had promulgated rules of civil procedure in 1941, Legislation recommended by the committee and passed by the General Assembly in 1960
gave the supreme court authority to promulgate rules of criminal
procedure.2 A Colorado Bar Association committee has recently completed a draft of criminal rules after a two-year study, and these
rules are now being reviewed by the supreme court.
The committee considered the judicial system study the most
important of its several assignments. For this reason full consideration of the criminal code was deferred until the work on court
reorganization was completed, although some study was made of several
criminal law subjects,
Among the topics discussed at the committee's regional
meetings were several which related to criminal law: sentencing,
probation, parole, definition of criminal insanity, the need for a
public defender system, and the regulation of bail bondsmen, The ·
docket analysis yielded information on these subjects, along with
other data on criminal cases. Study was made of sentencing practices
and parole board composition and authority in other states, as well
as the recommendations of Colorado law enforcement, correction, and
judicial officials on sentencing and release,

...

...

As a first step in revising the criminal code, the different
categories of crime and related penalties in the Colorado statutes
were compared with similar provisions in surrounding states and in
certain other states selected as having modern and well-written
criminal codes, Comparisons were also made with the preliminary
drafts of the m~del penal code.3
Two proposed statutes were

..,

I.

•
e

"'·

2.
3.

Senate Joint Resolution No, 16 (1959), and Senate Joint
Resolution No. 9 (1960).
Chapter 37, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960,
Model Penal Code, Tentative Drafts, The American Law Institute,
Philadelphia, 1956 •

.
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prepared for committee consideration. One was designed to combine
all illegal acquisition of money, goods, and other property in one
general theft statute. The other provided a definition of criminal
attempt and provided the penal ties ·therefor •

.

Originally, the committee was of the opinion that certain
improvements could be made in the criminal laws prior to a complete
revision. After further study, the committee feels that a piecemeal
approach is not advisable and that such changes which it might wish
to suggest as a result of its study thus far should be made only as
part of a general revision of the criminal laws. Therefore, the
only measure recommended by the committee is a bill to permit the
creation of a public defender office on a single or multiplecounty basis. Because of the amount of work involved in the judicial
administration study, the committee·was unable to do much more than
make a beginning on the criminal code. Judging by the experiences
in other states where the criminal code has been revised recently
or is in the process of revision, and the comments of experts with
whom the committee discussed this phase of the study, it will take
at least two years and perhaps longer to complete this assignment. 4
It is the committee's recommendation, therefore, that ·the General
Assembly authorize the continuation of the administration of justice
study for the purpose of completing its work on the criminal code
and related subjects. This report outlines the progress of the
committee on these matters thus far.

•

Sentencing
In Colorado there is no fixed penalty for the commission of
a felony. The statutes provide the range for each crime (e.g.,
voluntary manslaughter, minimum sentence of one year and maximum
sentence of eight years; grand larceny, minimum sentence of one
year and maximum sentence of ten years; aggravated robbery, minimum
sentence of two years and maximum sentence of life). Minimum and
maximum sentences for each offender are set within these limits by
the district judge who tries the case. This method of fixing
criminal penalties is known as indeterminate sentencing, which,
in the broadest sense, is defined as any method of sentencing which
includes a variable rather than a fixed period of incarceration.
There have been three major criticisms of sentencing in
Colorado. First, penal, probation, and parole officials and some
judges state that the sentences imposed usually have no relation to
the offender's potential for rehabilitation or to the period of
incarceration needed before this potential can be realized. More
than 95 per cent of all offenders committed to the penitentiary and
practically all offenders committed to the reformatory sooner or
later are released~
4.

New Mexico has been working on criminal code revision for five
years, and the American Law Institute has been working on its
model penal code since 1951.
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Second, there is a wide variation in the sentences imposed
for the same crime. Variation is expected because of previous
criminal records, extenuating circumstances, and the potential for
rehabilitation; however, it is argued that the variations in
sentencing are not always relate~ to these differences. Often
first offenders will receive a greater sentence for a similar crime
than repeated violators. These differences in sentence not only
result in injustices to individual offenders but also limit the
success of correctional programs. Inmates who feel they have
received an unfair sentence are less likely to respond to prison
rehabilitation programs.
Third, often the spirit and intent of indeterminate sentencing are violated by the imposition of sentences such as nine
years, 11 months and 29 days to 10 years.5 Such a sentence in
effect is a fixed sentence, and provides no leeway for early
release, if such is warranted by the inmate's attitude and performance in the institution.
A further complicating factor is the present method of
parole release in Colorado. Each inmate of the penitentiary may
receive certain statutory good time allowances which are deducted
from his minimum sentence.
This allowance may be as much as two
months during each of the first two years of incarceration; four
months for each of the third and fourth years of incarceration;
and five months for the fifth year and each succeeding year of
incarceration. For example, an inmate with a minimum sentence of
one year would be eligible for a parole after 10 months if he
received his maximum good time allowance; an ihmat~ with a
four-year minimum sentence would be eligible for parole after
three years if he received his maximum good time allowance. In
addition to statutory good time allowances, so-called trusty time
may be.earned, not to exceed 10 days per month. A first offender
is eligible for trusty time after he has been in the penitentiary
for 30 days. An inmate with previous felony convictions is not
eligible for trusty time until he has been in the penitentiary for
one year.
There is some question as to whether there is much relationship between an inmate's readiness to return to society and
the amount of statutory good time and trusty time which he may
earn. The warden of the penitentiary and other correctional
offici~ls _ag~ee that the granting of good time allowances does
not necessarily;result in a· release-date which corre~ponds to an
inmate's readiness to leave the institution. 7
5.

6.
7.

Such sentences are not common, but there are many 9 to 10 and
4~ to 5 year sentences imposed as shown in §tatistical Report
and Movement of Inmate Population, Annual Report, July 1, 1959
through-June 30, 1960, Colorado State Penitentiary, Canon City.
105-4-4 and 105-4-5, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953.
Colorado's Programs in the Fi.eld of Corrections, Colorado
Legislative Council, Research Report No. 21, December 1956, p. 68 •

•
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The Colorado adult parole board has no pow~r to release an
inmate on parole before he has served his minimum sentence less
accumulated statutory good time and trusty time. The board is
reluctant to hold back an inmate from parole if these requirements
are satisfied, unless the granting of• parole is clearly against the
public interest. The board recognizes that the institution would
have a real custody, discipline, and morale problem which could
erupt and be potentially dangerous to public safety if a high
proportion of inmates were refused parole. By statute and
precedent, inmates expect parole after serving the required
lengtn Qf time, and, in general, the parole board fo~lows this
policy.8
Several alternatives to present sentencing and parole
practices in Colorado h~ve been suggested. These include limitation of judicial sentencing authority, removal of good time
provisions, appointment of a full-time qualified parole board,
and the expansion of the parole board's authority for determining
release based on professional evaluation of the prospects for
parole success.

•

Sentencing in Other States
The method of sentencing and parole release in several
other states include the above ·components in varying degrees and
in several different ways, while others are similar to Colorado
in these respects.
In twenty-five of the states having indeterminate sentencing,
setting the sentence is a judicial responsibility. In six of these
twenty-five states, one of the two extremes is fixed by statute
while the other may be varied by the sentencing authority. These
six states include: Idaho, Michigan, South Dakota, Tennessee, ·
Texas, and Wisconsin. In all, except Michigan, the court may set
the maximum term but not the minimum, which is set by statute
(except for Idaho, which has no provision for a particular minimum
term). In Michigan, the maximum term imposed is the statutory
maximum, while the judge has the discretion to set the minimum.
In eighteen of these twenty-five states, the judge sets
the maximum and minimum at his discretion within the statutory
limits. These states include: Arizona, Arkansas, COLORADO,
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wyoming. In Georgia, sentence
is prescribed by the jury within the statutory minimum and maximum.
In three of these states there are statutory provisions
designed to prevent a judge from fixing a minimum term so nearly
identical with the maximum as to approximate a definite sentence
(e.g., 4~-5 years). The statutes in these states (Maine, New York,
and Pennsylvania) provide that the minimum term may not exceed half
.of the maximum term imposed.
8. Ibid., p. 84.
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Generally, in these twenty-five states, parole eligibility
depends upon completion of the minimum sentence. The exceptions
are as follows:

Georgia

when one-third of minimum sentence
has been served

Ictaho

at any time, as state has no
statutory minimum, and none is
imposed by the court

New Hampshire

after two-thirds of minimum
sentence, if minimum is two
years or more

New Mexico

when one-third of minimum sentence
has been served, if minimum less
than 10 years; if more than 10 years,
must serve one-third of first 10
plus one month for each additional
year

North Carolina

when one-fourth of minimum
sentence has been served

Texas

with perfect prison conduct record,
when either minimum or one-fourth
the maximum has been served, whichever is less; with imperfect conduct
record, one-third of maximum or
15 years, whichever is less

Wisconsin ·

after two years, or one-half the
maximum sentence, whichever is less

,..
.,._

...
,.

•

-

•

•

-

Earliest Date of Possible
Parole Release

State

Several of these states allow prisoners time off for good
behavior. This ''good time" is subtracted from the minimum sentence
in determining eligibility for parole release, as it is in Colorado.
In the states which allow release prior to completion of the
minimum sentence, the parole authority, in effect, has some of the
powers of a sentence-fixing board, in that it can release an inmate
sooner than was prescribed in the minimum sentence. It would appear
that the ~arole authorities in the states where the minimum (less
good time) must be served still have sentencing discretion, because the
parole boards have the power to withhold release until the maximum
is served.

,.,

-

13:> -

Sentence Set by Statute
In 11 states, the courts have the responsibility only for
the determination of guilt. T~e sentence imposed is a restatement
of the maximum and minimum set by statute. These states include:
California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico,
Ohio, Utah, Washfngton, and West Virginia •.

•

The removal from judicial responsibility of sentencing
discretion within statutory maxima and minima does not necessarily
mean that this discretion has been transferred to the paroling
authority. This tr~nsfer actually takes place only in those states
where the paroling authority has the power to determine parole
release at a time prior to the completion of the minimum sentence
set by statute. These states ( of those enumerated above) includ·e:
California, Iowa, Utah, and Washington.
California, of the four states whose parole boards have the
authority to determine parole release prior to completiori of the
statutory minimum, appears to have a sentencing system which has
made a complete break from the placement of sentencing authority in
the courts and the use of good time and trusty time in considering
parole release.

.

Sentence Determination by Board -- Pro and Con
Advocates of the approach taken to sentencing by California,
Iowa, Utah, and Washington present the following principal arguments:
1) Legal ,training does not necessarily equip judges to be
able to make proper determination of the sentence to be imposed.
Consequently, the sentence may bear no relationship to the period
of incarceration needed to enable an offender to have a chance
for a successful return to society. Some violators need little
if any confinement, while others may never be released safely.

•

J

2) The courts, for the most part, lack enough adequately
trained probation officers to provide judges with sufficient presentence data to assist them in setting sentences commensurate with
an offender's possibilities for rehabilitation.
3) Sentencing practices differ among judges -- not only
among those whose courts are in different districts, but also
among judges in the same district. This disparity is known to
convicted offenders who compare sentences, and it lessens the
success of institutional rehabilitation programs for this reason.
4) Length· of sentence can be more adequately and fairly
determined by a full-time qualified board removed from the immediacy
of the trial and local attitudes toward the case. This is especially
true when the board has the assistance of competent professional institutional personnel who can observe and evaluate the offender
during his period of incarceration.
·
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Opponents of proposals to remove sentencing responsibility
from the judiciary list the following major arguments:
1) The judge is the person most acquainted with the case.
He has presided during the trial~ has observed the offender, and
is acquainted with his record. Consequently, the judge can do a
better job of sentence setting than a board whose determination will
be based primarily on secondary, written, reports.
•

2) There is no basis for assuming that a board would be
any better at sentencing than the courts either in respect to
length of sentence or sentence variation for the same offense.
In fact, a qualified board could do much worse than the courts, if
the institutions are not adequately staffed to provide the data the
board needs.
3) There is the possibility of recourse in the courts if
the offender believes that he has been given an unfair sentence.
What recourse would be available from an unjust sentence determination on the part of the parole board?
4) There are institution-wise prisoners who can "con"
professional personnel as easily as they can accumulate good time
credits. Institutional conduct may not indicate that a man is
ready for release, but it does show an effort to get along and
obey rules and regulations; therefore, it should be considered
in determining release.
5) The paroling authority will be subjected to undue
public pressure and criticism if it exercises sentencing authority.
Mistakes made by the board will cause public reaction which in
turn could limit the board's effectiveness by forcing it to be
more conservative in its actions, regardless of the worthiness
of the cases before it.
1

'
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Parole Board Composition
A full-time, well-qualified parole board is considered
necessary for the successful operation of a correctional program
which places considerable discretion for determining release with
the paroling authority. Experience and training in correctional
work, law, social welfare, or psychology are considered prime
prerequisites for parole board membership. In addition, correctional institutions should be staffed with professional personnel
who can develop and analyze the data which the parole board needs
to determine release dates. Some of the states cited above meet
these criteria in all respects, but more do not.
Nine states in which either the minimum or maximum sentence
or both are fixed by law have full-time parole boards. These states
include: California, Florida, Ohio, Utah, Washington, West Virginia,
Michigan, Texas, and Wisconsin. Minimum qualifications must be met
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by parole board members in all of these states except Texas, Utah,
and Washington. In three states -- Florida, Michigan, and West
Virginia -- training and experience in corrections and penal work,
social welfare, and7or the social sciences is required. Qualifications are somewhat similar in Wisconsin, where parole board
appointments are made by the civil service commission. The
seven-member California Adult Authority is composed of people
with varied professional backgrounds including law, corrections,
social work, law enforcement, and probation. The board is required
to include members representing a variety of disciplines, and
standards are set for each.
In six of these nine states, parole board appointments are
made by the governor. In Wisconsin, as previously indicated,
appointments are made by the civil service commission. The board
of corrections makes parole board appointments in Michigan, and
a committee of state executives makes the appointments in Florida.
Five states have three-member boards (Florida, Texas, Utah, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin); three have five ·members (Michigan, Ohio,
and Washington); and one (California) has seven members.

•

The other states in which sentencing is fixed, at least in
part, by statute have part-time parole boards. In most -of these
states, board members are appointed by the governor and there are
no qualifications for the position.
Evaluation of Programs in Other States
Most of the states which limit judicial sentencing report
satisfaction with their present programs, but stress the need for
qualified personnel on the parole board and institutional staffs
to make the program effective. Many of these states report that
it is difficult to measure program results on the basis of parole
success for several reasons: 1) Accurate records usually were not
kept prior to the adoption of the present program, so no comparison
can be made. 2) There are so many factors involved in parole
success that no definite evaluation can be made on this basis.
3) As a result of improved and expanded probation programs, first
offenders and those violators who have the best chance of rehabilitation usually are not sentenced, so that prisons and ultimately
the parole agency primarily receive the repeaters and hard-core
failures. The prognosis of parole success for this group of
violators is not too favorable under any circumstances, and a
comparison of parole success for this group and a group of parolees
of a previous year which included more first offenders and other less
difficult violators would be unfair.
In general, these states report that their parole success
would be less if their present programs had not been adopted,
that further improvement is both desirable and possible, and that
their programs are based, insofar as practical, on modern
correctional concepts.
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Comments on Sentencing at Regional Meetings
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Two-thirds of the 27 district judges with whom sentencing
was discussed at the committee's regional meetings favored a change
in the method of sentencing. The other nine judges advocated
retention of the present judicial sentencing authority. Most of
the judges favoring change felt that the California system had
merit and recommended that the maximum and minimum sentences be
set by statute, with the courts' function confined to a determination
of guilt. One district judge advocated one day to life sentences in
pll felonies, with the parole board to determine release within this
range. Another district judge felt that the parole board should be
given the discretionary authority to determine release at any time
after six months had been served. These judges were unanimous in
the opinion that a qualified full-time parole board would be
necessary to make such a change in sentencing procedures successful •
Fixed statutory sentences were favored rather than open-ended
sentences to limit the effect of arbitrary parole board action,
which might result in incarceration of unjust length •
Several reasons were given by the district judges in favor
of adopting a system of statutory sentencing. Some judges said
that it was not possible to determine at the time sentence is
imposed what the offender's possibility for rehabilitation might
be five to 10 years in the future. It was pointed out that legal
training does not give judges special competence to determine what
to do with a man after he has been found guilty. Even recognizing
differences between individual cases, several judges felt that there
was inequality in the imposition of sentences and that the proposed
change would provide more opportunity for release on the basis of
an offender's prospects for a successful return to society.
The judges who opposed a change in the method of sentencing
pointed out that the sentencing judge is much more acquainted with
the case and the offender than any board would be after reviewing
the record and interviewing the offender months or years after the
crime had been committed. In imposing sentence, these judges said
they took into consideration the crime and extenuating circumstances
as well as the information developed through the pre-sentence
investigation.
Attorneys and other judges with whom the committee discussed
sentencing at the regional meetings were also divided two to one on
this question; the reasons advanced for both positions were very
similar to those of the district judges.
Comparison of Crimes and Penalties in Selected States
As a prerequisite to the adoption of statutory sentencing,
an analysis of the crimes and penalties provided by statute is
necessary to determine whether the penalties are adequate both with
respect to each crime and in relation to each other. A comparison

r •.

,._

- 139 -

was made of Colorado criminal categories and penalties with those
of other states and the model penal code. Mountain and neighboring
plains states were used for this comparison, except for Wisconsin
and Louisiana, which were included because of recent criminal code
revision~ This comparison is shown in Table X~I. Because ·or the
considerable variation among the states shown in Table XXI with respect
t6 most categories of crimes, further study is needed to determine
which provisio~s in other states· should be adopted in Colorado.

d

TABLE XXI
Comparhon of Crime&, Penalties iind Related Provhions, Color11do Rnd Selected Shte&
WISCONSIN

COLO!'IADO

CllHIE

LOllrnIANA

MODrL PENAL
CODE

Death only 1st de·
gre", intent, or felony
murder (14130)

isl doqroo fHlony
(1-20 to life) Death
if ag9rnv,, tad

Life m;ix,
(28-401)

NFBRASKA

First. Dn1Jreo
Murder ·

Life or de;i th
(40-2-3)

l.lft,

Second neqr""
Murder

10 yrs. to life
(40-2-3)

Depraved heart
5-25 yrs, (9'10,02)
3rd drigree murdllr
(fel.ony) 15 yrs.
mn, (940,031

Same a& above

Same as above

10 yrr., - life
( 2fl-402)

Voluntary
Mansbuqhter

1-8 yrs
(40-2-8~

10 yr, maw,
(940,05)

21 yr, maw,
(14131)

Second dP.qree felony
( 1-3 to 10)

1-10 yrs.
28-403

Involuntary
Manslaughter

1 yr. max.
(40-2-A)

5

yr. maw,
(940,06)

(Negliqent Homicide)
5 yr, max, (14132)

Same as above

Motor Vehicle Homicide, 1-10 yrs.
also misdem, 6 mos,
max, (28-403,01)

Death while driving.
under influence

1-14 yrs.
(40-2-10)

5 yr, max,
(940,09)

No special statute

Negligent homicide
3rd'degree felony
( 1-2 to 5)

No special statute

Assault
Simple

1 yr. max,

6 mos. max,
(940,20)

Battery 2 yr, max.
(14:35) Assault,
90 day maw, (14:35)

Mi&dem, (1 yr, max,)

1-5 yrs, (28-413)
Also misdem, (6 mos,
max, 28-411)

Assault & Battery
with deadly weapon

1-5 yrs.
(40-2-34)

Aggravated battery
(intent) 5 yr, max,
(940,22) depraved
heart - battery
10 yr. maw. (940.23)

A & B with intent
to kill, rape, rob,
steal, commit
mayhem

(i day to life if
s,ault to rape)*
39-19-1) 1-14 yrs,
40-2-34)

No special statute

llayhem

1-20 yrs, (40-2-24)

15 yrs, maw, (940,21)

See Assault
Battery

Rape • fore ible

3 yrs. t9 life

(Physical violence)
30 yrs. max, (944,01)
(without consent fraud) 15 yr&, max.
(944,02)

Physical force, or
female child under 121
Death (14:42) without
consent or fraud 1-20
yrs. (14-43)

3 yrs, to life, if
male ia over 181 1
yr, to 5 yrs, if
male 11 under 18
(40-2-28)

Female under 12, mnle 5 yrs, max, (14180)
ov~r 18, 30 yrs.maw,
Fcm~Je undar 16, mnle
over lH, 1~ yrs. m;iw,
Femnle under 18, ~ yrs,
maw, (9'1<1,10)

Third degree felony

3-2n yrn. (28-408)

Life or death, if for
ransom and victim
harmed, 30 yra. to
life if ransom and no
harm, 30 yr1, ~ax,
if no ransom (40-2-45)

Ransom - life, but if Ran1om - denth. but
releaaed safe 30 yrs. 1f reh;ised r..1 I•· max, All other 15 yrs.life "slmple" ~
max, (9-10,31)
yrs, max, (1<11'1'.1)

First degree felony
except 2nd degree
felony if releaaed
unh,1rmed in s11fe
pince.

R~nsom and injury
death-life, Ransom
life, Other 3-7 yra.
( 28-417)

&

Battery

(40-2-35)

Kldn,1pping

Battery - 10 rrs. maw, Second degree felony
(14:34) Assau t .2 yr. maw, (14:37)

No special statute

Same as above

r

(40-2-281

R~pe • statutory

('l-10,01)
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Felony assault
2-15 yrs, (2.8-409)

Shoot or stab
1-20 yra. (28-410)

.

1-20 yrs. (28-406)
Second degree felony
intent to inflict
s/b/11 intent to inflict non s/b/i with a
deadly weapon
First degree felony
1 f s/b/1 not Os
compa11lon1 Second
degree felony other-

'

• J

•

,.

Daughter - slater
life (28-407), other
3-20 yrs, (28-408)

wise

•

Table XXI Continued:
-~ Abort ion

Larcer:y - grand

WISCONSIN

COLOIJl\00

CHIME
~

yrs, max, (40-2-23)

1-10 yrs, (40-5-2)

6 mos, max. (40-5-2)

MODr:L PENAL
coor:

NF.ORASKA

0ther than mother
1-10 yrs, (14187)
unquickened foetus
3 yrs, max,, quickened
foetus 15 yrs, max,
death of mother 15 yrs,
max,, unquickened
mother 6 mos, max,
quickened mother 2
yrs, max, (940,04)

Third degree felony
if pregnant under 26
wks., 2nd degree
felony if pregnant
over 26 wks,

Theft crimes over_
$2,500, 15 yrs. max,
$100-'.&2,500 5 yrs,

Third degree felony
1-7 yrs. (28-506)
if over $500 (206,15)

m;nc.

Larceny - petit

LO\JIS{I\N_/\

tinder 1100 (, mos,
max. Special cir-

Theft crimes over
$100, 10 yrs, max,
$20-$100, 2 yrs max.
(14167) Livestock
1-10 yrs. \14:67,1
Supp, 1959
lhder $20, 1st offense: 6 mos. mAX,

Misdem, if $50-500
Petty misdem. if
under $50 ( 206, 15)

Vitalized foetus
1-10 yrs, (28-404)
Other 1 yr, max,
(28-405)

First offense - misdem,
2nd offense, 1-2 yrs,
(28-512)

$2,500 5 yrs, max,
(943,20)

2nd offense, 6 mos.1 yr, later offense
6 mos,•2 yrs. (14167)

1-10 yr~, (40a5-2)

5 yrs, max, (943,20

No spncial statute

Larceny of auto

l-10 yrs. (40-5-10)

!~ec l,1.rcnny

Joyriding

12 mo&, max, 1st
ottenie 1-10 yrs.
2nd offense wlthln
'., yrs. (13-13-2)

5 yrs. max, (9~3.23)

No specinl stntute

Embezzlement

1-10 yrs (grand) 6
mos. max! (petty)
(40-5-16

See theft crimes
under larceny

See theft crimes
under larceny

Third degree felony
if fiduciary third
degree felony if over
$500 (206.15)

Same penalty as larceny (28-538) Public
moneys 1-21 yrs,
(28-543)

False Pretenses

10 yrs. max, (grand)
6 mos, max, (petty)
(40-14-2)

See theft crimes
under larceny

See theft crimes
under larceny

Same as larceny

Under $351 misd~m.
( 30d) over $35
1-5 yrs. (28-1207)

Confidence game

1-20 yrs, (40-10-1)

See larceny

See larceny

No Acct. Checks

1-5 yrs, (40-14-10)

1 yr , max , ( 94 3. 24 )

See short checks

Petty Misdem7 (206.2?.) Misdem, or 1-10 yrs,
(28-1212)

Short checks

Misdem, (40-14-20)

1 yr, max, (943,24)

Check over $1001
5 yr, max,, $20-1001
2 yr, max,, under 201
6 mos, max) (14171
Supp, 1959

Same aa above

Receiving stolen
property

1-10 yrs, (grand)
6 mos, max, ()etty)
(40-5-12, -22

maJC., $100-2,500

Under $100 - 6 mos.
5 yrs, max., over

Over $1001 10 yrs,
max.• $20-100 2 yrs.
max., under f201
6 mos, max, 14169)

Third degree felony
if over $500 or if
dealer

Grand 1-7 yrs,
(28-508)

5 yrs.max, (14165)

Second degree felony

3-50 yrs, (28-414)

2-30 yrs, \14164
Supp. 1959

First degree felony
No special statute
if (1) attempt to
kill or do s/b/i
(2) purposely do s/b/i

cumst.:1nces 1111dr.r

Larceny from person

(J)(d)

$2,500 15 yrs. max,
(943,34)

Third degree felony
1-7 yrs, (28-505)
(regnrdlcss of amount)

1-10 yrs, (~8-522)
Auto or guns, third
degree felony (206,15)

Robbery - simple

1-14 yrs, (40-5-1)

10 yrs. max. (943,32)

Robbery - aggravated
(armed)

2 yrs, to life
(40-5-1)

30 yrs, max, (943,32)

Blackmail (extortion)

20 yrs, max, (40-12-1) 5 yrs. max. (943,20)

1-15 yrs, (14166)

Malicious mischief

If damage over $100
1-10 yrs, If less
than $100, misdem,
(40-18-1)

$1,000 damage 5 yrs.
max, Spec, prop. 3
yrs, max, Other
6 mos, max. (943,01)

Danger to life1 1-15
yrs, (14155) damage
over $5001 2 yrs,
max., damage under
$5001 6 mos, max.
(14156) intent to
defrauds 4 yrs, max,
( 14 157)

Forgery & uttering

1-14 yrs, (40-6-1)

10 yrs.max, (Legal
10 yrs, max, (14172)
documents or pub.record)
(Other/ 6 mos, max,
(943,38)

141

Misdem. 3-6 mos.
(28-521)

2-5 yrs, (28-953)

lhder $351 misdem,
(90d) over. $351 7
yrs, max, (28-1213)

Threatened kidnapping
1-20 yrs, (28-417)
Other 1-3 yrs, (28441 to 445/
Third degree felony
if property over
$1,0001 misdem, if
property over $1001
petty if property ia
recklessly caused over
$25 damage

$100 damage 1-3 yrs,
(28-572) under $100
damage 6 mos, max.
( 28-573)

Second degree felony
1-20 yrs, (28-601)
if forgery of part of
issue of stocks, bonds,
money, 3rd degree felony f other writings,

Table XXI Continued:
CRIME

KANSAS

OKLAHOMA
Death-life k 707

Nf.W MEXICO

ARIZONA

Death-life (4024-10)

Death-life (13453)

UTAH
Death-1 ife ( 7630-4)

Death-life (6-54)

Not under 3 yrs,
Not under 10 yrs.
(40-24-10)
(13-453)
Attempt• 1-10 yrs,
40-6-10

10 yrs,-llfe
(76-30-4)

20 yn.-llfe
(6-5!">)

1-10 yrs, (4024-10)

10 yrs, max,
( 13-457 Supp,
1%9)

1-10 yrs. (7630-6)

20 yrs, max, (6-58)

1-10 yrs, (4024-10)

10 yrs, max, !13457 Supp 1959
driving vehicle
1-5 yrs, or
mlsdem. 1 yr.
max. (13-457
S••pp, 1959)

Misdem. 1 yr. max,
(76-30-6)

Flrst Degree
Murder

Death-life (21·
403)

Second Degree
Murder

Not under 10 ~rs.
(21-403)

Voluntary
M,rnblaughter

First degree
First degree,
not under 4 yrs,
mlsdem, mansl,
i 715
5-21 yrs, 2nd
deqree heat of
pa s·slon (cruel)
3-5 yrs, ( 21-407ff,
421)

lnvolunhry
Manslaughter

Third degree
Involuntary 6 mos;
3 yrs,: 4th degree
heat of pa sslon
(not cruel) 6 mo&.
2 yrs. ( 21-472,
423)

Death while drlvinq under
infiuence

No special statute No special statute No special &tatute No special statute 1-10 yrs. (7630-7\4 Supp.
1959

A&sault & Battery
Simple

l yr,
436)

Assault & battery
with deai:11 y
weapon

10 yrs, max.
( 21-431)

Second degree
2-4 yrs, or
mlsdem,-1 yr.
max, § 722

VJVOMING

No special statute

Mlsdem\ (30d)
(ti 644

Upon wlfe1 30d-3
yrs., Felony
assault 6 mo~.3 yrs,, genP.ral
misdem, 90d max.
(40-6-1 to 4)

Assaul t-3 mos.
max,; Batt,-6 mos,
max., aggravated
1-5 yrs. ( 13-243
to 245)

Assault-3 mos,
Mlsdem,• 6 mo&,
max., Batt,-6 mos, max. (6-68)
max., (76-7-2,4):
by convict w/mallce
death-life (76-712 Supp. 1959) by
convict: 3-20 yrs.
(76-7-11 Supp. 1959)

5 yrs, max,
or misdem,-1 yr,
max, (I 645)

Armed robbery1
1-5 yrs. (40-6-B)

1-10 yrs, (13249)

5 yrs, max. (76-7- Inflicts grievous
6)
harm mlsdem,
1 yr, max, (6-70)

A & B with Intent 10 yrs, max, (21to kill, rape,
431)
rob, steal, commit
mayhem

Polson-not under
10 yrs. § 651
shootlng-20 yrs.
max. § 652, Other
5 yrs. max, or
mlsdem.-1 yr. max,
Ii 653

Rape-50 yrs. max.
(40-6-9) Intent to
kill 1-25 yrs,
40-6-6)

Intent to murder
not under 5 yrs,·
life (13-248)
r,1pe & mayhem,
etc. 1-14 yrs.
(13-252)

Rape, mayhem, 110 yrs. !76-7-7)
murder1 5 yrs.life (76-30-14)

Rape, 1-50 yrs.
(6-64) felonious
Intent, 14 yrs.
max. (6-69)

Mayhem

5-10 yrs. (21430)

7 yrs. max, or
mlsdem,-1 yr,
max. § 759

1-5 yrs. (40-30-1)

14 yrs. max. (13521)

10 yrs. max, (7641-2)

14 yrs. max, (6-72)

Rape-forcible

5-21 yrs. (21424)

Forcil)le or male
1-99 yrs. (40over 1B, female
39-1)
under 14 or lunatic
15 yrs,-death
§§ 1114-1115

5 yrs,-life (13614)

Not under 10 yrs,
(76-53-18)

l yr, • life (6-63)

HapP.-statutory

1-21 yrs, (21424)

1·15 yrs.
1116

5 yrs.-life
(13-614)

Female under 13120 l yr.-life (6-63)
yrs.-life (76-5318) carnal knowledge
female 13-181 5 yrs,
max. (76-53-19, 761-15)

Kidnapping

Ransom & injury
To extort, 10 yrs,
death-life, ransom death, other 10
not under 20 yrs. yrs, max, §§ 741,
(21-449 Supp. 1959)745
Other 30 yrs, max,
(21-450)

Ahortlon

1 yr, max. (21437)

Quickened foetus
1-5 yrs. (40-3l&t degree mans!. 1)
i 713. death of
mot.her, 1st deqree
mansl, § 714, procuring - 3 yrs. max,
or mlsdem.-§ 061

Livestock 7 yrs.
othr.r 5
yrs. max. (21-534)

S

La rceny-petl t

1 yr. max, (2153'.l t;upp. l 959)

Mlsdem, (30d)
§ 1706

Larceny from
person

4

yr,,.
242?)

Larceny of auto

"l-1', yrs. (21~,3'1)

l.,1rcony-grand

max, (21-

1114, Female under 161
life, 1-99 yrs.
(40-39-1)

§§

(

21-

Ransom-death, life Ransom-harm death
other l yr.-llfe
ransom 20 yrs,(76-35-1)
life (6-59)

2-5 yrs. ( 13-211)

2-10 yrs. (76-21) solicitation
hy woman 1-5 yrs.
( 76-2-2)

14 yrs. max. (6-77)
solicitation by
woman misdem: 6 mos,
max. (6-78)

Grand 11 thcft, 11 110 yrs, (13-671)

1-10 yrs, 76-38-6

10 yrs. max, (6-132)

Mi sdem, 3 mos,
max, (40-45-1)
:;hoplift.ing-3rd
offense 3-5 yrs,
('10-45-:>S ~upp,
1959)

l'et.t.y "theft"
misdem, ( 13-671)
6 mos, max , ( 131645)

Misdem, 6 mos\
m,lX, ( 76-38- 7

Misdem: 6 mos. Max.
2nd offense: 10 yrs.
max. (6-133)

Nlqht.t.lmc 10
yrs, max, § 170B

3 mor,. ('10-4'.\-9)

1-10 yrs, ( 13663,671)

tli,fincd as (Jro1nd
(76-38-4) 1-10
yrs, (76-38-6)

No special stat.ute

3-20 yrs.

No spi?cl.il st..,tut.,, No spccl.11 st..1t.11te No specl.,l statute No special statute

yrs.

ffl,1)(.

I 1705 1-10 yrs, (40-45-

1)

m.:JX,,

m,H •

For ransom, 5 yrs. Ransom-serious
death, child under harm: death-life
121 6 mos.-20 yrs. w/o parole ransom
Other1 10 yrs, max,20-50 yrs. Other
(40-25-1 to 3)
1-10 yrs. (13491, 492)

§

1720

4 yis.
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OKLAHOMA

Nf:W Mf'XICO

1 yr, max, (21544 l

Misdem,fine only
Ii 1787

No special statute Misdem, (13~672)
6 mos, ma,c, (13.
1645)

Fmbezzlement

Same pen,1lty as
larceny (21-545)

As for larceny
I 1462

Over '.!,501 1-10
yre,, under $501
mi sdcm, 30-90
days, 40-45-19

'

,._

Public funds: 21
yrs, ma,c, (6-136)
by atty, 20 yrs,
mall,, other 14 rrsj
ma,c, (6-138 to 42

Included in
"theft" see
larceny

Same penalty as
larcenr (7~-20-8
Supp, 959)

10 yre, mall, (6-38)

2•5 yrs, (40-21-

1-~ yre, al&o
mi&dem, 1 rr,
mo, (13-3 2
Supp, 1959)

10 rrs, mall, (7620- 7)

No &pecial &tatute

Over $20 5 yre,
max, , Under $20
mhdem, 3 moe,
max.

Defined-felony
(13-316 Supp,
1959) 5 yn.
mu, (13-1645)

"lnauff icient
fund1 11 Same ••
ehort checke

"In1uff icitnt
funds" Same a,
ehort check,

Same a, above

Under $25-miadem,
6 mos, mall, (131645) Over $25felony (13-316
Supp, 1959) 5 yre.
mn • ( 13• 1645)

5 yrs, ma,c, or
mi1dem,•l yr,
mu, (76-;lO-ll
Supp,1959)

Under $25-6 mo1,
ma,c, (ml&demlJ 2nd
offense, 5 yr1, mall
Over $25· 5 yrs,
mu, (6-39, 40)

Under $50-misdem,
3 mo&, ma,c,
Over $501 l•lO
yrs, 40-45·1

Over $50-felony
(13-621) 5 yr&,
max, ( 13-1645)

Grandt 5 yre, mall, Same penaltr a1
Petits miadem.6
larceny (6- 35)
mo1, ma,c, (76-3812, 76-1-16)

Not under 5 yrs,
(13-643)

5 yr&,•life
76-51-2

Y•••

Same penalty aa
larceny (21•551)

Over $20 7 yre;
mu, , Under $20
misdem, I 1541

l-5
l)

Confidence Gam_e

2-5 yr&, (21930)

Over $20 7 yn,
ma,c,, Under $20
mi&dem, I 1541

3)

No Acct, Check a

Under $50 6 mo&,
ma,c, , Over $50
1-5 yra, (;zl-555
Supp, 1959)

Over $20 7 yre,
ma,c,, Under $20
mi&dem, Ii 1541

Shoi·t check,

See no acct,
check,

Receiving Stolen
Property

Same penalty a&
larceny (21-549)

5 yre, ma,c, or
misdem, 6 mos,
max. I 1713

Robbery-simple

First degree-1021 yrs,, 2nd
degree 5-10 yr,,
'(21-530)

Two or more
3-15 yrs. (40-9robber11 5-50 yre, l) (40-42-1)
I 800, force or
fear, not under
10 yre, § 798,
other• 10 yrs, mall,
Ii 799

(40-21-

11)

14 yra, mall, (6-65)

Robbery-aggravated No special statute 5 yrs,-death I 801 3-25 yrs, (40(armed)
42-2)

No special statute 5 yrs,-life
76-51-3

5-50 yrs, (6-66)

Blackmail
(ell.tortion)

(Third degree
robbery) 5 yrs,
ma,c, !21-530) l-5
yrs, 21-2412)

6 mos, - l yr,
(40-46-1)

5 yrs, ma,c, (13·
401)

3 yrs. mall,
(76-19-3)

5 yrs. mall. (6-147)

Malicious
Mischief

Misdem, 1 yr, ma,c, Generally- misdem.
1 yr, ma,c, !iii 1760
Special property
2, 3, 4, 5 8. 10
yrs, ma,c, i§ 17511786

Certain named
realty, crops 8.
fixtures 10 day&3 yrs, (40-47-5
to 25)

General-misdem,
(13-501) 6 mos.
mall, (13-1645)

Mi&dem, 6 mos,
mall, ( 76-60l to 8 76-1-16)

Misdem, 6 mos,
mall, (6-227)

Forgery 8. uttering First degree-21
yrs, ma,c, , 2nd
degree-lo yrs,.
mall,, 3rd degree
7 yrs, mall,, 4th
degree 6 mo&,-5
yrs, ( 21-631)

,·

No specia 1 statute No statute

Same penalty as
lnrceny (76-17-

,.i

...

l''YOIHNG

Same penalty as
larceny (13-68B)

False Preten&e•

Same a, above

UTAH

Afl!ZONA

Joyriding

I ,.!

I

KANSAS

5 rrs. ma,c,
I 483

First degree-7-20 1-5 yrs, §i 40-20- l-14 yrs. (13-421) 1-20 yrs, (76yrs,, 2nd degree
l to 17, 2nd off26-4)
7 yrs. mall, I 1621 ense: twice
penalty (40-2018)

14 yrs, max. (6-17)

Arson

Dwelling-2-20 rrs, Inhabited hldg,Other bldg.-1- 0
1-30 yrs, Other
yrs, Personaltybld91 1-15 yrs.
1-3 yrs,, Defraud Other-1-5 yrs,
inaurer-1-5 yrs,
ii 1390-1392
Attempt 6 mos,-2
yrs. (21-58 to 585)

Dwelling: 2-20 yrs.Dwelling: 2-20 yrs.Owellin91 2-20 yrs.Dwelling• 2-20 yrs,
Other bldg, 1-10
Other bldg, 1-10
Other bldg, l-10
Other bldg. 1-10
yrs,, Personalty- rrs,, Personalty: rrs,, Personalty
yrs., Personalty
1-3 yrs., Insured
-3 yrs,, Attempt
-3 yrs,, Oefraud l-3 yrs,. Attempt
Personal tr• 1-5 yrsl-2 yrs,, defraud insurer 1-5 yrs,
l-2 yrs,, Oefraud
Attempt: -2 yrs, insurer, 1-5 yr&, Attempt l-2 yrs,
Inaurer 1-5 yrs,
(40-5-1 to 5)
13-231 to 235
(76-6-1 to 5)
(6-121 to 1251

Burglary

First degree10-21 yr&,, 2nd
degree 5-10 yrs,
3rd degreP. 5 yrs,
mn, ( 21-523)
w/e,cplosives 1030 yrs, (21-526)

Occupied bldg,
7-20 yrs., Other
2•7 yr1, ii 1431•
1436 w/ellplosives
20-50 yrs. I 1~41

1-15 yr&, (40-9l, 3) armed, 3-25
rs •• ~llplosives
r 0-30 yrs. (40-92, 5) daytime, 6
mos,-3 yrs. (40-97)

Daytime, 5 yrs,
mall,, nighttime,
1-15 yrs, w/ellplosivr.s, etc.
not under 5 yrs,
(13-302, 303)

W/ellplosive1, 25·
40 yrs,, ni9htt\m11, 1-20 yrs,
daytime 6 moe,3 yrs. {76-9·1 to

Possess burglary
t,>ol s

No statute

Mlsdem, 1 yr,
mall, i 1~37, I 10

10 yr&, ma~. (40-

Ml sdem. (13-304)
6 mos, mall, (13.

Mlsdem. (76-9-8)
6 mos, mall, (761-16)

10 yrs, mall, (6-131

::odomy (crime
nqninst. n,1 lure)

10 ~rs. m~ll. ( 21907

10 yrs. mr1x. I 11116 1 yr, t.o life
(40-7-7 ::upp.
1%"1) Attempt
10 yrs, mnll, (407-11 Supp, 1%7)

IncP.st.

7 yrs.
906)

10

rll.q.,my

ffl'1)(.

(21-

6 mo~.-!, yrs,

(21-901)
Knowlngly m~rry
birpmist

6 mo!a.-5 yrs.

(?l-905)

a

ri~~I

m,1x.

5 yrs, mall,
( §

q.9)

1M5)

~lo

7-3

lrs.

m,,x. (40-

ml sdem,-1 yr,
mall, 8 f!(M

6)

5-'?.0 yrs, (136,1 l Lr.wd Ach
1-~, y.rs, ( l3-6r,:;,)

:;>2)

3-20 yrs, (76-53-

10 yrs, mall,
(6-9R)

10 yrs, mall, (13•171)

3-l~ yrs, (76~3-4)

5 yrs. mall, or
misdcm. 1 yr. mall,
(6-85)

2-·1 yrs. (40-·1.l)

10 yrs, m~ll. (13- 5 yrs. mall,
271)
(76-53-11

~yrs.mall, (6-84)

No

3 yrs, m,,ll, (13-

No statute

003)

!l yrs. m,,x, or

14 yn. mall,
(6-129)

L t.,,tul.r.

273)

143

No statute

7
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WISCONSIN

CQLQRAOO

19!)!)

20 yr1, max,, dwell•
ing, 10 yrs, max,,
other realty. 3 yr&,
max,, peraonalty,
5 yra, max,, defraud
ins, co, (40-3-1, et,

Building 15 yr, max,
(943,021 Other property 3 yr,, max,
(943,03) defraud
insurer 5 yra,max,
(943,04)

CRIME
Arion

&eg,)

Cl1Jrglary

MODEL PENAL

LOUISIANA

CODE

1942

rra,

Nl.'BRASKA

Danger to life 2-20
yu•, ( 14 151) damage
under i!:>00, l yr, max,
damage over $500
10 yrs, max, (14152)
intent to d~fraud 5
yr, max, (14153)

Second degree felony
if purpoaely burn
house, occupied bldg,
Third degree felony
if to defraud ins, co,
& no one endangered

Dwelling 2-20 rr1,
Other bldg, 1- 0 yrs,
Per1onalty 1-3 yr&,
Attempt 1-2 yrs,
Defraud in,urtr 1-5 yr~
(28-504,01 to ,05)

Third degree felony•
dar, Second degree
fa ony1 night, injury

1-10 rr•. (28-533)
w/exp oaives 20 yrs.life (28•5

6, • 7)

1-10 yr,., 25-40 yr&,
if dynamited (40•3-

10
max. (943,10)
veh cle 1 yr, max,
(943,11)

Armed or commit&
battery 1-30 yr1,
(14160) other 9 yr&,
.
max, (14162)

'Po&ses& burglary
tool&

2 yrs, max, (40-3-8)

10 yr~. mo, (943,12)

6 mo&, max, (14195)

Sodomy (crime
agdn&t nature)

(1 day to• lifj)* 1-14
yrs, (40-2-31

5 yrs, max, (944,17)

5 yrs. max, (14189)

20 yr&, max. (28-919)
Second degree felony
if force, fear, victim
under 10. Third degree
felony if victim under
18, No crime if in
private with ~on1enting
adult& (207,51

Ince&t

(1 day to life)* 6 mo&, 10 yr&, max, (944,06)
to 5 yr&,, exc, 20 yrs,
mnx, for father with
daughter (40-9-6)

A&cendant-deacendant
siblings• 15 yrs.
max, uncle-nieceaunt-nephew 5 yr&,
max. (1417B)

Third degree felony
(207,3)

5-15 yr&. (28-905)
father w/daughter not
under 20 yr&, (28-906)

Blqamy

2 yr&, max, (40-9-1)

5 yrs.

ffltl)t',

( 944, 05)

5

yrs, max. (14176)

Third degree felony
(201.2)

1-7 yr&, (28-903)

Knowingly marry
bigamist

1 yr, max. (felony)
(40-9-2)

5 yrs.

fflrl)(,

(944,0!:>)

!'>

yrs, max. (14177)

Misdem, ( 207. 2)

No &tatute

Indecent Liberties
with minor (&exual
assault short of
intercourse)

10 yrs, max,, or
day to life)*
40-2-32)

p

10 yrs, max, (944, 11
Supp, 1960)

2 yrs, max, ( 14181
Supp, 1959)

1st offense misdem,/or
Third degree felony
1-5 yr&, 2nd offense
if force, threats,
carnal contact! other- 5-10 yrs. (28,929)
wise, misdem. (207,6)

Perjury

1-14 yrs, (40-7-1)

5 yrs, max, (946,31)

Felony trial 10 yrs.
max, Other case 5
yrs, max, (141123)

Thlrd degree felony
(208,20)

Subornation of
Perjury

1-14 yrs. (40-7-1)

No st,1 tute

No statute

1-10 yrs. (28-702)

Bribery

1-5 yrs. (40-7-6, -7)

5 yrs, m.Jx, (946,10)

Puhlic 1 !'> yrs, max,
Thlrd degree felony
(14:llll), voters1
(208,10)
l yr. max, (1409)
commercia\1 1 yrs. max.
(14173) sports par- ·
t!cipants1 1-!:> yrs.
(141118.l supp. 1959)

Juror or witnes& 1-~
yrs, (28-703)

l'scape by felon

1-10 rrs. (40-7-54)
Assau t by lifer,
death. Assault by
other, 5-50 yr1.
Hoatage during escape
5-10 yrsj (40-7-50,
-51, -52

5 yrs. max:-after
arrest, b•ifore
&entencing 1 yr.
max. (946,42)

0anger to life 10
yr&; max~ (141109)
Other l yr, max,
(141110)

l-10 yr&. (28-736)

Con1piracy

To commit felony 1-10 As for completed
r&,, to commit mi1dem.crime except crime
r yr, max, (40-7-30)
pennlized by life
30 yr&, mu,
(939,31)

0eath-life crime 120 rr&, theft, rec.
sto en good& J yrs.
max. - other~ max,
for complete crime
( 14 I 26)

2 yr&, max, (28-301)

Attempt

No general attempt
,t.atut.e

Felony, battery,
theft~ penalty for
completed crime except 11 fe-crime
30 yr1, max,
(939,32)

0eath-life crime 20
yrs, max., theft, rec,
&tolen goods 1 yr, max,
other~ max. for completed crime (14127)

No general attempt
1tatute

Poneasion of
Narcotic&

2-10 yr&,, l&t offense, 5-15 yrs, 2nd
offense (48-6-20)

1-5 yrs. also misdem,
1 yr, max, in jail
(161.02)

10-15 yrs. (401981)

1st offense 2-5 yrs,
2nd offense 5-10 yrs,
Later offense 10-20 yrs,
( 28-470)

Sale of Narcotics

5-15 yrs, if victim
21, 10-20 yrs, if
victim under 21
(48-6-20)

Same •• above

Same aa above

Same aa above

No.n- support

'l yrs, max. (43-1-1)

2 yrs, mnx. (52,03)

1 yr, max, (14174
supp, l9'l9)

144

1-5 yr&, (28-534)

Third degree felony
if felon escapes, or
if force, firearm&
u1ed, Misdem, otherwise (208,33)

Misdem, (207,14)

1-14 yrs. (28-701)

1 yr. max, (28-446)

.,.

,'
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Two prior felony
conviction a

.,.

..
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WISCONSIN

COLOflADO

CHIME

Not lea& than longeat
term, not more. than
3 time& longeat term
(39-13-1)

Three prior felony
convlctions

Life ( 39-13-1)

Indeterminate
sentence

Felony, except life
terms, court fix max,
& min, within the
max, & min, fixed by
statute (39-12-1)

1 felony, or 3.m11dem, No general atatute,
w/1 ~ yr&, p1at1 a, if see petit larceny for
max, term 1 yr, or
special case
leaa, add up to 3 yra,1
b, if max, term 1-lp
yra, 1 add up to 6 yra,1
c. if max, term 10 or
more yr&,, add up to
10 yr&, (939,62)

Good time
reduction sentence

....
..,..

... ,

Statutory Reference

~

Good time, 1st yr.2 mo,, 2nd yr.-2 mos,
· 3rd yr, - 4 mo&,, 4th
yr.-4 mos,5th and each
succeeding yr.-5 mos,
Trusty time1 max. of
10 da, per mo, p~~s
good time with a itional 3 da, per mo.
for constructive work,
Both subtracted from
min. sentence. (105-44 and 105-4-5)
Colo. Rev, Stat,
Ann, (1953)

NEBRASKA
No general atatute
aee petit larceny
indecent liberties
and narcotic& aection1

Extended term if D
peraiatent offender,

D profeasionai criminal, D dangeroua

and.mental}( abnormal,

D multiple offender

(aeries of crime&
charged together)
Extended term punishment11 1st degree
felony, 1-30 {min,)
to life, 2nd degree
felony 1-5 (min,) to
10-20 (max), 3rd degree
felony 1-3 to 5-10

Same as above

Third conviction not
over 15 yrs, (21-107a:

Court sets max, term,
min, is set.by statute, parole eligibility
after yr, or ~ of max,
sentence whichever
is less (with certain
other exceptions)
(606 & 607 I

Court sets min, &
max, within statutory
limits which va~y
according to degree
of crime

Court sets min, & max,
within statutory limit

Good time1 similar
to Colorado plus
max. of 5 da, per
mo, for diligence
in labor/study,
Note that time is
subtracted from max,
sentence rather than
min,

Good Time1 6 da, per
mo. plus a max. of 6
da, per mo, for extra
meritorious behavior
both subtracted from
min, to determine date
of parole eligibility
and from max. to
determine date when
parole release mandatory ( 305. 5)

Good Time1 1st yr.2 mos,, 2nd yr,-2
mos,, 3rd yr.-3 mos,,
4th and each succeeding yr,-4 mos, (29-263

Same aa above

...

MODEL PENAL
CODE

LOUISIANA
1942

19'..lii

Wis: Stat. Ann,

TJ95A,---

Nebr, Rev. Stat,

La, Hev. Stat,
Ann,7195~

Ann, {1956)--_

;..

KANSAS

CfllME

,..

-~

-

OKLAIIOf.lA

Nr:v, MEXICO

ARIZONA

WYOMING

UTAII

6 mos,-5 yrs,
(40-34-21 J

Lewd Acts 1-5 yrs. No statute
(13-652)

Some acts1 10 yrs,
max, (6-98)

Capital trial
Felony trial 2-20
against accused
rrs,, other trial
death or notunder
-10 yrs., Other
10 yrs. other fol- 5 yrs._max. § 499
ony not under 7 yrs.
Other 7 yr&. max,
(21-702)

Capit~l c~se 315 yrs,, Other
2-5 yrs, (4032-1)

Procures death sen-Judicial protence-death1 other ceeding 1-5
1-14 yrs, (13yrs, Other572)
mlsdem, 1 yr,
max, ( 76-45-13)

14 yrs, max, (6-153

Subornation of
Perjury

Same penalty as
for perjury (21704)

Same penalty as
for perjury (4032-4)

1-14 yrs, (13572)

Judicial proceeding 1-5 yrs,
Other-misdem, 1
yr, max, (76-4513)

14 yr&. max, (6-155

Bribery

Witne&s-1 yr, max, Exec, Off,-10 yrs. Of Judges & Pub.
Juror-5 yrs. max., max, (21 I 265)
Off ,-1-5 yrs,
(21-708, 709)
Legislator-2•5 yrs,Legislators-1-~
Pub. officer-7 yrs,(21 § 320)0ther
yrs, (40-8-1, 3)
max., Voter-5 yrs, Officers-5 yrs,
Witness-! yr, max.
(40-31-1)
max, (21-801-805) max, I 3Al
Jurors-10 yrs, max.
I 383

Pub. Officer-114 yrs. Legislator-1-10 yrs,,
Juror, 1-10 yrs,
(13-281, 285,

Officers-5 YH,
max. (76-28-a,
76-1-15) Leg\,~
lator-!:> yrs,
max. (16~fa-r,,
76-1-1!'>) JMrar
5 yr&, m~•i f16:
2fH!f3, 76- - bl

l4

Breaking out
yrs. max. (21732) w/o breaking out 3 yrs,
ma ic , ( 21- 734 )

State pen or
priGon 2 yrs,
max, 8§ 434, 435,

1-5 yrs. (40-412) with we.ipons
or explosives 2550 yrs, (40-41-3)

Felony (13-392)
5 yrs, max.
(13-1645)

Kidnappi.ng 5-50
yrs, (21-452)

Misdem, 1 yr,
may, § 421, i 10

1-14 yrs, (40-111) to kldnaP. 5
yrs,•death (4025-4)

1 rr, max. 1333

Indecent Liberties with minor
(sexual assault
short 9f intercourse)

Solicitation to
1-20 yrs.
indecencies child
under 15, 1-5 yrs.
15-18, 1 yr, max.
(38-711 Supp, 1959)

Perjury

racape by felon

5

Consp1.rAcy

§

1123

Same penalty as
for perjury I 504

9

145

287)

l3s~l~' max,
l,li&dem, l yr,
max. (76-12-l)

ns,

max. (6-

l!it,, t!i?)

l-10 Yf~, (6-167
1•6~ Supp,
1%9)

To kidnap-~~~e ~§.
kidnapping (J6-~~I
No general
con&piracy at~t.,

.

Table XXI Continued:
OKLAHOMA

KANSAS

CRIMF.

Attempt

Pouenioh of
Narcotic•

Nf:W MfXICO

AI\IZONA

Death-life
crime 10 yra,
mu, Other 1/::z
ma!( for compll
crime (21-101

4 yra, or more
Generol1 6 moa crime 1/2 mu,
3 yra, (40-1-6 1
for compl, crime
Under 4 yra,
crime mhdem, l
yr, ma!(, (21 I 42)

General, over
~ yr&. crime
IS mo, for
compl, crime
Under !'.I yra,
crime 6 moa,
mu, 13-110

7 y·u. mu, (6~2~02, 2!'.1191)

Flrat offenae, 2
yra, ma!(,, Sub•
aeq, offenae
3 yr•. mil(, (Title
63 11 402, 420)

Flrat offenae 2~ yr&,, 2nd
offenae ~-10
yra, Subaeq,
Offenu 10-20
yrs, adult selling to minor 10
ra,-llfe (~4-7r • ~4-7-1~ Supp.
19~7)

Fl rat off enae l
yr. ma!(, (miadem)
or 25 yr&, ma!(,
Subnq, offense 1
25 yrs, ma!(, (361002, 1020)

5Ale of Narcotic• Same aa above

~ yra, crime IS
ma!(, for compl,
crime, Under
~ yra. crime l
yr, ma!(, (mladem)
(76-1-31) .

Flrat offen1e !'.I
yra, mu, 2nd
or aubaeq, !'.I yr,,
life (!'.>B-13a-i,
44 Supp, 19~9)

No general attempt
1tatute

Same•• above

Same•• above

Same

2 yra, ma!(, (21•
442)

Desertion 1-10
yra, II 8~1. 8~3
non-aupport
mhdem, l yr,
mu, II 8~2, 10

l'lrst offenu l
yr, ma!(,, 2nd &
aubaeq. offense
2 yrs, mu, (40•
2-3)

Wife-felony (13803) Chlld1
mladem, (13-801)

Two prior felony
conviction&

Second conviction, Panaltr .
doubled (21- 071)

Petit larceny
No general &tat5 yra, ma!(, Over , ute; see forgery
5 yra, crlme1not
and petlt larceny
under 10 yrs,, 5
rs. crime or lea&
o r,••• ma!(, (21
1 5

II

above

Same•• above
~ yrs, ma!(, (761~-l Supp. 19!'.>9)

Over~ yrs. crime Not under 1~ yra,
not under 10 yra, (76-1-18)
Under~ yr&, crime
10 yrs. ma!(, Petty
theft, molestation,
lewd conductf under
5 yrs. crime, 5 yra,
mu. (13-1649)

Same II above
3 yrs, max, (20-71)

Life (6-10)

Same aa above

Same aa above

Same as above

Indeterminate
sentence

No provlslon

Mln, nnd ma!(,
are ~et by stat•
ute1 parole
eligibility aflei
one-third of m n,
if less than 10
rs, lf more than
0 yrs, one-third
of flrst 10 plus
l mo. for each
,1ddl t.lon.i 1 yr,

Court sets mln,
Court seta min,
Court sets min. and
ma!(, wlthln statutory
and ma!(. within . and ma!(., both
of which may be
limit&
statutory liml ts
modlfled by Board
of Pardon,

~lmllar to Colo.
plus 10 da, per
mo. for meritorious service or
conduct ptur an
addltlona
ump
sum award of 1 yr.
for el(tra meritor•
lous service or
conduct. Nltl..t!.l
all good tTiiie&ubtracted from ma!(,
aentonce (42·1-54
and 42-1-55)

1st y-rr2 mos., 2nd l yr, aeritenc'e or b1m1rar to Colo,
yr,-2 mos,, 3rd yr,less-5 da, per mo, plus special good
4 mos., 4th yr,•
1-3 yr, sentence- time allowance
4 mos., 5th and
6 da, per mo,, 3- conferred by
succeeding yr, 5
5 yr, &entence-7
Board of Pardons
da, per mo, 5-10
not to el(ceed 210
mos, plus trusty
time equal to good yr aentence-8 da, da, in any 12 mo,
time, both to be
per mo., 10 yrs.
perlod1 both to
subtracted from
sentence or more• be deducted from
10 da, per mo,
min, if first
ma!(, 1·1-308 and
7-325
offenae or from
~ofer court decmal(, lf &econd or
& ons have held
&ubseq, offenae
that it 11 not
(31-251 and 31·
mandatory that good
252)
time allowance&
be applied by the
Board of Pardon& in
eurcl&lng lta
authority under
the Indeterminate
sentencing law,
( 77-62-10 I

Same as above

r

Good time
reduct ton
&entence

Accumulated ace•
ording to regul-.
ations promulgated
by Board of Probatlon and Parole
and &ubtracted
from m1.n, (62•
2245)

Statutory
reference

~an, YtQA
=
9-,--------lli_L_

1st yr. -3 da, per
mo,, 2nd yr,6 da. per mo.,
3rd and each
succeeding yr,•
8 da. per mo,
(!'.17 I 232)

A2J' ~i~53hltl...
-,--------- ao.ri...

Qlli~
lliL.
crt:"""21;
TI9~

•

10-~0 yrs, (6-9)

Three prior felony Thlrd convic•
conviction•
~ion, not under
15 yr&, (21l07a)
Min; and ma!(, set
by i.tatute

•

Flrat offen1e 2-~
yra,, 2nd offenae
5-10 yra,, 3rd or
Subaeq,10-20 yra,
adult selling to
minor,, lat offenae
10-20 yra. 2nd or
ubseq, 20-50 yra.
35.3~0. 369)

i

Non-&upport

r

YNOMING

UTAH

•

~g5t

Arn~( ) lli.L.
~

l

.

.,
,.

Utah Code A!l!lJ.
(1953}

....
*

lndetermlnAte ••ntence for 1ew offen•••• 39-19•1,
Colorado Revlaed Stetut••• 19~3, •• emended,

Abbrevhtlon1 I
D • Dehndent
1/b/i • 1erlou1 bodily injury
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In district court criminal actions, statutory authority is
given the judge to appoint counsel for indigent defendants.9 This
authority is permissive rather than mandatory, but if counsel is
appointed he receives a fee fixed by the judge and paid by the county
in which the case is tried.lo There are no provisions for courtappointed counsels in cases before county, juvenile, and municipal
courts. The method of providing counsel for indigent defendants in
Colorado has been criticized for several shortcomings: 1) Counsel
is provided only for district court defendants when there is often
need for counsel in other courts as well. 2) Usually counsel is
not appointed until the defendant is arraigned, and to prepare an
adequate defense, counsel should be appointed as shortly after arrest
as possible. 3} The alleged violator is entitled to the best possible
defense, but often, inexperienced attorneys are appointed. 4} The
present system does not provide the investigatory and other facilities
necessary for a complete defense. 5} In some counties, the fees
paid are too small for the work involved in preparing an adequate
defense. 6) In some of the larger counties where the fees paid
are more commensurate with the work required, the total cost is too
great for the services provided.
Other Methods of Providing Counsel
These criticisms have also been made of the assigned-counsel
system in other states. As a result, several alternate approaches
to providing counsel for indigent defendants have been developed.
These include the voluntary-defender system, lhe public-defender
system, and the,mixed private-public system.l
.

.
.

These systems may be described as follows:1 2

_

The Voluntary-Defender System
Voluntary-defender organizations ••• lare7
private, non-governmental organizations
representing indigent defendants accused
of crime. They may or may not be affiliated
with a civil legal aid organization •••
The voluntary-defender system is characterized by what may be termed the "law-office"
approach to the representation of the indigent
defendant. While the assigned-counsel system

J'.

.,.
1ft.

#

9.
10.
11.
'

12.

39-7-29, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953.
Ibid.
Egual Justice for the Accused. Special Committee of the New
York City Bar Association and the National Legal Aid Association, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York,
1959, p. 25.
Ibid., pp. 50-52.

"'
JJ
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generally results in a number of different
lawyers being assigned from time to time
to represent indigent defendants, the
voluntary-defender system creates a law
office which the court may assign to
represent any and all indigent defendants.
These law offices vary in size from the
substantial organizations of New York and
Philadelphia to smaller offices such as
New Orleans. Nevertheless, under this
system the function of defending indigents
is centralized in a professional defense
unit.
·
Voluntary-defender offices are
privately controlled and supported.
Private control is usually achieved through
an independent governing body to which the
staff of the organization is responsible.
Financial support is sought either through
independent efforts to secure charitable
donations or through participation in
cooperative charitable efforts such as
the Community Chest. In some instances,
both methods are used.
The voluntary-defender system may
utilize trained, salaried investigators
to assist its legal staff. It may also
be aided by volunteers from private law
offices or local law schools •••

f

The Public-Defender System
The public defender, like the public
prosecutor, is a public official. The
former is retained by the government to
fulfill society's duty to see that all
defendants, irrespective of means, have
equal protection under the law; the latter
is retained by the government to serve
society's interest in law enforcement.
Generally, whenever there is a publicdefender office, that office represents
all indigent defendants in those courts
in which the public defender regularly
appears.
· Public-defender systems vary in size
from large offices such as those in
Los Angeles County and Alameda County,
California, to a single-lawyer office
such as the public defender in the
New Haven District in Connecticut.
Some, such as riertain offices in
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California, have facilities for investigation; others have only limited funds
and facilities.
The staff of public-defender offices
may be selected through civil-service
procedures, appointed by the judiciary or
the appropriate local officials, or elected.
On the whole. the legal staffs of publicdefender offices appear to be relatively
stable and in a number of instances these
staffs have developed the characteristics
of career services.
The larger public-defender offices
receive office facilities from the
gdvernment. However, smaller publicdefender offices often are operated
from the private law office of the
attorney serving as public defender.
Public-defender systems are financed
by public funds. In some instances, they
are treated in the same manner as other
government institutions and submit a
yearly budget to the proper appropriating
body. Others operate on a fixed retainer
basis, the public defender being paid a
yearly salary or fee for his services and
being expected to finance his office
expenses from his compensation.
The Mixed Private-Public System

,_

\

\.,

The cities of Rochester and Buffalo,
New York, have a mixed private-public
system which is unique in the United
States.
Rochester has had for some time a
Legal Aid Society which is active in civil
cases. In 1954, pursuant to an enabling
statute. the Legal Aid Society requested
and received from the Board of Supervisors
of Monroe County an appropriation to establish a defende.r service to function in the
inferior criminal courts of the county. A
lawyer employed by the Society has since
performed this function.
Thus, Rochester furnishes counsel to
the indigent defendant in lower court
criminal cases within the organizational
framework of a private legal aid society
and supports this system by public funds.
Buffalo has recently instituted a similar
program of operation.
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Recommendations for the Defense
of the Indigent in Colorado
In both the 1957 and 1959 sessions of the General Assembly,
a bill was introduced to establish a• public defender system in
judicial districts with more than 50,000 population. A public
defender was to be appointed for each such district by the governor
from person~ recommended to him by the district judge or judges.
The salaries set for public defenders were comparable to those for
district attorneys. In neither session was this measure approved by
the General Assembly.
Permissive Public Defender System
In September 1960, the Metropolitan Public Defender Committee
was formed with its membership composed of representatives from the
Legal Aid Society, Denver Mental Health Association, League of Women
Voters, Catholic Welfare, American Civil Liberties Union, and other
organizations. After considerable study, this group has recommended
legislation patterned after the Model Defender Act, which was drafted
by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association in conjunction
with the American Bar Association. This model act was adopted in
1959 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
The proposed legislation differs from the measures introduced
in 1957 and 1959 in three important respects: 1) The act is permissive rather than mandatory. 2) All counties, singly or in groups,
may establish a defender system instead of limiting the office of
public defender to judicial districts of a certain size. 3) The
public defender would be authorized to represent indigent defendants
charged with crimes in county and municipal court, as well as in
district court.
·
In those counties which would establish the office of public
defender as permitted in this act, the county commissioners would
appoint the defender, set his salary, and provide adequate office
space and supplies. The commissioners would also determine the number
of additional professional and clerical staff members, prescribe their
method of appointment, and set their salaries. If a public defender
office were established on a multi-county basis, the county commissioners of the several counties would make the appointment of the
defender jointly and devise a formula for sharing the expense of the
office. In the City and County of Denver, the bill provides that the
public defender would be appointed by the mayor.
·
Even if the office of public defender is established, the
court would have the authority to appoint an attorney other than the
public defender in the same way as now provided by law in district
courts. If the defender were appointed, however, it would be his duty
to represent the indigent defendant and provide counsel at every stage
of the proceedings following arrest.
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The act is flexible enough to permit the court to appoint
a representative of a local legal aid and/or defender organization
as counsel, if the county does not wish to establish the office.
Proponents of this measure feel that the permissive and
flexible provisions will make it possible for each local area to
adopt-a system tailored to meet its own needs. The Metropolitan
Defender Committee proposed this measure primarily to make it
possible for a defender office to be created in Denver and, perhaps,
in the large surrounding counties. The committee's opinion is that
th~ present method of assigning counsel, especially in Denver, is
extremely expensive for the services provided. This committee contends that more defendants can be assisted more adequately at less
cost through a public defender system and has cited experience in
other major cities as examples •
Fees Paid Court-Appointed Attorney§

...

Table XXII shows the annual amount of fees paid court-appointed
attorneys in Denver for 1950, 1954, and 1957 through 1959. The annual
total of fees paid increased almost 400 per cent from 1950 to 1959.
TABLE XXII

......

.

Court-Appointed Attorney Fees Paid,
Denver Diitrict Court Criminal Divisions,
for Selected Years
Year

"'

.

...
"

Amount

1950
1954
1957
1958
1959

$

27,111
40,175
63,552
80,225
133,794

Denver and the two Denver-metropolitan area judicial
districts (17th and 18th} for which data were available paid courtappointed attorneys considerably higher fees than the remaining
districts in criminal cases filed in 1958. The mean and median fees
paid in each judicial district for which information was available is
shown in Table XXIII.
Only the three judicial districts already cited had mean and
median court-appointed attorneys' fees in excess of $100, and in five
judicial districts both the mean and median fees were less than $75.
Many of the attorneys and judges who appeared before the committee
at its regional meetings complained of the low fees paid, but pointed
out that the county commissioners refused to allow larger amounts.
The attorneys stated generally that they tried to do an adequate job,
even if the fees were not commensurate with the work involved. However,
many felt that they lacked sufficient time for investigation to do a
thorough job.

,.
...
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TABLE XXIII
Fees Paid Court.- Appointed Attorneys,
Criminal Cases Filed in 1958. by Judicial District
Judicial
Districta

M!!!l

Median

2nd
3rd
4th
6th
7th

$195
25
93
83
41

$150
25
75
75
40

8th
9th
13th
15th
16th

53
82
81
62
35

35
75
50
61
35

17th
18th

18~
33

175
150

a.
b.

\,,.---

Information not available for 1st, 5th, 10th, 11th,
12th, and 14th districts.
Not a true reflection of average fees because of the
Early case and one or two other involved cases which
resulted in large fees to court-appointed attorneys.
These fees raised the average considerably; therefore,
the median is a much better indication of typical
fees paid.

•
\

.

.
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Defendants Represented by Couns~l in Criminal Cases
One-fourth of the defendants in criminal cases filed in
the district courts in 1958 were not represented by counsel. In
three judicial districts (11th, 12th, and 14th), more than threefourths of the defendants were not represented by counsel, and there
were three others (4th, 9th, and 16th) where counsel appeared for
less than half of the defendants. In contrast, there were five
districts (2nd, 3rd, 8th, 15th, and 17th) where 88 per cent or more
of the defendants had attorneys. In one of these districts (15th),
all defendants were represent~d by counsel.

•
...

•

Sixty per cent of the defendants represented by counsel had
court-appointed attorneys. This proportion varied from almost
80 per cent in the 3rd District to 12.5 per cent in the 12th District.
In a number of cases in which no counsel appeared, the docket analysis
ghows that a plea of guilty was entered on arraignment and that no

..
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counsel was requested. Some criminal cases in which there was no
representation by counsel were dismissed at the request of the
district attorney without prosecution, and in a few instances the
alleged offender had not been apprehended or had been returned to
prison for parole violation r~ther than prosecuted on a new charge.

,.

·.

Even when these factors are taken into consideration, the
small number of court-appointed attorneys in some judicial districts
as shown by the docket analysis indicates that present statutory
provisions for court-appointed counsel may not be entirely adequate.
An analysis by judicial district of defendants represented by counsel
in criminal cases filed in 1958 is shown in Table XXIV.

'
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TABLE XXIV
Defendants Represented by Counsel
Criminal Cases Filed in 1958 by Judicial District
1
No. of
Judicial DefendDistrict ands
,:,. ,._

'

.

..__

'

....

. .
'

-

1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th

Incomplete Data
1,056
1,046
113
97
159
131
15
15

4
Pct.
3 of 2

5
No. Rep.
by Ct.
Appt.
Attorney

6

7

Pct.
5 of 3

Pct.
5 of :

919
93
61
8

87. 8%
95.8
46.6
53.3

594
74
25
2

64.6%
79.6
41.0
25.0

56. 85
76.3
19.8
13.3

6th
7th
8th
9th
10th

80
266
259
62
218

65
220
244
58
187

47
130
224
25
132

72.3
59.1
91.8
43.l
70.6

29
90
143
14
51

61.7
69.2
63.8
56.0
38.6

44.6
40.9
58.6
24.l
27.3

11th
12th
13th
14th
15th

50
96
129
52
52

43
68
120
43
38

6

16
82
38

13.9
23.5
68.3
13.9
100.0

4
2
37
2
30

66.7
12.5
45.1
33.3
78.9

9.3
2.6
30.8
4.6
78.9

88
82
89
2,866

80
82
66
2,603

38
74
51
1,950

28.9
48.6
58.8
60.2%

13.8
43.9
46.0
45. 1:

16th
17th
18th
Total
a.

'

2
3
No.
for Which
Counsel
Rep. by
Indicateda Counsel

6

47.5
90.2
77.3
74.9%

11
36
30
1,174

Data not available for all cases on presence of counsel.

.
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Obstacles and Objections to Public Defender System
One of the major obstacles to adopting a public defender
system in most of the judicial districts is the small number of
criminal cases filed each year. Only eight judicial districts have
more than 100 criminal cases filed annually. Proponents of the
,public defender system contend that the appointment of a part-time
public defender and assistants in these districts at salaries equal
to those received by the district attorney and his assistants would
provide better defense counsel at less cost. At the committee's
regiQnal meetings, very few attorneys and judges in non-urban districts
wished to adopt the public defender system in their areas, although
conceding that perhaps such a system would work in Denver and the
surrounding counties. Expense and the small number of criminal cases
were cited as the reasonswhy a defender system would not be satisfactory in rural areas.
There have also been objections to the adoption of the public
defender system in Denver and other metropolitan areas. Some judges
and attorneys feel that adequate defense is now being provided and
at less .cost than through a public defender's office.
The Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of
Justice has recommended the adoption of the legislation proposed by
the Metropolitan Defender Committee, because it is permissive rather
than mandatory, so that no county would be required to adopt the
system unless there was local support.

•

•
•

••

Licensing and Regulation of Bail Bondsmen
•

There is no provision in the Colorado statut~s regulating
bail bondsmen or prescribing the terms and conditions for the issuance
of bail bonds. The absence of such regulation has led to several
alleged malpractices.13 Because there are no regulations or
qualifications applying to bail bondsmen, it is _alleoed that many
ex-convicts are now in the bail bond business. There is no way
at present to prohibit possible arrangements between bondsmen and
attorneys, which might require alleged violators to engage certain
counsel before bond would be made. It was stated that fees charged
by bail bondsmen were exorbitant and that it was not an uncommon
practice for a bondsman to request the court to terminate bond after
the fee had been paid on the grounds that the alleged violator was
a poor risk, even though this is not the case.
With the goal of taking some corrective legislative action,
an examination was made of statutory regulations in other states
pertaining to bail. bondsmen. Seven states (Arizona, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York)
13.

As indicated by some judges and attorneys who attended the
March 18 regional meeting of the Legislative Council Committee
on the Administration of Justice.
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were found to have such legislation.
state law is presented below:14

A summary analysis of each

Arizona
,..

...

.•

Arizona requires only that each professional bondsman
.
(other than a surety company) be registered with the clerk of the
superior court •
Connecticut
This act requires that each professional bondsman be
licensed by the state and includes other regulations.

►

,.

.

Bondsmen Licensed. Any person who makes bail in five or
more criminal cases, whether for compensation or not, must be
licensed.
Licensing Aythority. The state police commissioner is
charged with the licensing and regulation of professional bondsmen.
Qualifications. Each applicant must make a sworn statement
which contains the following:
a list of assets and liabilities
applicant's fingerprints and photo
proof of sound moral character
proof of financial responsibility
statement that applicant has never been
convicted of a felony

,.

,.
,.

. ::

The commissioner may deny or suspend a license if any of
the above are not truthfully provided •

,.

License Fee.

""
"'

The license fee is $100.

Maximum Bond Fees. First $100 of bond -- $5 fee;
$100 to $5,000 -- five per cent of bond amount; over $5,000
2.5 per cent of bond amount.

"'

•

Annual Report. Each bondsman must submit an annual report
to the commission showing: 1) the number of bonds handled;
2) amount of bonds; and 3) the fees charged •

•
•

Penalty. For violation of any of the above laws, sentence
may be $1,000 fine and/or two year~ in jail •

,.
,.

•

Florida

This state has the most comprehensive regulations of the
states which h~ve such laws.
14.

.

Except for Georgia, for which current Gtatutes were not available •

-

['.
l "'.).)

-

Bondsmen Licens • The state licenses sureties, bail
bondsmen, and runners who are leg men for professional bondsmen).
Licensing Authority. The state treasurer is the designated
insurance commissioner and enforces 'the law regulating bondsmen and
runners.
Qualifications for Bondsmen. Each applicant for a license
must take an examination administered by the commissioner of
insurance. In addition, he must show the following qualifications:
21 years of age
citizen and resident for six months
experience in bonding business by previous employment
or completion of correspondence course
high moral character
a detailed financial report
the rating plan the applicant will use (bond fees)
License Fee.

•
'

The license fee in Florida is $10.

Annual Report. Once a year the professional bondsman must
file a statement of his assets and liabilities and must list every
bond forfeiture.
Penalty. Any violation of law may be punished by $500 fine
and/or six months in jail.

••

Other. Several specific prohibitions are made in the law
pertaining to the conduct of bondsmen, including:
(a)

(d)

.

Bondsmen may not advise employment of a particular
attorney.
Bondsmen may not solicit business in court.
Bondsmen may not pay any fee to a jailer, attorney,
policeman or public official.
,
No bond agency may hold itself out as a surety company.

Ma§sachusetts
Bondsmen are required to register, but are subject to very
few regulations; they are regulated by the local courts.
Bondsmen Registered. All bondsmen, other than surety
companies, who make bond on five or more occasions must be
registered.
Registering Authority. Each bondsman must register with
and be approved by the superior court (similar to Colorado's
county court) and be subject to the rules of the court.

•
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Monthly Report. A 1959 amendment to the Massachusetts law
requires each bondsman to submit a monthly report to the chief judge
of each superior court showing the bail or surety, defendant's name,
offense charged, and fee charged on each case bonded for that month~

7.

P~nalt
Any violation of Massachusetts law is subject to
$1,000 fine and or one year in jail.
New Hampshire

...

.

...

The law requires registration of all bondsmen and makes them
subject to limitations on the fees that may be charged •
· Bondsmen Reatstgred. All professional bondsmen who receive
compensation for making ail must register •
Registering Authority. The clerk of the superior court
registers and administers an oath of financial responsibility to
each bondsman.

I"'""

the fee.

Registration Fee.

The clerk of each superior court sets

Maximum Fees. Professional bondsmen are prohibited from
charging more than five per cent of the amount of bail and in no
instance can charge more than $100 for a bond.

,..
,.

Penalty. Failure to comply with any of the above requirements may result in a $100 fine or 30 days in jail.
New York
New York has a rather rigid set of license requirements for
bondsmen.

I ,-

Bondsmen Licensed. Any person other than a surety company
who makes bond on more than two occasions within a two-month period
must be licensed.
Licensing Authority. The superintendent of insurance
licenses and regulates all professional bail bondsmen.
#

,.

~.,.

r

,.

Qyalific~tion§. Each applicant must submit to a written
examin-ation over any phase of the bonding business administered by
the superintendent of insurance. In addition, each applicant must
show proof of good character and reputation.
Qualification Bond. Each applicant must post a $5,000
bond in order to do business in New York State.·
License Fee. Examination fee of $5 and a license fee of
$25 is charged to applicants.

.,,
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Other. The superintendent of insurance may suspend or
revoke such licenses for any "fraudulent or dishonest conduct"
after due notice and opportunity for,hearing is given the licensee.

•

Sygg~§t~g Legislation· for Colorado
Proposed legislation for regulating bail bondsmen in
Colorado has been drafted for consideration along with other
subjects to be included in a major revision of the criminal code.
An outline of this proposed legislation follows:
'

Professional

Bond9men to be

Licensed

This provision is patterned after the law in Connecticut which
requires any person who makes a business of furnishing bail in criminal
cases to be licensed as a professional bondsman. It also requires
any person who furnishes bond in five or more criminal cases to be
licensed; this provision allows a person to occasionally furnish bail
for a friend or relative without being required to register as a
professional bondsman. Surety companies are exempted because their
bonding a~tivities are already regulated.

A

•

Department of Insurance Vested with Enforcement
The department of insurance is suggested as the authority to
enforce the provisions of this article. This is done in at least one
other state (New York). However, other state agencies that might be
qualified to enforce this bill are the department of state and the
office of judicial administrator.
License Application, Qualification Bond, and Forfeiture
The applicant for a professional bondsman's license is
required to provide certain information to the department of
insurance. Persons who have been convicted of a felony or crime
of moral turpitude and persons who are engaged in law enforcement
are prohibited from doing business as a professional bondsman
(as is required in the laws of Connecticut, Florida, and New York).
Each applicant is also required to post a $5,000 qualification
bond with the department of insurance as proof of his financial responsibility. Under present law, the attorney general must initiate civil
action in order to collect the amount due on a defaulted bond. The
provisi6n in the proposed bill requiring a $5,000 qualification bond
insures the court against loss on a bond issued by a professional
bondsman. If a bond issued by a professional bondsman is declared
forfeited and not p~id within a reasonable time, the court may order
the department of insurance to declare the qualification bond of
such professional bondsman to be forfeited. In addition, the
department is authorized to suspend the license of a professional
bondsman until such time as the bondsman posts a new qualification
bond.

' '

•

: >!

I

'
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The license fees of the states which regulate professional
bondsmen vary considerably (from $10 in New York to $100 in
Connecticut); a $50 fee was Gelected as an arbitrary figure between
these extremes. While no estimate is available on the number of
bondimen in this gtate, the $50 fee should provide most of the co~t
of adminigtering the act •
Annual Report§ Reguireg

...

'

,.

In order to detect fraudulent activity on the part of a
professional bondsman, provision is made for annual reports to the
department of insurance. Such reports will provide the department
with suffici~nt information to investigate properly any suspicious
activities on the part of a professional bondsman •

..

Denial, Suspension, Revocation, and Refusal to Renew

...

The department is authorized to deprive a professional
bondsman of his license for misrepresentations made to the department,
fraudr or dishonest business activity.

...
•

License Fee

License

Notice to Courts of Names of Bondsmen
ThiG provision requires the department of insurance to
provide all courts of the state with the names of professional
bondsmen lic~nsed under the act. Courts are prohibited from accepting
bond from a profesGional bondsman unless such bondsman is licensed
under the act.

,.

,.
,..

Maximum Cgmmi•ssion or. Fee
:.

,.
'\'I.

""
...

•

-.

"'

Prohibited Activities -- Penalties

,.

..
.

~

"""

Since professional bondsmen are in a position to charge
unreasonable fees, a maximum commission would be set by statute.
Connecticut limits bond fees to five per cent of any bond up to
$5,000 and 2.5 per cent of bond amounts in excess of $5,000.
New Hampshire limits professional bondsmen fees to five per cent
of the amount of bail, not to exceed $100. It is proposed that
bond fees be limited to 10 per cent· on the fir.~t, $100 of bail
furnished, five per cent on the amount of bail furnished up to
$5,000, and not more than 2.5 per cent of the amount of bail in
excess of $5~000. As an alternative to establishing maximum fees,
each professional bondsman could be required to submit a schedule
of his bail bond fees to the enforcing agency (as is provided in
the Florida law) •

Several prohibited activitieG for professional bondsmen are
enumerated ~nd criminal penalties provided; these activities are
similar to those contained in the laws of Florida and Connecticut •

.

,

~,

-

.l.59 -

This provision also prescribes a criminal penalty for one who attempts
to act as a professional bondsman under the act without a license.
Penalty for Violation

of

.,

Bond Conditio~s

It would be unlawful for a person to "jump bond." Bond jumping
is similar to theft in that it deprives another person of his property.
It was thought that this provision might give some measure of protection to professional bondsmen.

•

.
•·

•

••

•

•
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APPENDIX A
JUDICIAL ARTICLE
CONSTITUTION OF ALASKA
Article IV1

-

The Judiciary

Judicial Power and Jurisdiction.

.

SECTION 1. The judicial power of the State is vested
in a supreme court, a superior court, and the courts established
by the legislature. The jurisdiction of courts shall be
prescribed by law. The courts shall constitute a unified
judicial system for operation and administration. Judicial
districts shall be established by law •

►

.

Supreme Court •.

-

SECTION 2. The supreme court shall be the highest court
of the State, with final appellate jurisdiction. It shall
consist of three justices, one of whom is chief justice. The
number of justices may be increased by law upon the request
of the supreme court.
Superior Court.

,.._

,..

SECTION 3. The superior court shall be the trial court
of general jurisdiction and shall consist of five judges. The
number of judges may be changed by law.

,._
~

,..

Qualification§ of Justices and Judges .

...
,.

•

•

.
,.

SECTION 4. Supreme court justices and superior court
judges shall be citizens of the United States and of the State,
licensed to practice law in the State, and possessing any
additional qualifications prescribed by law. Judges of other
courts shall be selected in a manner, for terms, and with
qualifications prescribed by law .
Nomination and Appointment.
SECTION 5. The governor shall fill any vacancy in an
office of supreme court justice or superior ccurt judge by
appointing one of two or more persons nominated by the judicial
council.

...
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· Approval or Rejection.
SECTION 6. Each supreme court justice and superior court
judge shall, in the manner provided by law, be subject to
approval or rejection on a nonpartisan ballot at the first
general election held more than three years after his appointment. Thereafter, each supreme court justice shall be subject
to approval or rejection in a like manner every tenth year,
and each superior court judge, every sixth year.
Vacancy.
SECTION 7. The office of dny supreme court justice or
superior court judge becomes vacant ninety days after the
election at which he is rejected by a majority of those voting
on the question, or for which he fails to file his declaration
of candidacy to succeed. himself.
Judicial Council.
SECTION 8. The judicial council shall consist of seven
members. Three attorney members shall be appointed for sixyear terms by the governing body of the organized state bar.
Three non-attorney members shall be appointed for six-year
terms by the governor subject to confirmation by a majority of
the members of the legislature in joint session. Vacancies
shall be filled fbr the unexpired term in like manner. Appointments shall be made with due consideration to area representation
and without regard to political affiliation. The chief justice
of the supreme court shall be ex officio the seventh member
and chairman of the judicial council. No member of the
judicial council, except the chief juctice, may hold any other
office or position of profit under the United States or the
State. The judicial council shall act by concurrence of
four or more members and according to rules which it adopts.

-~

Additional Duties.
SECTION 9. The judicial council shall conduct studies
for improvement of the administration of justice, and make
reports and recommendations to the supreme court and to the
legislature at intervals of not more than two years. The
judicial council ~hall perform other duties assigned by law.

.,

- 162 -

•

Incapacity of Judges.
SECTION 10. Whenever the judicial council certifies to
the governor that a supreme court justice appears to be so
incapacitated as substantially to prevent him from performing
his judicial duties, the governor shall appoint a board of
three persons to inquire intQ the circumstances, and may on
the board's recommendation retire the justice. Whenever a judge
of another court appears to be so incapacitated as substantially
--to prevent him from performing his judicial duties, the judicial
council shall recommend to t~e supreme court that the judge
be place under ~arly retirement. After not!ce and hearing,
the supreme court by majority vote of its members may retire
the judge.
Retirement.
SECTION ll. Justices and judges shall be retired at
the age of seventy except as provided in this article. The
basis and amount of retirement pay shall be prescribed by law.
Retired judges shall render no further service on the bench
except for special assignments as provided by court rule.
Impeachment.
SECTION 12. Impeachment of any justice or judge for
malfeasance or 'misfeasance in the performance of his official
duties shall be according to procedure prescribed for civil
officers.

~

~

f

~

-

~

~

Compensation.

~

~

~

l

~

~

•

SECTION 13. Justices, judges, and members of the judicial
council shall receive compensation as prescribed by law. Compensation of justices and judges shall not be diminished during
their terms of offiGe, unle~s by general law applying to all
salaried officers of the State .

•

-

t

r•
~

~
~

,

A

~
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Restrictions.
SECTION 14. Supreme court justices and superior court
judges while holding office may not practice law, hold office
in a political party, or hold any other office or position of
profit under the United States, the State, or its political
subdivisions. Any supreme court justice or superior court
judge filing for another elective public office forfeits his
judicial position.

'

~

~

~
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Rule-Making Power.
SECTION 15. The supTeme cou~t shall make and promulgate
rules governing the administration of all courts. It shall
make and promulgate rules governing practice and procedure
in civil and criminal cases in all courts. These rules may be
changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members
elected to each house.
Court Administration.
SECTION 16. The chief justice of the supreme court shall
be the_administrative head of all courts. He may assign
judges from one court or division thereof to another for temporary service. The chief justice shall, with the approval of
the supreme court, appoint an administrative director to serve
at his pleasure and to supervise the administrative operations
of the judicial system.

·-

•
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APPENDIX B
JUDICIAL ARTICLE
CONSTITUTION OF HAWAII
Judicial Power.
SECTION 1.

The judicial power of the State shall be vested

:i:n one supreme court, circuit courts, and in such inferior courts

~.

as the legislature may from time to time establish. The· several
courts shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as provided
by law.
Supreme Court.
SECTION 2. The supreme court shall consist of a chief
justice and four associate justices. When necessary, the chief
justice shall assign a judge or judges of a circuit court to
serve temporarily on the supreme court. In case of a vacancy
in.the office of chief justice, or if he is ill, absent or otherwise unable to serve, an associate justice designated in accordance
with the rules of the supreme court shall serve temporarily in
his stead.
~
Appointment of Judges.
SECTION 3. The governor shall nominate and, by and with
the advice and consent of the senate, appoint the justices of the
supreme court and the judges of the circuit courts. No nomination
shall be sent to the senate, and no interim appointment shall
be made when the senate is not in session, until after ten
days' public notice by the governor.
Qualifications.

•
•

No justice or judge shall hold any other office or position
of profit under the State or the United States. No person shall
be eligible to such office who shall not have been admitted to
practice law before the supreme court of this State for at least
ten years. Any justice or judge who shall become a candidate
for an elective office shall thereby forfeit his office.

'
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Tenure - Compensation - Retirement - Removal
f

The term of office of a justice of the supreme court shall
be seven years and that of a judge of a circuit court shall be
six years. They shall receive for their services such compensation
as may .be presribed by law, which shall not be diminished during
their respective terms of office, unless by general law applying
to all salaried officers of the State. They shall be retired
upon attaining the age of seventy years. They shall be included
in aoy retirement law of the State. They shall be subject to
removal from office upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the
membership of each house of the legislature, sitting in joint
'session, for such causes and in such manner as may be provided
by law.
Retirement for Incapacity.
SECTION 4. Whenever a commission or agency, authorized
by law_for such purpose, shall certify to the governor that any
,justice of the supreme court or judge of a circuit court appears
to be so incapacitated as substantially to prevent him from
performing his judicial duties, the governor shall appoint a board
of three persons to inquire into the circumstances and on their
recommendation the governor may retire the justice or judge from
office.

·•

Administration.
SECTION 5. The chief justice of the supreme court shall
be the administrative head of the courts. He may assign judges
from one circuit court to another for temporary service. With
_the approval of the supreme court he shall appoint an administrative director to serve at his pleasure.
Rules.
SECTION 6. The supreme court shall have power to promulgate
rules and regulations in all civil and criminal cases for all
courts relating to process, practice, procedure and appeals, which
shall have the force and effect of law.

•
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APPENDIX C
NUMBER OF DISTRICT AND COUNTY JUDGES REQUIRED
UNDER THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

...
...

.

..,.

The proposed transfer of county court probate, juvenile,
and mental health jurisdiction to the district courtsl would
require 28 additionel di1trict judges, if present judicial district
goundaries are retained.2 This total includes two district
judges recommended by the committee immediately for the 2nd
District (Denver), four judges who may be needed anyway in the
near future because of increased district court business, and
two judges who might not be needed necessarily because of
consolidated case loads, but who have been added to provide better
judicial service and at least two judges in each judicial district.
The following table shows the present number of district
judges in each judicial district and the number of additional
judges required under the proposed amendment:

.._

.,.,

.

, _

,.

.

-

Judicial
District

Present
No. of
Judges

Additional
Judges
Reguired

191.tl

3

1st
2nd

10

1
2

4
12

3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th

1
4
1
2
2

1
2
1
1
3

2
6
2
3
5

8th
9th
10th

3
1
2

3
1
2

6
2
4

11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th

1
2
2
1
1
1
2a

1
1
2
1
1
1
2

2
3

18th

2a

2

4

41 8

28

69

Total

Comments
addition recommended because of increase
in district court business
addition to make 2-judge district
including one judge who may be needed
shortly anyway
including one judge who may be needed
shortly anyway

4

2
2
2
4

addition to make 2-judge district
including one judge who may be needed
shortly anyway
including one judge who may be needed
shortly anyway

w

a As of January, 1961 •

.
1 Except in Denver (2nd District).
2 Based on present case load data and anticipated increases •
...
.,_
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Consideration of Judicial Boundary Changes
Several factors should be considered in evaluating the
adequacy of present judicial distritt boundaries and proposed
changes following expansion of di$trict court jurisdiction. Where
possible, as justified by increased case loads~ districts should
be reduced in size. The possibility of establishing one-county
districts in the larger Class II counties should be examined.
The exceptions would include those large counties with small
counties immediately adjacent, which because of geography or
limited judicial business could not be appended to any other
district. Attention should be directed as well to realigning
districts (if compatible with case load) to encompass homogeneous
geographic areas and to eliminate mountain passes and other
travel impediments.
All districts should have at least two judges under
the proposed plan. With two judges in multi-county, less
populous districts, better judicial service could be provided
and travel time reduced. In such districts, the judges could
have cases assigned either according to the type of case or the
county of filing, whichever method provides the most efficient
administration of justice. In the eight districts (aside from
Denver) where the total number of district judges would be four
or more, it would be possible to have at least one judge for each
division of the court, such as probate, civil, criminal, and family.

,

·•

County Court Judges
New county court jurisdiction, which would be provided
by statute pursuant to the proposed amendment, would require
at least one additional county judge in 12 counties, because of
case load and/or geography. The estimated total number of county
judges required would be 84. Counties where additional judges are
expected to be needed include:

>

• ;I,
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County

...

.

.

No. of
Additional
Judges

Adams

3

Arapahoe

3

Boulder
Denver
El Paso
Garfield

3
2

Jefferson
Larimer

3
2

Mesa
Montrose

2
2

Pueblo
Weld

3
2

Total

31

2

4a

Comments
possibly located in Thornton, Brighton,
and Aurora
possibly located in Littleton, Englewood,
and Aurora
possibly located in Boulder and Longmont
one located outside of Colorado Springs
geographic considerations: judges in
Glenwood Springs and Rifle
possibly located in Fort Collins and
Loveland
geographic considerations: judges in
Montrose and Nucla

J-,

a In addition to present superior court judge

,.

At present, there are 41 district judges, 63 county
judges, one juvenile judge, one superior court judge, and
approximately 275 justices of the peace. Under the proposed
judicial reorganization there would be initially 69 district
judges, one probate judge, one juvenile judge, and 83 county
judges •

.

,

.
...

,,
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APPENDIX D
CO,IPARISON OF JUDICIAL ARTICLE AND PROPOSED AMENDMENT
PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE
Section 1. Vestment of judicial power.-The judicial power of the state as to all
matters of law and equity. except as in the
constitution otherwise provided. shall be
vested in the supreme court, district courts,
county courts. and such other courts as may
be provided by law. In counties and cities
and counties having a population exceeding
100,000. exclusive original jurisdiction in
cases involving minors and persons whose
offenses concern minors may be vested in a
separate court now or hereafter established
by law.

....
ci

Section 2. Appellate jurisdiction.-' The supreme court, except as otherwise provided in this constitution. shall have
appellate jurisdiction only. which shall be
coextensive with the state, and shall have
a general superintending control over all
inferior courts, under such regulations and
limitations as may be prescribed by law.

.

_

.

PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT

Cotn.lENTS

Section 1. Vestment .Qi judicial power.
The judicial power of the state shall be vested
in a supreme court, district courts, a probate
court in the city and county of Denver, a
juvenile court in the city and county of Denver,
county courts, and such other courts or judicial
officers with jurisdiction inferior to the
supreme court, as the g.eneral assembly may,
from time to time establish; provided, however,
that nothing herein contained shall be construed to restrict or diminish the powers of
home rule cities and towns granted under
Article XX, Section 6 of this constitution
to create municipal and police courts.

The proposed amendment eliminates justice
of the peace courts as constitutional courts.
While county courts retain constitutional
status, their jurisdiction would be limited
generally to that of present justice courts.
except that the limit in civil cases would
be set by law. Denver would also have a county
court to handle minor state jurisdiction instead
of the Denver municipal court as at present.
(See Sections 14 and 15 for more detailed provisions re: county courts.) The proposed
amendment would also create a probate court
and a juvenile court as constitutional courts
in the city and county of Denver. Certain
jurisdiction of the present Denver county court
would be transferred to the probate court, as
provided in Section 9 (3) of the amendment. A
clause has been added to insure no interference
with the constitutional authosity given home
rule cities to create municipal or police courts •

Section 2. Appellate jurisdiction.
(1) The supreme court, except as otherwise
provided in this constitution, shall have
appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be
coextensive with the state, and shall have
a general superintending control over all
inferior courts, under such regulations and
limitations as may be prescribed by law.
(2) Appellate review by the supreme
court of every final judgment Qf the district
courts, the probate court of the city and
county of Denver, and the juvenile court of
the city and county of Denver shall be allowed,
and the supreme court shall have such other
appellate review as may be provided by law.
No appeal shall lie to the district court
from any final judgment of the probate court
of the city and county of Denver or of the
juvenile court of the city and county of
Denver.

The proposed amendment adds a paragraph to
Section 2, which provides for appellate review
by the supreme court from final judgments of the
district courts and Denver probate and juvenile
courts (not now provided in the judicial article).
Trials de novo in Denver are eliminated by providing that there is no appeal from the Denver
juvenile and probate courts to the district
courts. Supreme court review of county court
decisions would be as provided by law.

;
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT
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CQI.V,IENTS

Section 3. Original jurisdiction--opinions.-It shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus. quo warranto. certiorari, injunction, and
other original and remedial writs, with authority
to hear and determine the same: and each judge of
the supreme court shall have like power and authority as to writs of habeas corpus. The supreme
court shall give its opinion upon important
questions upon solemn occasions when required
by the governor, the senate, or the house of
representatives: and all such opinions shall be
published in connection with the reported decisions of said court •

Section 3. Original jurisdiction--opinions.
The supreme court shall have power to issue writs
of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, injunction, and such other original and
remedial writs as may be provided by rule of court
with authority to hear and determine the same; and
each judge of the supreme court shall have like
power and authority as to writs of habeas corpus.
The supreme court shall give its opinion upon
important questions upon solemn occasions when
required by the governor, the senate, or the
house of representatives; and all such opinions
shall be published in connection with the reported decisions of said court.

Section 4. Terms.--At least two terms of
the supreme court shall be held each year, at
the seat of government.

Section 4. Terms.--At least two terms of
the supreme court shall be held each year, at
the seat of government.

Section 5. Personnel of court--departments.--The supreme court shall consist of
seven judges, who may sit en bane or in two
or more dep=tments as the court may, from
time to time. determine. In case said court
~ shall sit in departments, each of said depart... ments shall have the full power and authority
of said court in the determination of causes,
the issuing of writs and the exercise of all
powers authorized by this constitution, or
provided by law, subject to the general control of the court sitting fill bane, and such
rules and regulations as the court may make,
but no decision of any department shall become the judgment of the court unless
concurred in by at least three judges, and
no case involving a construction of the
constitution of this state or of the
United States shall be decided except by
the court fill bane.

Section 5. Personnel of court--depaftments. The supreme court shall consist o not
less than seven justices, who may sit e n ~
or in departments. In case said court shall
sit in departments, each of said departments
shall have full power and authority of said
court in the determination of causes. the
issuing of writs and the exercise of all
powers authorized by this constitution, or
provided by law, subject to the general control of the court sitting~ bane, and such
rules and regulations as the court may make,
but no decision of any department shall become judgment of the court unless concurred
in by at least three justices, and no case
involving construction of the constitution
of this state or of the United States shall
be decided except by the court~ bane. Upon
request of the supreme court, the number of
justices may be increased to no more than nine
members whenever two-thirds of the members of
each house of the general assembly concur
therein. The court shall provide by rule for
the manner of selecting a chief justice from
among the court membership, who shall preside
at all sessions of the court.

The proposed amendment provides that the
general assembly may increase the number of
supreme court justices from ~even to nine upon
two-thirds vote, if such increase is requested
by the supreme court. This 1ast clause was
added to insure that no incr~ase would_be made _
in the size of the court, if the court:ct,jected.
The supreme court is oiven authority to-make
its own rules for selection of a chief justice.
At present, the supreme court justice with
the shortest time to serve oot holding
his office by appointment ~r election to
fill a vacancy, serves as chief justice
as provided in the present section 8 of
the judicial article.

Section 6. Election of justices.--The
justices of the supreme court shall be
elected by the electors of the state at
large. Vacancies shall be filled as
provided in Section 20 of this article.

This section in the pro~osed amendment is very similar to Section 6 in the
present judicial article.

Section 6. Election of judges.--The
judges of the supreme court, except as
herein provided, shall be elected by the
electors of the state at large.

Section 3 of the proposed amendment is
similar to Section 3 of the present judicial
article except for two changes. •The supreme
court" has been substituted for "It" in line
one. The phrase "as may be provided by rule
of court• was added to provide that the supreme
court shall define by rule those unspecified
original and remedial writs which it is
willing to entertain.
•

No change.

PRESEITT JUDICIAL ARTICLE
Section 7. Term of office.--The term of
office of the judges ofthe supreme court,
hereafter elected, except as in this article
otherwise provided. shall be ten years.

Section 8.

PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT

COWJI.Et.'TS

Section 7. Term of office. The term of
office of justices of the supreme court shall
be ten years, and justices of the supreme court
holding office on the effective date of this
constitutional amendment shall continue in
office for the remainder of the respective
term.for which they were elected or appointed.

The proposed amendment adds the provision that supreme court justices holding
office on the effective date of the amendment shall continue in office for the
remainder of their respective terms.

Appointment and election of

This section of the present judicial
article is repealed.

J..!!s!9il.--No successor of the judge of the court

of appeals whose term expires in April, 1905,
shall be appointed.
On the first Wednesday of April, 1905, the
court of appeals shall cease to exist, and the
judges of said court whose regular terms shall
not then have expired shall become judges of
the supreme court. All causes pending before
the court of appeals shall then stand transferred to, and be pending in, the supreme court,
and no bond or obligation given in any of said
causes shall be affected by said transfer.
The term of office of that judge of the
supreme court whose term expires on the second
,-. Tuesday in January, 1907, shall so expire; the
;:; term of office of that judge transferred from
the court of appeals whose term shall expire in
April, 1907, shall expiTe on the second Tuesday
in January, 1907; and the term of office of
that judge of the supreme court whose term
expires in January, 1910, is hereby extended
to the seCQnd Tuesday in January, 1911; and
tile term of office of the judge or judges
transferred· from the court of appeais whose
term would expire in April, 1909, shall
expire on the second Tuesday in January, 1909;
and the term of office of the judge of the
supreme court.whose term expires on the second
Tuesday in January, 1913, shall so expire.
At the general election in the year 1906
and every tenth year thereafter, there shall be
elected two judges of the supreme court.
At the general election in the year 1908,
there shall be elected three judges of the
supreme court, one for the term of six years,
and two for the term of ten years.
At the general election in the year 1910
and every tsnth year thereafter, there shall be
elected Orte judge of the supreme court.
At the general election in the year 1912 and
every tenth year thereafter, there shall be
elected one judge of the supreme court.
At the general election in the year 1914 and
every tenth year thereafter, there shall be
elected one judge of the supreme court.
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT

Section 8. Continued:
At the general election io the year 1918 and
every tenth year thereafter, there shall be elected
two judges of the supreme court.
Provided, that if said court of appeals shall
at the time of the going into effect of this amendment, by law consist of only three judges, the
governor shall nominate and by and with the advice
and consent of the senate appoint two judges of
the supreme court whose terms of office shall
begin on the first Wednesday of April, 1905, and
expire on the second Tuesday of January, 1909.
Provided also, that nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent the general assembly
from changing the time of electing judges of the
supreme court and frOlll extending or abridging ·
their terms of offi~e as provided in Art. VI,
Section 15 of the constitution of this state.
The judge having the shortest time to
serve, not holding his office by appointment or
election to fill vacancy, shall be the chief
justice.
Of the two judges whose terms of office
'.::; expire upon the same day, the younger in years
~ of the two judges shall be chief justice during
, the next to the last year of his term of office
and the elder of the two judges shall be chief
justice during the last year of his term of
office.
The chief justice shall preside at all
sessions of ~he court !!l bane, and, in case
of his absence. then the judge present who
would next be entitled to become chief justice
shall preside.
Until otherwise provided by law, the
supreme court shall have power to review the
judgments and proceedings of inferior courts,
in such instances and in such manner as was
provided by law previous to the act establishing the court of appeals.
Section 9. Clerk of supreme court.-There shall be a clerk of the supreme court,
who shall be appointed by the judges thereof,
and shall hold his office during the pleasure
of said judges, and whose duties and emoluments shall be as prescribed by law and by
the rules of the supreme court.

This section is not included in the
proposed amendment, as the position is
provided for by statute.

t,

PRESEITT JUDICIAL ARTICLE
Section 10. Qualifications of jfdqes.-person shall be eligible to the of ice of
judge of the supreme court unless he be le~rned
in the law: be at least thirty years of age
and a citizen of the United States, nor unless
he shall have resided in this state or territory at least two years next preceding his
election.

No

Section 11. Jurisdiction.--The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all causes both at law and in equity, and
such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law. They shall have original
jurisdiction to determine a 11 controversies
, upon relation of any person on behalf of the
..,. people, concerning the rights, duties and
~ liabilities of railroad, telegraph or toll~ road companies or corpcnations.

It-
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT

CCJQ.fENTS

Section 8. Qualifications of Justices. No
person shall be eligible to the office of justice
of the supreme court unless he shall be a qualified elector of the state of Colorado and shall
have been licensed to practice law in this state
for at least five years.

Section 8 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 10 of the present judicial
article, with the qualifications for the
office of supreme court justice changed.
The 30-year age minimum i1 eliminated and
the qualification as to legal training is
increased. The present qualification is
that a supreme court justice be learned in
the law. The proposed amendment change~~
this· to. ,•have been lic;eoM!Cl -to"'I>ractice law
in this stat&-. for at least five years.•
The present provision includes two-year res·idency in the state among the qualifications.
The proposed amendment stipulates that a
qualified elector shall be eligible without
the two-year requirement.

Section 9. District courts--jurisdiction.
(1) The district courts shall be trial courts
of record with general jurisdiction, and shall
have original jurisdiction in all civil, probate,
and criminal cases, except as otherwise provided herein, and shall have such appellate
jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law.
(2) Effective the second Tuesday in
January, 1965, all causes pending before the
county court in each county, except those
causes within the jurisdiction of the county
court as provided by law, and except as provided in SubNction (3) of this section, shall
then be transferred to and pending in the
district court of such county, and no bond or
obligation given in any of said causes shall
be affected by said transfer.
(3) In the city and county of Denver,
exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters
of prabate, &ettlemenu of estate.s of deceaed
per sons, apl),9i:nt111ent of guardians, conservators
and administrators, and settlement of their
accounts, the adjudication of the mentally ill,
and such other jurisdiction as may be provided
by law shall be vested in a probate court,
created by Section 1 of this article, and to
which court all of such jurisdiction of the
county court of the city and county of Denver
shall be transferred, including all pending
cases and matters effective on the second
Tuesday of January, 1965.

Section 9 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 11 of the present judicial
article. It confers upon the district
court all original jurisdiction, with
certain exceptions, in line with t!N!
changed jurisdiction of county courts and
elimination of justice courts~

(

'IJ

,,

,

)'7
•

j

..

"

-=

"

., -•

PRES!Jff JUDICIAL ARTICLE
Section 12, Judicial districts--term of
judges.--The ,~ate shall be d~vided i n ~ judicial di,tri~ts, in each of which ther~
sh~~! be elected by the electors thereof, one
or lllff• judges of the district court therein,
as m~y Qe provided by law. whose term of
offise shall be six years; the judges of the
ijistiict-courts may hold courts for each
other, and shall do so when required by law,
and the general assembly may by law provide
for the selection or election of a suitable
person to preside in the trial of causes in
~pecial cases.
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT
Section 10. Judicial districts--district
. judges. (1) The state shall be divided into
judicial districts. Such districts shall be
formed of compact territory and be bounded by
county lines. The judicial districts as provided by law on-the effective date of this
1,.-_
~mendment stiall constitute the judicial districts
of_the state until changed. The general,assembly
_ may by law, whenever two-thirds of the members of
each house concur therein, change.the boundaries
of-any district or increase or diminish the number of judicial districts.
·
(2) In each judicial district there shall
be elected by.the electors thereof one or more
judges of the district court. The term of
office of a district judge shall be six years
and district judges holding office on the·
.. , effective date of this constitutional amendment
·-- ·shall continue in office for the remainder of
· the respective terms for which they were
elected or appointed. Vacancies shall be
filled as provided in Section 20 of this
article.
(3) The number of district judges provided by law for each district on the effectiva date of this amendment shall constitute
the number of judges for the district until
changed. The general assembly may by law,
whenever two-thirds of the members of each
house concur therein, increase or diminish
the number of district judges, except that
the office of a district judge may not be
abolished until completion of the term for
which he was elected or appointed, but he
may be required to serve in a judicial district
other than the one for which elected, as long
as such district encompasses his county of
residence.
(4) S~parate divisions of district
eourts may be established in districts by
law, Q~ in the absence of any such law, by
rule of c;aurt.
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COMMENTS
This section replaces Sections 12,
13, 14, and 15 of the present judicial
article. It provides for election of
district judges in the same way as is
provided in Section 12 of the present
judicial article. Proposed Section 10
also provides that separate divisions of
the district court in any district may be
established by law, or in the absence of
any such law, by majority vote of the
judges in any such district.
The judicial districts are not
enumerated as in Section 13 of the present
judicial article. Instead, Section 10
states that the judicial districts as provided by law upon the effective date of the
amendment shall constitute the judicial
districts of the state. Section 14 of
the present judicial article ~rovides that
no change in j~dicial district boundaries
shall cause the removal of any judge during
the time for which he shall have been
elected or appointed. This provision is
also incorporated in the proposed Section 10.
An additional phrase has been added to
Subsection (3) to provide that a judge may
be required to finish his term in a district
other than the one in which he was elected
as long as it encompasses his county of
residence. This makes it possible to
change judicial district boundaries during
a judge's term of office. This provision
is necessary because without it the possibility of staggered terms would ma"lce it
impossible to change judicial district
boundaries.

PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT

PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE

CCM,!ENTS

Section 13. Judicial districts.--Until
otherwise provided by law, said districts
shall be four in number, and tonstituted as
follows, viz:
·
First District--The counties of Boulder.
Jefferson, Gilpin. Clear Creek. Summit and
Grand. ·
Second District--The counties of Arapahoe,
Douglas, Elbert, Weld and Larimer.
Third District--The counties of Park.
El Paso. Fremont, Pueblo, Bent, Las Animas and
Huerfano.
Fourth District--The counties of Costilla,
Conejos, Rio Grande, San Juan, La Plata,
Hinsdale. Saguache and Lake.

This section of the present article
is repealed, and judicial district composition is covered in Section 10 of the
proposed amendment.

Section 14. Number of districts
increased or diminI'stied':" ..,.he general assembly
may (whenever two-thirds of the members of each
house concur therein) increase or diminish the
number of judges for any district, or increase
or diminish the number of judicial districts
and the judges thereof. Such districts shall
' be formed of compact territory, and be bounded

The provisions of Section 14 of the
present judicial article are covered in
Section 10 of the proposed amendment.

~

~~~~~! t~n~~! ~~n~~~~e!n~fe:s~is~!r~~u:~:~i
, not work the removal of any judge from his
office during the time for which he shall have
been elected or appointed.

~:

The provisions of Section 15 of the
present judicial article are covered in
Section 10 above of the proposed amendment.
Present Section 15 provides that the terms
of all district judges shall expire on the
same day. This provision is eliminated
from Section 10 of the proposed amendment,
because proposed Section 20 concerning the
filling of vacancies provides that a
·
successor elected after a vacancy is
filled shall be elected for a full term,
rather than for the remainder of the term
in which the vacancy was created.

Section 15. Election of jud vs--term.-The judges of the district court irstelected
shall be chosen at the first general election.
The general assembly may provide that after the
year eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, the
election of the judges of the supreme court,
district and county courts, and the district
attorneys, or any of them, shall be on a
different day from that on which an election
is held for any other purpose, and for that
purpose may extend or abridge the term of
office of any such officers then holding, but
not in any case more than six months. Until
otherwise provided by law. such officers shall
be elected at the time of holding the general
elections. The term of office of all_judges
of the district court, elected in the several
districts throughout the stat~, shall expire
on the same day; and the terms of office of
district attorneys elected in the several
districts throughout the state shall, in like
manner, expire on the same day.
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Section 16. Qualifications of district
~.--No person shall be eligible to the
office of district judge unless he be lea~ned
in the law. be at least thirty years old, and
a citizen of the United States, nor unless he
shall have resided in the state or territory
at least two years next preceding his election,
nor unless he shall, at the time of his election. be an elector within the judicial district
for which he is elected; provided, that at the
first election, any person of the requisite
age and learning. and who is an elector of the
territory of Colorado, under the laws thereof,
at the time of the adoption of this constitution. shall be eligible to the office of
judge of the district court of the judicial
district within which he is an elector.

Section 11. Qualifications of district
judges. No person shall be eligibie to the
office of district judge unless he shall be
a qualified elector of the judicial district
at the time of his election or selection and
shall have been licensed to practice law in
this state for five years. Each judge of the
district court shall be a resident of his
district during his term of office.

Section 11 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 16 of the present judicial
article. This section changes present
qualifications for the office of district
judge by eliminating the JO-year age minimum
and requiring admittance to the practice of
law in Colorado instead of being learned in
the law. Section 16 requires two-year
residence in Colorado. The proposed section
does not contain this provision; however, a
clause has been added requiring a district
judge to have been licensed to practice law
in Colora~o for five years--similar to the
qualifications for supreme court justice.

Section 17. Terms of court.--The time
of holding courts withinthe said district
shall be as provided by law, but at least
one term of the district court shall be held
annually in each county, except in such
counties as may be attached. for judicial
purposes. to another county wherein such
courts are so held, This shall not be
construed to prevent the holding of special
terms under such regulations as may be provided by law.

Section 12. Terms 2.f court. The time
of holding courts within the judicial districts
shall be as provided by rule of court, but at
least one term of the district court shall be
held annually in each county,

Section 12 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 17 of the present judicial
article and provides that terms of court
shall be established by court rule instead
of by statute.

Section 18. Compensation ,!!lg_ services
of ~.--Judges of courts of record shall
receive such compensation as may be provided
by law. w~ich may be increased or decreased
during their terms of office, and shall also
receive such-pension or retirement benefits
as may be provided by law. The supreme
court shall be open except on Sundays and
holidays during customary hours of court.
No judge of the district court or supreme
court shall accept nomination for any public
office other than judicial, the term of which
shall begin more than JO days before the end
of his term of office, without first resigning
from his judicial office, nor shall he engage
in the practice of law, nor shall he bold
office in a political party organization,
When called upon to act any county judge
admitted to the practice of law in the
state of Colorado may serve as district judge
in any district with full authority therein as
the judge of the district wherein he serves.

Section 18 of the present judicial
article is replaced by Section 18 of the
proposed amendment.

PR~SENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE

PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT

COMMENTS

Section 19. Clerk of district court.-There shall be a clerk orthe districtcourt
in each county wherein a term-is held, who
shall be appointed by the judge of .the
district. to hold his ofHce d~ing the
pleasure of the judge. His duties and compensation shall be as provided by law, arid
regulated by the rules of the.court.
.
Section 20. Jud~ '!!!Y ill!!!!!!!, when • .Until the general assem ly shall provide7i'ylaw
for fixino the terms of the courts aforesaid,
the judges of the sup%eme and district courts,
respectively. shall fix the terms thereof.
Section 21. ~lection--term--sala~y-gualifications. --There shall"""""E>"eelecte by the
qualified electors of each judicial district,
at the general election in the year nineteen
hundred and four, and every four years thereafte~. a district attorney.for such district,
whose term of office shall be four years, and
whose duties and salary or compensation,
, either from the fees or emoluments of his
~ office or from the general county fund, as
;::! shall be provided by law. .
No person shall be eligible to the office
' of district attorney who shall not, at the
time of his election. be at least twentyfive years of age and possess all the
qualifications of judges of the district·
courts. as provided in this article. The
tenn of office of the district attorneys
serving in the sever·a1 districts, at tt:ie
time of the adoption of this amendment, is
hereby ~tended to the second Tuesday of
January, in the year A.O. 1905.

These two sections are repealed in the
proposed amendment. Section 19 is eliminated
as the office of district court clerk is
provided by statute. Section 20 is eliminated as no longer being applicable. as it
is covered by Section 12 of the proposed
amendment.

Section 13. District attorneys--e\ection-term--salahy--guali£ications. In each Judicial
district t ere sfiiH be a district attorney
elected by the electors thereof. whose term of
office shall be four years. District attorneys
shall receive such salaries and perform such
duties as provided by law. No person shall be
eligible to the office of district attorney who
shall not, at the time of his election possess
all the qualifications of district court judges
as provided in this article. All district
attorneys holding office on the effective date
of this amendment shall continue in office for
the remainder of the respective terms for which
they were elected or appointed.

Sections 22 and 23 of the present
judicial article, which pertain to county
courts, would be repealed as of the second
Tuesday in January, 1965--tl\e time when
county courts would no longer have their
present jurisdiction. N- constitutional
provisions for county courts will be found
in Sections 14 and 15 below of the propo5ed
amendment.

Section 22. ~--jlect~on-~..!&l.!!!-~.--There shallbe e ecte at tnegeneral
election in each organized county in the year
nineteen hundred and four, and every four years
thereafter, a county judge, who shall be judge
of the county court of said county, whose term
of office shall be four years, itnd who shall be
paid such salary or compensat"ion, either from the
fees and emoluments of hls office Ol' from the
general county fund, as shall be p~ovided by law,
The term of office of the county judges
serving at the time of the adoption of this
am&ndment is hereby extended to the second
Tuesday of January in the year A.D. 1905.

,,.

" ,,,

Section 13 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 21 of the present judicial
article. The proposed section eliminates
reference to compensation from fees. as
this practice has not been followed for
several years. The language of the section
has also been simplified in its reference to
the selection and qualifications of district
attorneys and provides that district attorneys
must meet the same qualifications as district
judges.
•
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COA.MENTS

Sectio~ 23, CoYft of. record--lrfisdictioo-aeeeals--!!r!ll af m.--County CINr s shall be
courts of record and.shall have original jurisdiction in all matters af probate, settleinent of
estates of deceased persons. appointment of
gua-rdiam;.. conservrtor-s and a<tministtators, and
settlement of their a1:counts, and such other
eivil and criminal jurisdiction as may be conferred by law: provided, such courts $hall not
have jurisdiction in any case wtU!re the debt,
da1nage. or claim or value of property involved
shall exceed two thousand dollars, except in
cases relating to the estate of deceased persons.
Appeals may·be taken from county to disttict
courts. o-r to the supreme court, in such cases
and in such manner as may be prescribed by law.
Writs of error shall lie from the supreme court
to every final judgment of the county court. No
appeal shall lie to the district court from any
judg,nent given upon an appeal from a justice of
the peac-e.

;--

-.:

'°

Section 14. Probate court--iurisdiction-judges--election--term--gualifications. The
probate court of the city and county of Denver
shall have such jurisdiction as provided by
Section 9. Subsection (3) of this article. The
judge of the probate court of the city and county
of Denver shall have the same qualifications and
term of office as provided in this article for
district judges and shall be elected initially
by the qualified electors of the city and county
of Denver at the general election in the year
1964. Vacancies shall be filled as provided in
Section 20 of this article. The number of
judges of the probate court of the city and
county of Denver may be increased as provided
by law.

Section 14 of the proposed amendment
takes effect at the time present county
court jurisdiction is changed (although a
probate judge would be elected in 1%4)
and refers to the probate court of the
city and county of Denver. This court
is established as a constitutional court
by Section 1 of the proposed amendment.
and the probate court's jurisdiction is
covered by Section 9 (3) of the proposed
amendment. This section of the proposed
amendment pertains to the election, term,
and qualifications of the probate judge.
The provisions which apply to district
judges as to election. term, and qualifications are similar for probate judges.
In addition, proposed Section 14 makes
it possible to increase the number of
judges of the Denver Probate Court by
statute.

'

•

PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT

COMMENTS

Section 15, Juvenile court--iurisdiction-~--election--term--guaII1Tcations. The
juvenile court of the city and county of Denver
shall have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law, The judge of the juvenile court
of the city and county of Denver shall have the
same qualifications and term of office as
provided in this article for district judges
and shall be elected initially by the qualified electors of the city and county of Denver
at the general election in the year 1964.
Vacancies shall be filled as provided in
Section 20 of this article. The number of
judges of the juvenile court of the city
and county of Denver may be increased as
provided by law.

Section 15 of the proposed amendment
pertains to the selection, term. and
qualifications of the judge of the Denver
Juvenile Court {which is established as a
constitutional court in Section 1 of the
proposed amendment). This section also
does not take effect until the second
Tuesday in January, 1965, but a juvenile
judge will be elected in 1964. Election,
term, and qualifications for the juvenile
judge are the same as for the district and
probate judges. Proposed Section 15 makes
it possible to increase the number of
judges of the Denver Juvenile Court by
statute.

PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTIClE

This section is repealed, because
separate criminal courts in counties over
15,000 population are not needed and would
be contrary to the court consolidation
embodied in the proposed amendment.

Section 24. In what. coun.ties--jurisdiction.--The general assembly shall have
power to create and establish a criminal
court in each county having a population
exceeding fifteeri thousand. which court
, may have concurrent jurisdiction with the
disttiet courts in all criminal cases not
~o capital! the tei'nis of such courts to be as
provided by law,

This section is repealed, because it
refers to justice of the peace courts, which
are abolished by the proposed amendment.
This section is repealed as of the effective
date of the amendment rather than as of the
second Tuesday in January, 1965, when justice
of the peace courts are abolished, because
there is sufficient legislation to cover
these courts and their jurisdi_Etion.

Section a;, Jutj $dicHon.--Justices
of the peac• shall have such jurisdiction as
may be confttfed by law, but they shall not
have jurisdiction of any tase wherein the
value of the property dt the ameurit in controversy exceeds the •uffi df thtee hundred
dollars. nor where the boundaries dt title
to real property shall be called in question.
Section 26. How creat~d••iw;:iJdictiqg,••
The general assemb!yshallave power to pro•
vide for creating such police magistrates for
cities and towns as may be deemed from time to
time necessary or expedient, who shall have
jurisdiction of all cases arising under the
ordinances of such cities and towns respectively.

•
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ThTs section is repealed because the
authority to create such courts is contained
in Section 1 of the proposed amendment.
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT

Section 27. Judges to Tepo 1t defects in
laws--governor !.2 tfansmit.-- he Judges of
courts of record in erior to the supreme court
shall on or before the first day in July, in
each year. report in writing to the judges of
the supreme court such defects and omissions
in the laws as their knowledge and experience
may suggest. and the judges of.the supreme
court shall, on or before the first day of
December of each year report in writing to
the governor. to be by him transmitted to the
general assembly, together with his message,
such defects and omissions in the constitution
and laws as they may find to exist, together
with appropriate bills for curing the same.
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CO,.•J.\ENTS
This section is repealed as its
purpose can be accomplished by statute.
if desired.

Section 16. County judghs--election-term--qualifications.--In eac county there
shall be elected by the electors thereof in
the year 1964, and every four years thereafter, one or more judges of the county court
as may be provided by law, whose term .of office
shall be four years, and whose qualifications
shall be prescribed by law. Such judges shall
be qualified electors of their counties at the
time of their election or appointment.

Section 16 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 22 of the present judicial
article and applies to the election, term,
and qualifications of county judges. Under
this section it will be possible for counties
to have more than one county judge as provided by law. Additional county judges will
be necessary in several counties because of
the volume of justice court cases and/or
convenience to litigants and defendants.
This section also provides that county
judges' qualifications shall be set by
statute, which would make it possible to
have lawyer judges in the larger counties.

Section 17. County courts--iurisdiction-appeals,--County courts shall have such civil,
criminal, and appellate jurisdiction as may be
provided by law, provided such courts shall not
have jurisdiction of felonies or in civil cases
where the boundaries or title to real property
shall be in question. Appellate review by the
supreme court or the district courts of every
final judgment of the county courts shall be
as provided by law.

Section 17 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 23 of the present judicial
article and applies to county court jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction would be limited
to misdemeanors and civil cases not involving
title to or boundaries of real property. This
jurisdiction is similar to that of present
justice courts, except that no constitutional
monetary limit is set in civil actions. Such
monetary limits would be set by statute and
could be varied according to economic conditions without constitutional change. This
section also provides for appellate jurisdiction as set by statute. This provision
would make it possible for municipal court
cases to be reviewed by the county courts.
Appeals from the county court may lie to
either the district court or the supreme
court as provided by law.

PRES~NT JUDICIAL ARTICLE

Section 28. Laws relating to courts-uniform.--All laws relating to courts shall
be general and of uniform operation throughout
the state: and t:1e organization, jurisdiction,
powers, proceedings and practice of all the
courts of the same class or grade, so far as
regulated by law, and the force and effect of
the proceedings. judgements and decrees of
such courts severally shall be uniform.

....

,.,,j

PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT

COMMENTS

Section 18. Compensation and services.
Justices of the supreme court, d!strict judges,
probate judges, juvenile judges, and county
judges shall receive such compensation as may
be provided by law, which may be increased
during their terms of office, and shal.l receive
such pension or retirement benefits as may be
provided by law. No supreme court justice,
district court judge, probate judge, juvenile
judge, or county court judge shall accept
nomination for .any public office other than
judicial, the term of which shall begin more
than thirty days before the end of his term
of office, without first resigning from his
judicial office, nor shall he hold at any
other time any other public office during
his term of office, nor· hold office· in any
political party organization, No supreme
court justice, district court judge,
probate judge, or juvenile judge shall
engage in the practice of law. District
judges, probate judges, juvenile judges,
and county judges possessing the qualifications of district judges, when called
upon to do so, may serve in any state court
with full authority as provided by law. Any
county judge may serve in any county court
or as a municipal judge or police magistrate
as provided by law,

Section 18 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 18 of the present judicial
article. The present section provides that
salaries may be increased or decreased
during judges' terms of office. The proposed section provides only for increases
during judges' terms of office.
Judges of all state courts are prohibited from holding or running for a nonjudicial public office without resigning
their judicial positions. Judges of all
courts except the county court are prohibited from practicing law. District,
probate, juvenile, and qualified county
judges are permitted to sit for each other.
County judges may serve in other county
courts or as municipal judges or police
magistrates as provided by law.

Section 19. Laws relating to courts-uniform. All lawsreTating to state courts
shall be general and of uniform operation
throughout the state, and the organization,
jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and
practice of all courts of the same class,
and the force· and effect of the proceedings,
judgments
and decrees of such courts
severally shall ·be uniform. County courts
may be classified or graded as may be provided by law, and the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings., and practice
of county courts within the same class or
grade, and the force and effect of the proceedings, judgments
and decrees of county
courts in the same class or grade shall be
uniform.

Section 19 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 28 of the present judicial
article. This section also specifies that
county courts may be classified by group
and that as long as organization. jurisdiction, and procedures are the same within
each class there is rib violation of uniformity.
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT

Section 29. ~here officers must reside-vacancies.--All officers provided"'"1or in this
article, excepting judges of the supreme court,
shall respectively reside in the district,·
county, precinct. city or town for which they
may be elected or 3ppointed. Vacancies occurring in any of the offices provided for in
this 3rticle shall be filled by appointment as
follows: Of judges of the supreme and district
courts. by the governor: of district attorneys.
by the judge of the court of the district for
which such attorney was elected: and of all
other judicial officers, by the board of county
corrn:1issioners of the county wherein the vacancy occurs. Judges of the supreme, district and
county courts appointed under the provisions
of this section shall hold office until next
gener3l election and until their successors
elected thereat shall be duly qualified.

Section 20. Vacancies. (1) Vacancies
occurring in any of the elective judicial
offices of the supreme court, district courts,
probate court of the city and county of Denver,
and the juvenile court of the city and county
of Denver shall be filled by appointment of the
governor. Judges appointed under the provisions
of this section to elective judicial offices
shall hold office until the next general
election and until their successors elected
thereat shall be duly qualified. Such
successors shall be elected for a full term
to their respective offices.
(2) Vacancies occurring in the office
of county judge of any county shall be filled
by appointment of th~ county commissioners of
such county. County judges appointed under
the provisions of this section shall hold
office until the next general election and
until their successors elected thereat shall
be duly qualified. Such successors shall be
elected for a full term to their respective
offices.
(3) Other vacancies occurring in judicial
offices shall be filled as now or hereafter
provided by law.
(4) Vacancies occurring in the office of
district attorney shall be filled by appointment of the governor. District attorneys
appointed under the provisions of this section
shall hold office until the next general election and until their successors elected thereat
shall .be·duly·qualified. Such successors shall
be elected for the remainder of the unexpired
term in which the vacancy was created.
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Section 20 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 29 of the present judicial
article with some significant changes:
1) The Denver Probate Court and the Denver
Juvenile Court have been added to the list
of judicial vacancies to be filled by the
governor. 2) Judges appointed to fill
vacancies would hold office only until the
first general election as at present, but
their successors would be elected for a
full term rather than for the expiration
of the term in which the vacancy is created.
3) The provision as to residency has been
eliminated as it is covered in other sections
of the proposed amendment. 4) Vacancies in
the office of district attorney .->uld be
filled by the governor rather than by the
judges of the district courts in which such
vacancies were created. Vacancies in the
office of county judge would be filled by
county connnissioners' appointments as at
present, but the duly elected successor would
be elected for a full term rather than for
the unexpired term as at prese'l'lt.
The provision allowing a successor to
be elect~d for a full term rather than for
the remainder of the unexpired term was
included for two reasons. First, it would
have the effect ultimately of staggering
judicial terms so that it would not be
necessary to elect a large number of judges
at one time. Second, it might encourage
qualified men to accept appointment if they
know they can run for a full term rather
than for two to four years and then be faced
with another election. The change in filling
vacancies in the office of district attorney
was also motivated by two factors: first,
the difficulty of filling such vacancy in
two-judge districts where the judges are of
opposite political parties; and second, the
questionable desirability of having district
attorneys appointed by judges before whom
they will appear.

'

PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE

PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT
Section 21. Rule makidg power. The
supreme court shalr"'iiiake an promulgate rules
governing the administration of all courts and
shall make and promulgate rules governing
practice and procedure in civil and criminal
cases. except that the general assembly shall
have the power to provide simplified procedures in county courts for claims not
exceeding $500 and for the trial of
misdemeanors.

~
~

Section 30. Process--run in name of
oeople.~-All process shall run in the name
of "The People of the State of Colorado;"
all prosecutions shall be carried on in
the name and by the authority of "The
People of the State of Colorado." and
conclude, "against the peace and dignity
of the same."
Section 31. Retirement of judges.--Any
judge of any court now existing in the state
of Colorado. or hereafter created, shall be
retired from office if found permanently
disabled, by reason of mental or physical
infirmities. from performing the duties of
his of:ice. Issues c0~cerning retirement
for disability shall be initiated by motion
of the attorney general to the supreme court
for investigation concerning the permanent
disability of such j1Jdge, whereupon said
court may appoint a referee who shall have
authority to subpoena witnesses and make
full investigation and submit his report
thereon to the court. In the event the
court shall determine such judge to be so
permanently disabled. he shall be retired
with such pension or retirement benefits as
he would have re~eived had he fully completed
his then term of office. Upon such retirement his office shall be deemed vacant and
be filled as provided by law.

ii
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Section 21 of the proposed amendment
is not in the present judicial article
except for the provision in Section 2 that
the supreme court has general superintending
control over all courts. (This provision
is also incorporated in Section 2 of the
proposed amendment.) This proposed section
gives the supreme court authority to promulgate rules governing administration of
all courts and for civil and criminal
practice and procedure with one exception.
The general assembly is given the authority
to provide simplified procedures in county
courts for small civil cases and minor
misdemeanors. This provision makes it
possible to provide simplified procedures
for cases fonnerly within the jurisdiction
of justice courts.

Process--prosecution--in
In all prosecutions for
violations of the laws of Colorado, process
shall run in the name of "The People of the
State of Colorado;" all prosecutions shall
be carried on in the name and by the authority
of "The People of the State of Colorado,• and
conclude, "against the peace and dignity of
the same."

Section 22 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 30 of the present judicial
article. This section has been limited to
violations of state law, so that it is clear
that in violations of ordinances tried in
municipal courts, process shall run in the
name of the people of the respective city
or town.
•

Section 23. Retirement of judges. Any
judge of any court now existing in the state
of Colorado, or hereafter created, shall be
retired from office if found permanently disabled, by reason of mental or physical infirmities, from performing the duties of his
office. Issues concerning retirement for
disability shall be initiated by motion of
the attorney general to the supreme court for
investigation concerning the permanent disability of such· judge, whereupon said court
may appoint a referee who shall have authority
to subpoena witnesses and make full investigation and submit his report thereon to the
the court. In proceedings against a justice
of the supreme court under this section, such
justice shall be disqualified from sitting as
~ judge.
In tne event the court shall determine such judge to be so permanently disabled,
he shall be retired •ith such pension or retirement bene-fits as he would have received
had he fully completed his then term of office.
Upon such reti~ament his office shall be deemed
vacant and be filled as provided by law.

Section 23 of the proposed amendment
replaces Section 31 of the present judicial
article with the restriction added that in
proceedings against a justice of the supreme
court under this section. such justice shall
be disqualified from participating in the
decision.

~

Section 22.

COMMENTS
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PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE
Article XIV. Section 11. Justices of the
peace--con~tables.--There shall oe elected at"'"
the same time at which members of the general
assembly are elected, beginning with the year
nineteen hundred and four. two justices of the
peace and two constables in each precinct in
each county. who shall hold their office for a
term of two years: provided, that in precincts
containing fifty thousand (50,000) or more inhabitants, the number of justices and constables
may be increased as provided by law. The term
of offices of all justices of the peace that
expires in January. 1904, is hereby extended
to the second Tuesday in January, 1905, This
section shall govern, except as hereafter
otherwise expressly directed. or permitted
by constitutional enactment •
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT
Section 24. Justices of 1ll!. ~ - constables, Effective on the s,econa Tuesday
in January, 1965, all justice of the peace
courts shall cease to exist, and as of said
date, Section 11 of Article XIV of the
constitution of the state of Colorado shall
be repealed, and no justices of the peace or
constables shall be elected at the general
election held in 1964.

)
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COMMENTS
The proposed amendment also includes
repeal of Article XIV, Section 11 of the
constitution. This section refers to
justices of the peace and constables and
would be repealed effective the second
Tuesday of January, 1965, when justice of
the peace courts would be terminated.

'

APPENDIX E
BILL NO.

BY

A BILL FOR AN ACT
CONCERNING PUBLIC DEFENDERS.
Be It Enacted e:t. the General As$embly Q.f. the State Qi Colorado:
SECTION 1.

Definitions.

As used in this act, unless the

context clearly indicates otherwises
(1)

The term ~governing authority" shall mean the board of

county commissioner& in the case of a county, and the city council
in the oase of a city and county.
(2)

The term "county" shall include a city and county.

SECTION 2.
public defender.

Permissive authority to establish office of
In any county the governing authority may establish

the office of public defender.

A county may join with one or more

other counties to establish one office of public defender to serve

....

those counties.
Comment*
Provision for securing counsel for indigents charged with
criminal offenses has been accomplished in various patterns:
1.

By statute setting up the office
a. as mandatory for every county;
b. as permissive for every county;
c. as mandatory in counties of a stated population
and permissive for others.

*Comments are those of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to the equivalent sections of the Model Defender
Act approved by the Conference in 1959. The Colorado Defender Act
is substantially the same as the Model Defender Act.
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2.

Appointment by the court in individual cases with
compensation
a. under legislative scale;
b. fixed by the appointing court.

3.

By le9al aid and defender organizations in certain
~unicipalities supported by public funds, private
philanthropy,.or both.

'J

It seems wise, therefore, to create the office by an enabling
act with the county as the appropriate unit, so that local requirements and wishes can be carried out.
Throughout the act• the county is made the governmental unit.
In some jurisdictions this will necessarily require changes.
SECTION 3.
.,,ii

S~lection ~nd qualification of public defender -

represent intjig!nt,eersons.

(1)

The public defender shall be a

qualified attorn~y licensed to practice law in this state, selected
by the governing authority in the case of a county, or by the mayor
in the case of a city and county.

The public defender shall repre-

sent, without charge, each indigent person who is under arrest or
charged with

·-

a

crime, including such offenses under municipal codes

as he may, in his discretion, determine, if:

,..,.

\

\...

a.

The defendant requests it; or

b.

The court, on its own motion or otherwise, so orders and
the defendant does not affirmatively reject of record the

I"'-

opportunity to be so represe~ted •

...
(2)

\.,.

The determination of indigency shall be made by the

public defender, s~bject to review by the court.

\

·-

\

...

Comment

,

, It is r~cognized that the criminal codes of the several states
vary widely with respect to what specific acts constitute offenses
against the state. Therefore, it should be left to each jurisdiction
to determine what crimes are to be covered in this act.

'

Careful thought should be given to the method of selecting the
public defender. A ~ethbd oth~t th~n by electi~n will shield the

\_
- 187 -

\,....,

\

\

_,

'
public defender from the hazards and expense of campaigning for
office. In some jurisdictions, a judicial selection is made; in
others, the public defender is chosen by the legislative division.
Sometimes he is under civil service.
If local conditions are such that election of the public
defender must be the method of selection in order to get the bill
passed, additional safeguards may be set up.
Many lawyers who have studied the various defender systems
feel tnat the method of selecting the official is the key to the
success of the plan. The objective, whatever the method, is to
make certain that 11ot only a qualified lawyer holds the position
but that he will also have the independence to serve his clients
with complete professional loyalty.
Former drafts embodied the thinking that it was appropriate
to pattern the office after its so-called counterpart, the office
of the prosecuting attorney, and subject to the sa$e restrictions
respecting salary, private practice, etc. Debate has shown this
provision to be inelastic, difficult to create, and provacative of
.controversy.
SECTION 4.

Term of public defenge; - assistant attorneys and

employees - compensation.

(1)

The term and compensation of the

public defender shall be fixed by the governing authority.
(2)

The public defender may appoint as many assistant

attorneys, clerks, investigators, stenographers, and, other
employees as the governing authority considers necessary to enable
him to carry out his responsibilities.

.,;,

Appointments under this

section shall be made in the manner prescribed by the governing
authority.

An assistant attorney must be· a qualified attorney licensed

~

to practice law in this state.
(3)

The compensation of persons appointed under subs~ction

(2) of this section shall be fixed by the governing authority.
Comment
This section should be flexible enough to cover jurisdictions
of varying size and population, as some counties may need only a
part-time defender while others may require more than one lawyer and
additional clerks, etc., on the staff. In the more populous counties,
the effectiveness of the office will be greatly reduced unless there
is provision for an investigator.
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SECTION 5.

Dpties of public defender.

When representing an

indigent person, the public defender shall (1) counsel and defend
him, whether he is held in custody or charged with a criminal
offense, at every stijge of the proceedings following atTest; and

.,.

-

(2) prosecute any appeals or other remedies before or after conviction that he considers \o be in the interest of justice •

.....

~gmrnent
Thi$ wide authority is given to permit the defender to represent indigent clients at every stage of the proceedings and to
appear for those charged with felonies and misdemeanors. One of
the chief criticisms of the assigned counsel system is that the
defendant's lawyer is selected too late in the proceedings to
render the most effective $ervice. Too, there are many situations
where indigent defendants with misdemeanor charges need a lawyer
as much as thoae facing more $erious offenses. This is particularly
true where the defendant is young or is a first offender, and in
jurisdictions where misdemeanors carry a heavy penalty •

•

SECTION 6.
defender.
•

.,.

Appointment of other attorney in place of public

For cause, the court may, on its own motion or upon the

application of the public defender or the indigent person, appoint
an attorney other than the public defender to represent him at any
stage of the proceedings or on appeal.

The attorney shall be

awarded reasonable compensation and reimbursement for expenses

•

necessarily incurred, to be fixed by the court and paid by the county.
Comment

s ..

•
•

It seems d,e·sirable to provide a pl.an for handling those cases
where· a conflict of interest or other legitimate reason makes 1 t
desirable to appoint counsel other than the public defender •

SECTION 7.

Report of public defender.

The public defender

~hall make an annual report to the governi~g authority covering
all cases handled by his offlce during the preceding year.

.

.
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Comment

•

This requirement is self-explanatory, Th~ justification of
the office as well as a history of its efficiency makes this regulation
a requisite.
SECTION 8,
by counties.

,.

Office space. equipment. etc, - expenses - sharing

The governing authority in the case of a county, and

the mayor in the case of a city and county, shall provide office
space, furniture, equipment, and supplies for the use of the public
defender suit~ble fot the conduct of the business of his office.
However, the governing authority in any case may provide for an
allowance in place of facilities,

4

Each such item is a -charge

against ~he county in which the services were rendered.

If the

public defender serves more than one county, e~penses that are

....

properly allocable to the business of more than one of those counties
shall be prorated among the counties concerned, as shell be agreed
upon by the governing authorities of the counties concerned.

.

Comment
If the defender serves more than one county, the last two
sentences are desirable to clarify the division of cost and expense.
SECTION 9.

Absence of office of public defender.

If the

governing authority does not create the office of public defender

'

•

then, at county expense, either
(1)

The services prescribed by this act shall be provided by

a qualified attorney appointed by the court in each case and awarded
reasonable compensation and expenses by the court; or
(2)
through

The servi~es prescribed by this act shall be provided

• A

nonprofit legal aid or defender organizations designed

by the governing authbrity, which organizations may be awarded
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